Ali.[1] The guardianship was one of the highest Islamic decorations that no doubt only Ali possessed.[2] Ali’s followers and Abu Bakr’s followers disagreed on the meaning of guardianship. The first great companions believed that it was a decree for Ali’s caliphate but the others interpreted it and said: “Ali is the guardian of the Prophet’s knowledge, Sharia and affairs.” Now we do not want to oppose these or to support those but we want to discuss the tradition as much as concerning the subject of this research and then to decide what result comes out of each interpretation. Let us suppose first that the guardianship meant the caliphate to try Abu Bakr’s situation in the light of the tradition. We will find that he had usurped the most precious Islamic values and had disposed of the fates of the umma without any legal authority. So this man had no right to rule or judge between people and any tradition of his could not be believed. Let us abandon this interpretation for it would be so severe to the caliph. Let us say: “Ali was the guardian of the Prophet’s knowledge and Sharia.” Then could we, while confessing such kind of holy guardianship, believe in a tradition denied by the guardian himself? And as long as he (Ali) was the wakeful guard of the divine Sharia[3] so his [1] Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.1 p.47-48 and vol.3 p.15. [2] Ibn Abul Hadeed said in his book Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.1 p.46: “we believe undoubtedly that Ali was the Prophet’s guardian, although some ones, whom we consider as resistants, opposed that”. [3] Refer to the Prophet’s saying: “Ali is with the Quran and the Quran is with Ali. They will not separate until they came to me at the pond (in Paradise)”. Refer to al-Mu’jam as-Sagheer by at-Tabarani. The Prophet (s) chose Ali among all his companions and relatives in entrusting him with seventeen decrees that he did not entrust any one with other than Ali. The Prophet (s) said: “Ali is opinion had to be obeyed in every matter as an indisputable decree because he was the most aware of what the Prophet (s) had recommended and entrusted him with. And if Ali was the guardian of the Prophet’s patrimonies and affairs, so what would be the meaning of plundering the Prophet’s patrimonies by the caliph whereas the Prophet’s guardian was available and he was more aware of their verdict and legal fate? Fourth: the nationalization of the Prophet’s inheritance was one of the caliph’s initiatives in history. It was unprecedented in any of the (prophets’) nations’ histories. If it was a basis followed by all, who ruled after the prophets, it would be so famous and all the nations of the prophets would know that. Denying the Prophet’s ownership of Fadak by Abu Bakr-as it was shown by some of his arguments with Fatima-had much hastiness because Fadak was not gained as booty in war but its people gave in because of fear as it was mentioned by all the historians;[1] Sunni and Shia. Each land, whose people gave up like that (without fighting), was to be pure property of the Prophet (s).[2] Allah declared in the holy Quran that Fadak was of the Prophet (s) by saying: (And whatever Allah restored to His Apostle from them you did not press forward against it any horse or a riding camel. Quran 59:6) It was not proved that the Prophet (s) had granted Fadak as charity or with the truth and the truth is with Ali”. He (s) also said: “Ali is from me and I am from him. No one is to carry out my tasks except him…”.Refer to as-Sawa’iqul Muhriqa by ibn Hajar p.122 and ibn Assakir’s Tareekh, vol.17 p.256-. [1] Futooh al-Buldan by al-Balathari, p.46, ibnul Atheer’s Tareekh, vol.2 p.321, Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.4 p.78 and ibn Hisham’s Seera, vol.2 p.368. [2] Tafseer al-Kashshaf by az-Zamakhshari, vol.4 p.502. he entailed it. Fifth: both of the traditions that Abu Bakr protested with in this concern had no any evidence certifying what he wanted to prove. We have already studied both variations of the tradition and shown that their meanings had nothing to do with the caliph’s intent. If this is not acceptable, let us suppose the two meanings to be equal and then no one could be preferred to the other in order to depend on it. 2. These were the objections we already got. We add to them now a sixth objection after supposing that the phrase (We, the prophets, do not bequeath) is closer to denying the verdict of bequeathing than to deny the existence of the patrimony to be inherited and to suppose the phrase as following: (We do not bequeath what we leave as charity), which will be in the interest of the caliph and to cancel the interpretation saying that the charity left is not to be inherited and then to study the case in the light of these accounts. The clearest meaning of the caliph’s tradition, after interpreting it according to all the possibilities, determines that the prophets were not to bequeath their patrimonies as it was clear in his saying: (We, the prophets, do not bequeath). Let us have a look at his saying: (We do not bequeath. What we leave is to be charity). The pronoun refers to the plural that the verdict concerns a group. Since the verdict in the tradition concerns not bequeathing of the patrimony then it is clear that it relates to the group of the prophets because there is no another group that we can think that their patrimonies are not to transfer to their heirs. The holy Quran declared the matter of bequeathing by the prophets. Allah, the Almighty, said about Zachariah: (And surely I fear my cousins after me, and my wife is barren, therefore grant me from Thyself an heir, who should inherit me and inherit from the children of Yaqoub, and make him, my Lord, one in whom Thou art well pleased. 19:5-6) The inheritance in the verse means the inheritance of wealth because it is wealth, which actually transfers from the bequeather to the heir but knowledge and prophethood do not transfer in the real sense.[1] It is definitely clear that knowledge does not transfer according to the theory of the union of the apprehender and the apprehended data.