n relation to the mind, propositions are discussed primarily as they fit into propositional attitudes. Propositional attitudes are simply attitudes characteristic of folk psychology (belief, desire, etc.) that one can take toward a proposition (e.g. it is raining, snow is white, etc.). In English, propositions usually follow folk psychological attitudes by a that clause (e.g. Jane believes that it is raining). In philosophy of mind and psychology, mental states are often taken to primarily consist in propositional attitudes. The propositions are usually said to be the mental content of the attitude. For example, if Jane has a mental state of believing that it is raining, her mental content is the proposition it is raining. Furthermore, since such mental states are about something (namely propositions), they are said to be intentional mental states. Philosophical debates surrounding propositions as they relate to propositional attitudes have also recently centered on whether they are internal or external to the agent or whether they are mind-dependent or mind-independent entities (see the entry on internalism and externalism in philosophy of mind).
Posted on: Thu, 05 Jun 2014 00:05:34 +0000
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