-Another Catholic Club Alumnus Magnificat Catholic High School Graduate, Former Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Judge Bridgett McCafferty; Ex-Judge Isnt Disbarred from the Practice of Law for Life: Ohio Supreme Court Junior Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger dissenting: I do not see how the majority can square a sanction of a mere indefinite suspension with its statements that “[t]his court has stated that judges are held to the highest possible standard of ethical conduct,” and that “ ‘ “judges are held to higher standards of integrity and ethical conduct than attorneys or other persons not invested with the public trust,” ’ ”I disagree that Bridget McCafferty’s case should be distinguished from other cases in which a judge has been disbarred. She has been convicted of a felony, as were the judges...(...cited in the majorities opinion) We are to consider all the circumstances surrounding her conduct in determining what sanction should be imposed for these disciplinary violations. McCafferty was convicted on multiple counts of lying to FBI agents about conversations with people who were the subject of a county-wide corruption investigation. Those conversations, which the FBI intercepted, revealed that she had used or intended to use her influence in cases in her courtroom to advance the interests of Frank Russo, Jimmy Dimora, and a local businessman. This misconduct strikes at the very heart of the judiciary. And it is not conduct that we can ignore, as the majority opinion attempts to do. The majority focuses solely on McCafferty’s conversation with FBI agents and paints her conduct as a one-time, brief lapse in judgment. This narrow characterization is simply untrue; McCafferty’s misconduct was more prolonged and more egregious than the majority admits. Months before she ever spoke to the FBI, McCafferty was swaying judicial outcomes for political associates and giving special consideration to high-ranking politicians. There can be no dispute that this conduct occurred. McCafferty’s criminal indictment outlined her involvement with Dimora and Russo, and she stipulated, at her disciplinary hearing, to engaging in the conduct described in the indictment. Even without this clear stipulation, her convictions alone would still establish an irrebuttable presumption that this particular misconduct occurred. We must therefore presume that she grossly abused her judicial position for political favor. There can also be no dispute that this misconduct is part of the case before us. The disciplinary complaint specifically charged McCafferty with violations of Jud.Cond.Rules “A judge shall not abuse the prestige of judicial office to advance the personal or economic interests of the judge or others, or allow others to do so” and “A judge shall not permit family, social, political, financial, or other interests or relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or judgment.” Both of these rule violations relate to her abuse of office and her involvement with Russo and Dimora. It therefore makes no sense for the majority to claim that McCafferty’s misuse of her position is “not a part of the instant case.” If it formed the basis for her rule violations—violations which the majority upholds—then it is clearly part of this case and we must consider it in imposing our sanction.We have stated that “[w]hen a judge’s felonious conduct brings disrepute to the judicial system, the institution is irreparably harmed,” and the judge deserves “the full measure of our disciplinary authority.” If the primary purposes of judicial discipline are to protect the public, guarantee the evenhanded administration of justice, and to bolster public confidence in the institution, then nothing short of disbarment should be imposed in this case. (1.) Cuyahoga County ex-judge McCafferty isnt disbarred for life. There was never a trial for former Cuyahoga County Auditor Frank Russo because he entered a plea agreement in the Cuyahoga County corruption scandal, then testified against others. He is now in prison for 21 years. There was an epic trial for former Cuyahoga County Commissioner Jimmy Dimora, one that lasted over a two-and-a-half-month span in U.S. District Court in Akron. It ended with him being convicted and sentenced to almost 28 years in prison. He was in prison nearby but was transferred to federal prison in Victorville, California a few months ago for unknown reasons. But before there was a Dimora trial, two Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court Judges were put on trial for their parts in the Cuyahoga County corruption probe. One