16 | Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament The Brotherhood’s early 2013 draft of legislation that would lower judges’ retirement age was particularly dangerous. It would have sent one-third of the judiciary into retirement overnight. It was suggested by some Brotherhood leaders that 3,000 lawyers from the general assemblies of Egyptian courts would be promoted as replacements, and it was feared by the rest that these replacements would be Muslim Brotherhood members or surrogates. An uproar by the judiciary and public was enough to block the Muslim Brotherhood’s project, but the resulting loss of credibility and public resentment at the Brotherhood’s hegemonic agenda was incontrovertible. Incompetent pol - icymaking and ill-advised, premature bids for hegemony earned the Brothers more determined enemies. Violence Beyond harsh political and legislative practices, the Muslim Brotherhood gov - ernment under Morsi more or less retained Mubarak-era crony capitalism; rentier policies; reliance on foreign loans; and neglect of structural economic reform, social justice, and sustainable development. Furthermore, in addi - tion to public relations disasters, the Muslim Brotherhood was involved in disseminating hate speech against the religious, sectarian, and political other. The Brothers either perpetrated such acts or tolerated the perpetrators who belonged to more extreme Islamic movements, creating a climate conducive to further violence-prone sectarian and political hatred. And violence did happen, including Muslim Brotherhood attacks on dem - onstrators in Tahrir Square in October 2012 and an attack by the Brothers on their opponents in front of the presidential palace on December 5, 2012. In addition, there were frequent Muslim Brotherhood crackdowns on the opposi - tion and bystanders during protests and demonstrations that rocked the coun - try in January and February 2013. Sectarian attacks against Copts and Shia were also reported. From November 2012 onward, the country, amid this atmosphere of intense political and social polarization, was slipping into low-intensity but steady civil strife on different axes of confrontation—the Muslim Brotherhood against the opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood against the common people, the Islamists against the Shia, and the Islamists against the Copts. This wreaked havoc on political stability, the economy, and security. Placating the Old State The Muslim Brotherhood also tried to appease old state institutions and inter - ests, which it deemed necessary to achieve its long-term objective of infiltrating the state and eventually taking it over. The Brothers tried to pacify the old state institutions through constitutional changes and policy packages. The military got what it wanted in the imbalanced civil-military relations outlined in the 2012 constitution. The constitution exempted the military Ashraf El-Sherif | 17 budget from any parliamentary oversight, securing the army’s economic empire. Other articles in the 2012 constitution granted the military-domi - nated national defense council veto power over questions of war, peace, and national security. Finally, the document approved of military trials for civilians and legitimized courts-martial as a judicial institution. Moreover, Morsi’s government and the Muslim Brotherhood–dominated par - liament refrained from carrying out any transitional justice projects, to the dis - may of many revolutionary movements. Demands for restructuring the Ministry of Interior and making the police force accountable for atrocities committed before, during, and after the January 2011 uprising were rebuffed, despite rheto - ric to the contrary. Morsi’s government also doubled the police budget and paid lip service to the top military and police commanders in terms of promotions and appointments within the Ministry of Interior (mostly keeping the old guard untouched). As just one example, Khaled Tharwat, appointed by Morsi as the new leader of the Egyptian Homeland Security (the successor of the infamous State Security Investigations Service), was the head of the religious activities department in the state security intelligence service in the 1990s. Morsi awarded Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi and General Sami Hafez Anan—the two top military commanders in the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), which ruled Egypt immediately after Mubarak’s overthrow—the most prestigious national medals of honor after they were removed from office in August 2012. That recognition sent a disheartening message to the Egyptian people. There was no talk of bringing them to justice for the almost 200 people killed while the SCAF was in power. Even Morsi’s reshuffling of SCAF leaders, initially hailed by the Muslim Brotherhood’s media as “an end of military rule,” was ostensibly carried out in coordination with the military institution and the second-tier SCAF leaders. 