Africa: Tunisia Special Report: Two years after Jasmine Revolution, Tunisia marked by turmoil More than two years after its Jasmine Revolution that lit the spark for the so-called Arab Spring, Tunisia was a country rocked by political violence, instability, and turmoil. At issue were the assassinations of two opposition politicians and the ensuing outrage from the Tunisian citizenry who were taking to the streets en masse. Attempts to dissolve tensions, via a meeting between the ruling party and political and labor leaders did not seem to yield many results. In fact, only a day after that meeting, the opposition was urging the government to resign. Indeed, by mid-August 2013, Tunisia had been catapulted into disarray and by September 2013, the Islamist government was finally assenting to the demands of secularist protesters and announcing its resignation. Going back to February 2013, the secular opposition leader, Chokri Belaid, was shot dead outside his house in Tunis. Belaid was a well-known critic of the governing Islamist Ennahda party. The ruling Ennhada party has come under fire for mismanagement of the Tunisian economy and its failure to deal with an increasingly strident Islamist movement. Indeed, there were some suggestions that despite its claim of being a voice of Islamic moderation, Ennahda was tacitly encouraging Islamic extremism in Tunisia. Just months later in July 2013, Mohamed Brahmi -- the leader of the nationalist Movement of the People party -- was shot to death outside his home in Tunis. Brahmis death was, thus, the second case of an opposition party leader being assassinated in 2013. While not as well-known an opposition figure as Balaid, Brahmi was nonetheless also a critic of the governing Islamist Ennahda Party. There was no claim of responsibility in either the case of Belaids assassination or the case of Brahmis assassination, however, the interior ministry noted that the two killings were related since the same semi-automatic weapon was used in both cases. There has been some suggestion that Salafists -- extremist Islamists -- were behind both attacks. In fact, Tunisian Interior Minister Lotfi Ben Jeddou was dropping strong hints that Abu Bakr el-Hakim, an extremist jihadist with links to Ansar al-Sharia -- a radical Salafist group regarded as a terrorist enclave -- was likely behind the two assassinations. As was the case after Belaids death, the killing of Brahmi was met with outrage among the Tunisian citizenry, and sparked massive protests. In February 2013, those protests led to the resignation of then-Prime Minister Hamadi Jebali. (Note: Jebali was succeeded by Ali Larayedh at the helm of an Ennahda-led government supported by two secular parties and a handful of independents). In mid-2013, after the assassination of Brahmi, fresh protests rocked Tunisia, and spread from outside the office of the Ministry of Interior in Tunis to the city of Sidi Bouzid, which was also Brahmis hometown. As well, several opposition parties announced their withdrawal from the national assembly and were demanding the resignation of the Ennahda-led government and its replacement with a national unity government. By the start of August 2013, the speaker of Tunisias National Constituent Assembly said he was suspending the bodys activities until there was progress made among the opposing parties. For its part, the governing Ennahda party rejected calls for the dissolution of the National Constituent Assembly along with demands that it resign from power and be replaced by a unity government. That being said, Ennahda conveyed its sadness and shock over the assassination of Brahmi and announced there would be a state funeral for Brahmi. The funeral did not seem to decrease the fervor of protesters who gathered outside parliament buildings in central Tunis, demanding an end to terrorism and violence, and compelling police to use tear gas in an effort to disperse the crowds. Bardo Square was becoming a gathering space for thousands of people in a show of outrage. The existence of people on the streets, outside the parliament buildings, and at Bardo Square, did not change the fact that an increasing number of Tunisians, particularly young people, were expressing their disillusionment with the 2011 Jasmine Revolution and the resulting Ennahda government. They were seeing that the ousting of former President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali had not resulted in the sought-for secular democracy, but instead, legitimized an Islamist government and unleashed an extremist Islamic movement. Of note, for example, was the introduction of unpopular religious laws. First, extremist Islamists took control over thousands of mosques in Tunisia. Originally under the control of the Religious Affairs Ministry, now the mosques were being transformed from quiet gathering places of prayer to venues where extremists could stridently demand jihad and Sharia (Islamic) law. Also of significance was the introduction of special regulations preventing non-Muslims from entering mosques. Now, only persons willing to declare There is no god but God and Mohammad is Gods messenger were being allowed to enter mosques, which were previously open to persons wishing to see the religious centers on cultural rather than religious grounds. The change essentially now required individuals to publicly convert to Islam in order to be admitted to mosques that were once viewed as cultural monuments. This slide towards more hardline and Islamist regulations in previously moderate Tunisia further raised the ire of young people and secularists who were central to the 2011 Jasmine Revolution. Combined with the deaths of the two opposition leaders discussed above, it was possible that hardline Islamist extremists were actually emboldened to go even greater lengths to advance their extremist agenda. As noted above, by mid-August 2013, there were attempts to dissolve tensions, with a meeting convened between the ruling party and a mix of political and labor leaders. Far from reaching a compromise agreement or auguring a breakthrough of some sort, the