5 Figure 4: Example of a matrix C R The strategic behavior of both is the result of the choice to cooperate (C) or not cooperate (N), or the pair of the respective choices , For which the outcome (4,1) will be preferred from R to (1.4) 8 . In this perspective, the strategy N (not cooperate) is called the dominant strategy of R if in a 2x2 game with simultaneous choices the result of such behavior has a better outcome than that which would be obtained or otterebbe strategy through C (cooperate), while it is called Nash equilibrium 9 the situation it in which no player has an interest in being the only one to change strategy, as it is called Pareto optimality 10 the outcome where it is not possible to make any profit, even if each of the two actors unilaterally chose a different strategy, without worsening the situation of the . the difficulty of cor correspondence to reality, far from being static, the principle of dominant strategy has meant that game theory would explore other principles of rational choice aimed atinvestigate the structural aspects of the game to a more accurate analysis of the players preferences and their beliefs about these preferences. prisoners dilemma: the story of the life of the damned and deserved death of Doctor Iohn Faustus 11 and the arms race Those who constantly strives to advance, it is those one who can save. Goethes final chorus of angels in The Faust 8 (4.1) R does not cooperate and cooperate while C (1,4) C R cooperates and does not cooperate. 9 The name comes from m athematic John Nashwhich, while still a student at Princeton, he had the 1950 formula to the definition. The story of his genius is described in a famous book called Sylvia Nasar A Beautiful Mind , From which it is was the eponymous film. 10 Named after the famous Italian economist Vilfredo Pareto. 11 The title of the paragraph is taken from reasonably loan translation of 1592 PF Gentlemans story popular German Historia von D. Iohan Fausten , Announced later by Goethe (1772-1775): the protagonist in a wicked pact with the devil (Mephistopheles) in cam bio of her soul will receive the conos absolute license. C N C N (3,3) (4,1) (1,4) (2,2) 6 The prisoners dilemma is a classic example of game theory that denied the above said and adding the complete information among the actors, ie each player is perfectly informed of the context and de lle strategies of the opponent, or better than the other player, but not on his actions 12 Shows how two individuals are not inclined to cooperate even in the case of lora best choice. 13 The expedient which the model has the particular name is as follows: two criminals suspected of having committed a crime are put into two separate cells and is given the opportunity by the investigators to conclude a pact with the devil, or to confess 14 or less, according to these conditions: if they both decide to remain silent, they will receive a year in prison for less an indictment; if both confess, both will get a sentence of five years; if one confesses and the other remains silent, the first will be released while the other will be conviction to aten years. In the daunting as wretched attempt to immedisimazione is easy to notice that in front to impossibility of knowing exactly the work of the other player, the only interest is to minimize the length of time to spend in prison. In fact, if on the one hand Another actor confessed, in case we also obtained confessassimo rremo a minor penalty, dallaltr or even if the other remain silent, the best strategy would be to confess, however, as it could race ntirci freedom. The same speech should know the, ça va sans dire , Also for the other actor. The rational action the door in terms of self-interest, then, both to confess and serve as a penalty equal to detention. The paradox in this circumstance is that we may be in silence so as to guarantee us the minimum penalty, as evidenced by the representation of the game with a 2x2 matrix where cooperate (C) corresponds to remain silent and Not cooperate (N)to confess. 15 R then rank his preference according to the result in q uestordine: 4: N - R confesses and admits no C: R is released from prison; 12 In games withnformation perfect instead the actors know each other all the and moves and strategies of the other. 13 This problem of game theory was introduced in 1950 by two mathematicians Merrill Flood and Melvin M. Desher to a RAND Corporation study on conflict and cooperation . However, it is known today as dilemma prisoner due to the mathematical cana dese Albert W. Tucker. See William Poundstone, Prisoners Dilemma, John Von Neumann, Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb , Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992. 14 The peculiarity of the U.S. system known to the general public film allows the confession within the limits of the Miranda Warnings as pointed out by Allan D. Taylor and Allison M. Pacelli Mathematics and Politics: Strategy, Voting, Power and Proof , Cit., P. 117. 15 The logic of This correspondence carries with it the implicit intention of understanding co-operation with its partnersvisa that the assumption of paragraph is the possibility of a pact with devil, represented by judicial. 7 3: CC - Rdoes not confess as well as C: R gets a year; 2: NN - R andC confess: R gets five years; 1: CN - Rconfesses and admits C: R ottien a sentence of ten years. preferences will be the same for C in the case of CC and NN, while they will reverse in the remaining two, respectively 1 instead of 4 for the CN and CN as shown in figure 5. https://academia.edu/6254163/The_Logic_of_Conflict._Use_and_Methodological_Limits_of_Game_Theory
Posted on: Sat, 08 Mar 2014 00:37:44 +0000
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