8 The Brothers also refrained from taking any serious steps to restructure the procedures related to recruitment, employment, and promotion within state institutions. In reality, their goal was to maintain the existing system while gradually plac - ing their own people inside it. The Muslim Brotherhood government also tried to accommodate the old business class. The Brotherhood continued Mubarak-era economic policies and professed a reluctance to significantly shift wages, taxation, public expenditure, or fiscal policies. It was also willing to normalize relations with Mubarak-era businessmen charged with corruption. The Muslim Brotherhood’s pro-free- market and consumerist ideology and activities paved the way for this eco - nomic policy. In fact, members of the Brotherhood said that they believed that Mubarak-era economic policies could be successful if implemented by uncor - rupted leaders like the Brothers themselves. Despite populist Islamist rhetoric, Morsi’s government caved in the face of the past. 18 | Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament The Muslim Brotherhood’s Fall None of these tactics was effective. By 2013, the Brotherhood regime had earned the wrath of the pro-democracy revolutionary movements and many of the common people. Its attempts to accommodate the old state institutions and networks failed miserably, and the Brotherhood did not set in motion a broad right-wing conservative political and social coalition. This grand failure was dangerously consequential because, after an ini - tial experimental period, the old state switched its allegiances. The old elites rebuffed Muslim Brotherhood bids for partnership and cooperation and instead threw their weight behind the opposition, capitalizing on anti–Muslim Brotherhood popular protest that climaxed in the June 2013 demonstrations. Two factors were key to this failure. First, the Muslim Brotherhood did not successfully form political coalitions, even on non-antagonistic issues. That was clear when they were unable to win over non-Islamist political movements and state institutions during the 2012 constitution-drafting process, in the formation of Morsi’s cabinet, and in the formation of 2011 parliamentary elec - toral coalitions. Second, the ideological and organizational characteristics of the Muslim Brotherhood left them uneasy bedfellows with the old state institutions. As a social and religious sect, the Muslim Brotherhood is not easily accessible or inclusive of partners and clients. Recruitment and membership is a lengthy process of ideological qualification, social commitment, and exclusive identi - fication with the group as the Muslim Brotherhood’s big family. Hence, the Brothers’ identification with the clients of the old state patronage networks is rather limited. The Muslim Brotherhood with its Freedom and Justice Party could not be a functional replacement of the Mubarak regime’s ruling party, which united the state institutions, prominent families and notables, and patronage networks. A self-centered and closed group like the Muslim Brotherhood, with a holis - tic ideology of a “new Islamic state,” was understandably suspicious in the eyes of its supposed power partners, that is, the old state institutions of the military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy. The specter of the Muslim Brotherhood’s infiltration of the state haunted these institutions. The Brothers’ bid to form a new political ruling class, led by an alliance with the old state institutions, was seen by these state institutions and by worried non-Islamist politicians and common people as the Brotherhood’s conquest of the state. A decades- long legacy of anti-Islamism among the old state institutions, in addition to divergent worldviews and disagreements on the notions of national interest, national security, and national unity, all rendered a partnership between the Muslim Brotherhood and the old state unrealizable. Old state forces decided to act against the Muslim Brotherhood regime, but not because of their hatred of the Brotherhood’s reformist project of change. Rather, they saw an overly Ashraf El-Sherif | 19 greedy Muslim Brotherhood prove to be an utter failure at co-opting partners and accommodating the old state in a satisfactory way. The Brothers were too greedy and reckless in asserting themselves politi - cally. Domination over the parliament was not enough; they viewed the presidency as indispensable to securing their ruling scheme, understandable given the important historical role of the president as the boss in the Egyptian political system. But putting forward a candidate for president was ill-advised. It raised fears among the state institutions and the non-Islamist opposition, thereby scuttling any bids for appeasement of or partnership with the state. The move was particularly unwise given the imbalance of power between the Brotherhood and the state fiefdoms, principally the military, police, judiciary, and bureaucracy. These state fiefdoms remained the key power holders in the country. The Brotherhood effectively hindered the creation of a functioning new version of authoritarianism. With the military, police, and judiciary on