[2] But if we acknowledge the existential difference between them, then there is no doubt of the abstractness of the scientific images[3] and that they (the scientific images) are existing in the soul in an emanational [1] Sharh Nahjul Balagha, vol.16 p.241. [2] The concept of this theory is that the apprehended images, which are abstract, have no material aspects except that they are apprehended. Apprehension is the essence of these apprehended images. Divesting these data of the apprehender means divesting the data of their very essence. This is the sign of the existential unity. So the graduation of the soul in the ranks of knowledge is its graduation in the stages of the existence. Whatever the psychic existence becomes a confirmation for a new concept; it will be increased in its essential integration and will become of a higher rank. There is nothing at all preventing from the union of many concepts in the existence. This is not like the existential union of two existences or the conceptional union of two concepts. These two unions are impossible and not like that of the apprehender and the apprehended data. [3] The truth is that all the ranks of knowledge and all the apprehended images are abstract but they are different in the ranks of abstractness. The thing apprehended by the ego will not be the very actual thing with its material identity, even that, which is apprehended by the sense of sight, has a way of abstractness and may be not defined exactly by the emanation of the ray or by the impression. What was proved about the seeing related to the science of mirrors and the researches of physics, which interpreted the optical perception philosophically, confirmed the thought of abstractness. We have to acknowledge it besides imagination and mind. We have explained this ism in our book The Divine Belief in Islam. existence,[1] which means that it is an effect of the soul and the one effect according to the soul-not by connection only-is rectified by its cause and connected with it identically so it is impossible for it to transfer to another cause. And if we supposed that the apprehended images were symptoms and qualities existing in the apprehender immanently, it would be impossible to transfer because of the impossibility of the movement of the symptom from a subject to another as it was proved by philosophy whether we thought of its abstractness or materiality in accordance with our acknowledgement that the apprehended images included the general aspects of the material object like the ability of division and the likes. [1] and not immanental existence, which means to be as symptoms for the soul. Some philosophers adopted this ism in order to solve the problem, which occurred to the researchers when they wanted to adapt the evidences of the mental existence to what was known about science as it was quality, which meant that if the apprehended image was quality so what we would perceive of a human being was not essence because it was a quality and not a human being while every human being was to be essence. When all of the answers, which was put to solve the problem of denying the mental existence, determining the idealism, choosing multiplicity, considering science as symptom and the apprehended data as essence and interpreting the essence as it was the outside independent existent and not the mental existent failed, the later researchers became obliged to determine that the apprehended image was of the essence and not of the quality but the great Islamic philosopher, Sadruddeen ash-Shirazi mentioned in his Asfar that it was essence in its quiddity and quality in its presentation. We could object to him by saying that all what was in the presentation would end to what was in the soul. Then we had to suppose a real quality united with the image to be quality in the presentation. Then the theory would get to one of two things; either keeping to the multiplicity of what was there in the soul or colliding with the first problem itself. It would be better to determine that the image apprehended by man was to be essence and not in presentation at all and its connection with the soul was as the connection between the cause and effect and not the presentation with its subject. So it is impossible for knowledge to transfer according to the philosophical isms concerning the scientific images. And if we consider prophethood, we will also find that it cannot be transferred whether we interpret it according to the ism of some philosophers to say that it is a rank of the spiritual perfection and a degree of the virtuous human existence, to which the human essence ascends towards the infinite perfection or we interpret it according to the general concept understood by people that prophethood is a divine position unlike the position of a king or a vizier and that spiritual perfection is a condition for that divine position. Hence in the first sense transfer cannot occur because it is the very existence of the prophet with his personal perfections and prophethood in the other sense is impossible to be transferred too because it is a moral matter with its specified aspects and it is not possible for any aspect to transfer except by the change of the individual himself into another individual. For example the prophethood of Zachariah (S) concerned Zachariah himself. It was not possible that it would refer to other than him for it would not then be Zachariah’s prophethood but a new position or a new prophethood. In fact the initiative look at the matter determines that it is impossible for prophethood and knowledge to transfer with no need for prospect or lengthy discussion on the matter. Reason decides easily that wealth is the only thing that transfers by bequeathing and not prophethood and knowledge. 3. Someone might object that the interpretation of inheritance in Zachariah’s speech might not refer to wealth because Yahya (Prophet John) was martyred during his father’s life and did not inherit his father’s wealth. So it must be interpreted to refer to prophethood because Yahya inherited the prophethood and that Allah responded to the prayer of his father then. But this objection should not have to concern one interpretation rather than the other because as Yahya did not inherit his father’s wealth, neither did he succeed him in prophethood. The prophethood of Yahya was not hereditary and it was not the wish of Zachariah. Zachariah asked his God to grant him an heir inheriting him after his death when saying according to the holy Quran: (And surely I fear my cousins after me).[1] He meant: (after my death). It was clear from his saying that he wanted an heir succeeding him and not a prophet coeval with him otherwise his fear from his cousins after his death would remain. We have to explain the verse in a way free from objection that the phrase (Who should inherit me and inherit from the children of Yaqoub. 19:6) was to be an answer for his prayer. His prayer meant: “O my God, grant me a son to inherit me!” So what he asked his God for was realized when he got a son. Bequeathing him wealth or prophethood was not included in what Zachariah asked his God for but it was as a result of what he asked for in his prayer. If we noticed the story of Zachariah in its other place of the holy Quran, we would find that he did not ask his God but for good offspring. Allah said: (There did Zachariah pray to his Lord; he said: My Lord! grant me from Thee good offspring. Quran 3:38) The best way of understanding the holy Quran is what is explained by the Quran itself.[2] Hence we [1] Quran 19:5. Refer to Tafseer al-Kashshaf, vol.3 p.4. [2] Al-Ittiqan by as-Sayooti, vol.4 p.200.
Posted on: Fri, 28 Jun 2013 11:00:38 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015