meeting instead led the labor union leadership to call for strikes and protests across the country. Then, a day after that meeting, an opposition coalition, known as the National Salvation Front, demanded that the Ennhada government resign from office. The coalition also called on governors and regional delegates associated with the ruling party to also step down. In fact, the opposition coalition took the provocative step of launching an actual movement to demand the resignation of Ennhada politicians and the installation of a national salvation government under the campaign slogan Erhal (Go Away). By the end of August 2013 and well into September 2013, thousands of opposition supporters rallied in the Tunisian capital Tunis, demanding the immediate resignation of the Islamist-led government. The new wave of protests had been organized by the opposition coalition, the National Salvation Front, and marked the 40 day mourning period over the death of opposition politician, Brahmi. The National Salvation Front along with other opposition and anti-Ennhada blocs promised further rallies and protests in the near future, while Ennhada itself said it would organize mass actions intended to highlight its legitimacy to govern. Meanwhile, the Ennhada government was clinging to power and refusing to step down. It was abundantly apparent that dissonance and division marked the mood in Tunisia. As September 2013 drew to a close, it was evident that the relentless demands from secularist protesters for the government to resign had taken its toll. The ruling Ennahda party finally announced that it would step down from power. Ennahdas resignation would, thus, set the stage for negotiations on the establishment of a caretaker government and elections would be in the offing. In fact, elections were already expected to take place later in 2013; however, these latest developments suggested that the precise schedule for elections were subject to change. By October 2013, Tunisias governing Islamist Ennahda party and the opposition had agree on a power transfer that would include the appointment of a caretaker government. The deal called for the establishment of a cabinet of technocratic independents to function in a caretaker capacity until fresh elections could be held. As noted above, elections were already set to take place later in 2013; however, the political crisis and ensuing agreement would affect the timeline of elections. Later in the month -- October 2013 -- the government launched a raid on Islamists that led to the deaths of several police officers and injuries to even more. The clash erupted when police raided a house where the suspected Islamic militants were hiding in Sidi Bouzid to the south of Tunis. The militants responded by opening fire and a gun battle between the two sides erupted, with deadly results. It was not known if the militants were from the banned hardline Salafist Islamist entity, Ansar al-Sharia, which has been suspected of carrying out the assassinations of the two opposition politicians discussed above. The bloodshed in Sidi Bouzid marked some of the worst violence in the country since the 2011 Jasmine Revolution took hold of the country, and occurred at an unfortunate time when negotiations were underway to transition the Islamist-led government from power. But in the last week of October 2013, the attention was focused on the eruption of clashes between police and Islamist militants, which ultimately led to the deaths of several police officers. The situation raised the alarm on the deteriorating stability in Tunisia and outraged Tunisians took to the streets across the country to register their anger over the deaths of the police officers and the governments insufficiently hardline response to the threat posed by Islamist extremists in Tunisia. Family members of the slain police officers went so far as to ban members of the ruling government from attending the funerals, while in Beja, to the west of the capital city of Tunis, protesters attacked the Ennahda office. As well, general strikes were launched in various cities, including Sidi Bouzid. Indeed, the deaths of the police officers appeared to have ignited a popular drive for the ruling governing Islamist Ennahda party to step down from power. In regards to that transition, despite announcing that the government would indeed resign from power, Prime Minister Ali Larayedh was, on Oct. 23, 2013, claiming that the government intended to complete its work on the countrys new constitution, the establishment of an electoral commission, and the scheduling of elections, before it actually resigned. This news was not met positively by the opposition and thousands of opposition activists took to the streets of Tunis to call for the immediate resignation of the Ennahda-led government. They emphasized their demand that the government resign ahead of the national dialogue, rather than prolonging its lock on power. A day later on Oct. 24, 2013, a leftist opposition coalition said it would withdraw from the national dialogue unless Prime Minister Ali Larayedh could confirm that his government would step down within three weeks. With that three week deadline stipulated, talks commenced on Oct. 25, 2013 between the governing Islamist Ennahda party and the opposition on the formation of a non-partisan caretaker government composed of technocrats and preparations for elections, including the establishment of an electoral commission. In and interview with the media, Ennahda chairman, Rached Ghannouchi, lauded the launch of the national dialogue saying, The train out of this crisis is on the tracks, and we are now on the way to finishing our transition to elections. Nejib Chebbi, an opposition leader, struck a similarly optimistic tone, declaring, This is the end of the crisis. It was yet to be seen if the progress on the governing front would augur improvement on the security front. Written by Dr. Denise Coleman, Editor in Chief, CountryWatch Copyright © 2013 CountryWatch Inc.
Posted on: Thu, 31 Oct 2013 19:27:09 +0000
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