was Judge Steven Terry and the other was Judge Bridget McCafferty. McCafferty was convicted of lying to FBI agents. Terry was also found guilty and sentenced to prison. McCaffertys trial was in August 2011, six months before Dimoras trial began. For McCafferty, she was sentenced by U.S. District Court Judge Sara Lioi to 14 months in federal prison in Alderson, affectionately known as Camp Cupcake. Its where Martha Stewart served her prison term.McCafferty looked completely shocked when the jury found her guilty and just a little bit shocked when she was sentenced to prison instead of probation. Today the Ohio Supreme Court indefinitely suspended McCaffertys law license. But it wasnt a unanimous decision. And Im not surprised at that. Voting for indefinite suspension were Justice William ONeill, Justices Paul E. Pfeifer, Terrence ODonnell, and Sharon L. Kennedy. Justice Judith Ann Lanzinger dissented in an opinion joined by Chief Justice Maureen OConnor and Justice Judith L. French. They wanted McCafferty disbarred. The Supreme Court released its 4-3 opinion to suspend her license instead of disbarring her and preventing her from practicing law ever again in Ohio. Justices favoring disbarment cited her behavior and relationships with Russo and Dimora. ONeill, who authored the courts majority opinion, noted that McCaffertys misuse of her judicial position was not charged in the federal criminal complaint against the judge, so that conduct was not part of the disciplinary case before the Supreme Court. In a release, Lanzinger spoke for the dissenters. I do not see how the majority can square a sanction of a mere indefinite suspension with its statements that [t]his court has stated that judges are held to the highest possible standard of ethical conduct, Justice Lanzinger wrote. In her view, the case deserved the full measure of the courts disciplinary authority. The majority focuses solely on McCaffertys conversation with FBI agents and paints her conduct as a one-time, brief lapse in judgment, Justice Lanzinger continued. This narrow characterization is simply untrue; McCaffertys misconduct was more prolonged and more egregious than the majority admits. Months before she ever spoke to the FBI, McCafferty was swaying judicial outcomes for political associates and giving special consideration to high-ranking politicians. There can be no dispute that this conduct occurred. McCaffertys criminal indictment outlined her involvement with [then-Cuyahoga County Commissioner James] Dimora and Russo, and she stipulated, at her disciplinary hearing, to engaging in the conduct described in the indictment. I covered her trial, as well as Terrys trial and Dimoras trial. All three shared one trait in common -- all staunchly and freely maintained their innocence. McCafferty went through the trial convinced she was going to be found not guilty and she often spoke to people outside the courtroom that she wasnt worried because she was innocent. Terry just sternly maintained he did nothing wrong and Dimora said he never did anything illegal. They were all wrong. Citations to Authorities: (1.) Ohio State Bar Assn. v. McCafferty, Slip Opinion No. 2014-Ohio-3075;(Judith Ann Lanzinger, J., dissenting) at ¶ 27-¶ 32 [Judges—Misconduct—Felony convictions—Lying to FBI agents—Conduct prejudicial to administration of justice—Conduct adversely reflecting on fitness to practice law—Violation of rules of Code of Judicial Conduct, including those prohibiting noncompliance with law and abuse of prestige of office—Indefinite suspension imposed, without credit for time served under interim felony suspension, to begin when term of federal supervised release is completed.] citing majority opinion at ¶ 16, citing Mahoning Cty. Bar Assn. v. Franko, 168 Ohio St. 17, 23, 151 N.E.2d 17 (1958), and Disciplinary Counsel v. Hoskins, 119 Ohio St.3d 17, 2008-Ohio- 3194, 891 N.E.2d 324, ¶ 42, majority opinion at ¶ 20, quoting Disciplinary Counsel v. O’Neill, 103 Ohio St.3d 204, 2004-Ohio-4704, 814 N.E.2d 286, ¶ 57, quoting SHAMAN, Lubet & Alfini, Judicial Conduct and Ethics 2 (3d Ed.2000). ...in Disciplinary Counsel v. Mosely, 69 Ohio St.3d 401, 632 N.E.2d 1287 (1994); Disciplinary Counsel v. Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d 51, 693 N.E.2d 1078 (1998); Disciplinary Counsel v. McAuliffe, 121 Ohio St.3d 315, 2009-Ohio-1151, 903 N.E.2d 1209See BCGD Proc.Reg. 10(B); Hoskins at ¶ 79.See Gov.Bar R.V(5)(B). Jud.Cond.R. 2.4;Jud.Cond.R.1.3.Majority opinion at ¶ 7. Gallagher, 82 Ohio St.3d at 53, 693 N.E.2d 1078.
Posted on: Sun, 20 Jul 2014 18:57:13 +0000
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