its side, the old state could knock the Brothers out. However, such a step needed popular support and backing from key nonstate actors, such as the business class, private media, political elites, prestigious national religious institutions (al-Azhar and the Coptic Church), and revolutionary movements. Ultimately, the old state was able to secure this support thanks to the Brothers’ policy of alienating all other actors. Of course, the Brotherhood regime commanded political support among con - siderable sectors of the population. These included Islamist constituencies who identified with the regime ideologically as well as those who tolerated Morsi’s undisputed blunders and incompetence in the name of safeguarding the infant “electoral democracy” in Egypt. Still, wide segments of the population were angry about the Morsi government’s failed economic policies and nonexistent progress regarding inflation, as well as declining living standards; deteriorating quality of public services; and daily energy, electricity, and fuel crises. Although many of these problems were structural and born of decades of the government’s developmental failures, the Brotherhood regime was blamed because it held the power. And the Brothers were not helped by the fact that their pompous electoral propaganda claimed that their “renaissance project” would bring immediate progress to Egypt, raising expectations. 9 Another source of public discontent was that the Brotherhood’s entry into power marked the apparent takeover of the country by a mafia-style, secretive, closed sect with convoluted and suspicious regional and internal extensions. That was outrageous in the eyes of a public saturated with classical legacies of nationalist pride and identity. Finally, many within the Egyptian urban middle and upper classes loathed what they saw as a threat to their lifestyles and an attempt to restrict their liberties as part of the long-term project of forced Islamization. Reacting to public dissatisfaction and increasingly isolated, the teetering Brotherhood regime fell back on its key ideological clientele and power base— the Islamist bloc, including the most retrograde Islamist factions, such as the 20 | Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament Salafists and jihadists. The Brotherhood began using aggressive, confronta - tionalist, and extremist Islamist discourse, launching a phony war from the podiums at Islamist demonstrations. This extreme discourse, in addition to reported incidents of physical violence against political opponents and religious and sectarian minorities, furthered political destabilization, societal polariza - tion, and economic instability. If they had been presented in a timely manner, meaningful concessions (such as changing the ineffectual Hisham Qandil’s cabinet, replacing the Morsi-appointed attorney general with a new independent one, or reforming electoral laws) could have de-radicalized the situation. But self-deluded and unaware of the full impact of polarization and mobilization and true to its ideology-shaped, zero-sum-game mentality, the Muslim Brotherhood declined all calls by domestic and international interlocutors for compromise and con - ciliation. Mobilizing the Islamist bloc behind Morsi along ideological lines had in effect rendered such compromises and concessions unmarketable and hence unrealizable among the Islamist grass roots. The headstrong and uncompromising Brotherhood regime stayed the course until the masses took to the streets in very large numbers on June 30, 2013, in defiance of the regime and demanding early presidential elections. This turn of the tides signaled the end of Morsi’s rule. Morsi declined the demand for early presidential elec - tions, killing any remaining chance for democratic recon - ciliation. The military launched a coup on July 3, taking power to contain the wave of anti-Morsi popular protests. Perennially obsessed with eternal martyrdom, the Brothers depicted their ouster as a result of a conspiracy, shaped by the Mubarak regime’s interests and spearheaded by a military coup against the popular will. However, the Brotherhood’s unsurprising downfall was actually an out - come of its ideological, organizational, and political structure, which left it unable to deal with the old state and relate constructively to the broader national, societal, and political crises and demands that triggered the January 2011 earth - quake. When the moment of truth came, the Brothers’ intellectual poverty, dearth of capable cadres, preference for loyalty over competence, and lack of experience or knowledge about the realities of the Egyptian state and society left them unable to act as a force for change in an unruly environment. In post-2011 Egypt, change can only be meaningful if it is comprehensive and deep. What Comes Next? To avoid larger-scale civil conflict or the more likely outcome of uncontrollable radical revolutionary politics that would have torn apart the old state, the armed forces had no option but to contain the mass movement and build a new political The Brotherhood’s unsurprising downfall was actually an outcome of its ideological, organizational, and political structure, which left it unable to deal with the old state and relate constructively to the broader national, societal, and political crises and demands. Ashraf El-Sherif | 21 process of counterrevolution. The new process is supposed to accomplish what the collapsed one failed to do. The success of this second process of counterrevo - lution as well as the path of the Islamists will both shape Egypt’s development. The Future of the Islamists The June 30 mass demonstrations, which were the largest anti-Islamist mass protests in Egypt’s history, marked the end of the hegemonic project of political Islam. This, of course, does not mean the end of Islamic movements in Egypt. If they are reintegrated, these movements will remain key political and social actors with recognizable constituencies and electoral capacities to be reckoned with in any competitive electoral contest and in the balance of political power in Egypt. But the June protests marked the demise of the attempt to dominate the state and public sphere as part of the broader goal of inheriting the old state and building an Islamic state controlled by Islamists, whether through the bal - lot box or the use of force. Islamist movements can maintain their political and ideological intransi - gence by participating in protest politics aimed at delegitimizing and destabi - lizing the current system in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist partners have chosen this path, and Islamist ideology and organizational style lean toward this contentious policy option. But the Islamists can also still hypothetically reach an agreement with the interim government and the military institutions to be included in the new system, hence ending the current protests and achieving political stability. To reach such an accord, they will have to agree to the new regime’s terms of inclusion: They must cease demonstrations. No bids for Islamist hegemony are to be tolerated. Ties between the Freedom and Justice Party and the closed, opaque society of the Muslim Brothers must be severed in reality, not just in rhetoric. The Brothers can be no more than first among political equals in the political and electoral fields. They must agree to have their key leaders brought to justice and expelled from their organization. And Islamists must respect the military’s redlines on national security and Egyptian identity. In return, the Brotherhood’s participation in politics will be tolerated and many of its mem - bers will be released. Practically, the acceptance of these terms would reduce the Brotherhood to a position of junior partnership with the military in the new political process, a significant demotion when compared with the 2011– 2013 political process when the lines were not clearly demarcated. The state could conceivably agree to such a setup, as Islam is already close to the state apparatus. The institutions of the old state often employed Islam to jus - tify their policies, and they manipulated both Islam and political Islamic move - ments to their advantage. General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, the army’s commander and Egypt’s strongman, was born into this tradition. Moreover, the state is cur - rently waging a war on terrorism in the name of centrist Islam represented by al- Azhar, the country’s premier religious institution, and the state itself. Al-Azhar, in 22 | Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament addition to the Salafist al-Nour Party, is one of the key actors within the current military-led road map. Al-Nour’s participation in the political process deprives the Brotherhood of an important part of its antiregime propaganda because the current political process cannot be dubbed anti-Islamist or anti–Islamic identity. The post-Morsi constitution-writing panel reasserted articles pertaining to the Islamic identity of the state, society, laws, and family and defining the authorita - tive position of al-Azhar in Islamic affairs. Furthermore, the old state’s pragmatism means that leaders understand the practical impossibility of excluding Islamists given their social base of sup - port, economic prowess, organizational power, and regional and international links. If not included, the Islamists can spoil any political process in Egypt. Including the Islamist movements in the state would also help move the national political conversa - tion away from the serious questions of resource realloca - tion, new economic policies, and state institutional reform because volatile Islamist-secularist identity debates would take center stage. Inclusion could mean the end of political instability and the start of economic recovery as well. Islamists and members of the old state that once found common ground are, however, currently more prone to belligerence than compromise. Cooperation will depend on the old state’s flexibility as well as the willingness of the Brothers to forgo their zero-sum game and mindset of existential conflict and to accept the regime’s terms of inclusion, which amount to effective political surrender. Most importantly, the current top priority for the Brotherhood is to maintain organizational unity. This is best achieved through an existential, polarized confrontation with the regime on the basis of an Islamist-secularist dichotomy, an appeal to Islamist mobilizing ideology, and a cult of martyrdom and suffer - ing, which will lead the grassroots supporters of the Brotherhood to coalesce behind their incumbent leadership. Making a deal with the regime now would create confusion among these masses, divide supporters, alienate non-Broth - erhood Islamists, and cause the Brotherhood leadership to lose credibility in the eyes of its members. A contentious issue is the fate of Brotherhood leaders and activists currently in jail. Reconciliation has become even harder given the regime’s brutal crackdown against the organization, which has left hundreds dead and led to thousands of unlawful arrests over the past few months. It is much harder now to market reconciliation to a weary body of Brotherhood sup - porters who seek justice in the name of the victims. Moreover, if the two sides do reconcile, defections could cripple the Brotherhood and members might finally hold their leaders accountable for their immense mistakes that brought down the Brotherhood regime. On the other hand, anti-Islamist enmity and a desire for vengeance among the ranks of the regime’s security institutions, in addition to the belief that the current situation presents a golden opportu - nity to deal the Brotherhood a crippling blow, prove that maximalist thinking exists on both sides. If not included, the Islamists can spoil any political process in Egypt. Ashraf El-Sherif | 23 Therefore, the option of reconciliation is highly unlikely in the near future, but not completely off the table. It will depend on the perseverance of both sides. The Brothers have officially made restoring Morsi as president one of their objectives, and although they might be aware that such an aim is practi - cally impossible, they may think they can still delegitimize the new military- led political process by continuing to protest. As a decentralized organization, with the help of its regional and international extensions, the Brotherhood is flexible enough to mount effective protests even with most of its key leaders in prison or outside of Egypt. The Brothers are likely attempting to hold out until popular attitudes shift because of the caretaker regime’s political mismanagement and economic fail - ures. If attitudes shifted, reconciliation with the military and the state could be achieved on much better terms for the Brotherhood. 10 Beyond reconciliation, the Muslim Brotherhood could attempt to become a nonhegemonic, center-right political and social actor that can advocate for a conservative cultural agenda and win shares of political power proportionate to its relative electoral fortunes within a system of consensual rules and values of liberal democracy (not just the procedural aspects of democracy). To do so, the organization would have to make systemic ideological and organizational changes, something that the current Brotherhood is unwilling to do. As long as the political polarization and confrontation between the Muslim Brotherhood and the state persists, the Brotherhood will maintain its existing ideological and organizational structure. The Brotherhood is in a dire situation. Any reconcili - ation must be on the regime’s terms, which would mean political surrender and the likely disintegration of the orga - nization. Its remaining option—to continue its protests, betting on tactical destabilization and hoping for some miraculous turn of events that could provide room for a comeback—represents a more face-saving alternative, even if the organization were to be ultimately crushed by the regime. The Brothers’ ideological culture of martyrdom, patience, and endless hope for a future comeback shapes their attitude, which favors this suicidal zero-sum game. Reconciliation with the regime and the Brotherhood’s political integration as a junior partner is still possible in the long run, but it will require additional time, clear political capitulation on the part of the Brotherhood, and a change in leadership on both sides. The Brotherhood can still survive the current regime’s onslaught. But in the event that the organization is completely crushed, there are two possibilities for the remaining Brothers. They might resort to hibernation and focus on apoliti - cal underground social and religious activities until conditions become ripe for rebuilding the organization. Alternatively, various factions of the Brotherhood Reconciliation with the regime and the Brotherhood’s political integration as a junior partner is still possible in the long run, but it will require additional time, clear political capitulation on the part of the Brotherhood, and a change in leadership on both sides.
Posted on: Thu, 25 Dec 2014 12:41:39 +0000
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