Andrew M. Koch: “Max Stirner: The Last Hegelian or the First Poststructuralist?” Abstract: “Most political philosophers have argued that Stirners concerns are compatible with those put forward by Hegel and by those influenced by Hegel. However, there is good reason for disputing this view, and for understanding Stirner as an original thinker, whose ideas in some ways anticipated the concerns of contemporary post-structuralists. ‘Anarchist Studies’ 5, 1997, pp. 95-107. *** “In 1845 Max Stirner published The Ego and His Own. The work, as a whole, can best be portrayed as a individualistic challenge to the legitimacy of the state. This work stands in stark contrast to other treatises on anarchism in the late nineteenth century. While the works of Kropotkin, Godwin, Proudhon, and others sought to create a philosophic basis for an anarchist position that retained the notion of community, Stirners work defended an anarchist position based solely on the individual. Stirner argued that the individual ego is the measure of the world, which has led Stirner to be criticised by Hegelians, Marxists, and other anarchist writers. “Stirner is most often discussed as part of the Hegelian tradition. Hegels writings on philosophy, politics, and community had a profound impact on nineteenth and twentieth century political thought, particularly as the Hegelian tradition was interpreted by Karl Marx. Stirners connection to this tradition is problematic, however, given his distrust of community. Nevertheless, Lawrence S. Stepelvich, echoing similar claims of David McLellan, argues that Stirner can be seen as a disciple of Hegel and perhaps even the last Hegelian.’ Other scholars have supported this view. Fredrich Engels and Karl Lowith treated Stirners work as the culmination of the Hegelian conception of absolute spirit, although Karl Marx and Sidney Hook saw Stirner as a dangerous apologist for the failing bourgeoisie. “The link between Stirner and the Hegelian tradition is an uncomfortable one. It is largely explained, I believe, by Stirners attraction to some of the ideas of Hegel while a student in Berlin. In addition, Stirner spent a period of his life socialising with the group known as the Young Hegelians. Yet, as Stepelvich recognised, Stirner does not employ any of the Hegelian concepts in his work. There are no references to the dialectic, no use of the Hegelian triad, and there is none of Hegels technical language. Further, The Ego and His Own can easily be interpreted as an attack on Hegel.... “This essay will argue that attempts to understand Stirner within the structural confines of a Hegelian ontology cause a serious misreading of Stirners work. While Stirners discussion of the state and the political order does contain assumptions regarding human nature that are essentially individualist in nature, and might be seen as the culmination of spirit coming to self realisation as ego, (an interpretation that can loosely be called Hegelian) there is something fundamentally different in Stirners approach that sets him off from others in the Hegelian tradition....He is far more interested in the way state power gains legitimacy within a system of power/knowledge than he is in challenging the Hegelian conception of the state as objective spirit. “To Stirner, the modem state legitimates itself through creating the illusion of fixed and essential ideas, and by convincing the population that it has discovered immutable truth. Only by understanding Stirners attack on what he called the fixed idea will his position make any sense. In short, rather than being the last Hegelian Stirner might just as easily be said to be the first poststructuralist, in offering the first modem epistemological critique of the way in which state power is legitimated through the nexus of power/knowledge contained within the dominant culture. “...The poststructuralists assert that in any culture power legitimates itself through its connection to the validating mechanism for truth claims. This position effectively negates all transcendental truth claims by the state as well as calling into question the sanctity of collective decision making. Stirner shares this point of view, and the parallels will be elaborated in the discussion. I. INDIVIDUALISM, POLITICS, AND THE MODERN STATE “For Max Stirner the state is an enemy. In the state individuals must sacrifice their labour, body, and freedom to a collective called the state (pp.111-116). The government needs money so it takes property and labour (pp.100, 115). It subordinates human beings to its will and crushes them if they resist. The state is, therefore, the enemy of all human beings. “Stirner claimed that this is the case even with the development of modem institutions and the emergence of democratic political practice. Thus when Stirner spoke of the liberal political tradition, he spoke with nothing but disdain. The liberal revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries did not free the individual from the state but made the individual subservient to the state....What Stirner called humane liberalism (more in the tradition of Kant) sought to obliterate the concept of self and replace it with a generalised concept, Man, to which all would owe their allegiance in the modem state (p.128). “Both of these forms of liberalism create the dream of freedom, but the promise cannot be fulfilled. In fact, this freedom is not real, it lives in the realm of dreams (p.157). The real is what Stirner called Ownness. Ownness is personal and internal. It is not linked to the authority of the state. I am my own only when I am master of myself, instead of being mastered either by sensuality or by anything else (God, man, authority, law, State, Church) (p.169). “Ownness cannot be achieved within the two modem political traditions (socialism and liberalism). They reject the idea that the individual is unique.... This conclusion stems from a resolute ontological position. Stirner means the individual in the strictest sense of the word. Only the individual has real being. Only organisms think, feel pain, breath, live and procreate....To subordinate this uniqueness to any concept of state, collective union, or society that would negate this ontological reality would be an affront to reason. “...Stirner puts it very directly. Doubtless I have similarity with others, yet that holds good only for comparison or reflection; in fact I am incomparable, unique. My flesh is not their flesh, my mind is not their mind (p.138). Any structure of authority resting on a concept that seeks to make the individual subordinate to a concept or idea beyond this principle is the enemy. “Liberals do not see man, but only the concept Man (p.173). They do not allow room for individuals. The individual man is refused, only the general human being is revered (p.205).... “...Once any authority has the power to determine the ideal to which life should be oriented the individual is in danger. Ideals get fixed within the laws, code, and practices of the state. Then ... the butchery goes on here in the name of the law, of the sovereign people, of God, etc! (p.205).... ... “What is unique about Stirners work is that it does not conform to the normal strategy employed by the other anarchist writers of the period. Most anarchist writers of this period began with a construction of human nature and then proceeded deductively. While there is some disagreement over how benign these authors saw the human character, generally human nature was presented in such a way that the state could be seen as unnecessary, irrelevant, and intrusive. (This positive characterisation of human nature is also perceived to be one of the major criticisms against anarchism.) For example, in Mutual Aid Kropotkin asserts that, in contrast to Darwin, species that learn to cooperate are the most successful. In modem society institutions have disrupted the natural condition of human being. The same methodology is employed by Godwin and Proudhon Society is spontaneous and natural, and it is the formal institution of the state that prevents the natural condition from realising its potential. All of these conclusions, however, have their origins in a fixed view of human nature and human essence. Stirner rejects this strategy suggesting that it is not only flawed, but dangerous. II. STIRNERS CRITIQUE OF TRANSCENDENTALISM AND THE FIXED IDEA “To understand Stirners attack on the authority of the state, his attitude toward the Western philosophic tradition must be examined. Stirner treated the Western conception of the idea as an historical phenomenon. It has changed from the early Greek civilisation to the present. The ancient sophists understood that the mind was a weapon, a means to survival (p. 17). Truth was generated as the mind interacted with nature. But the world of nature was characterised by flux and change. It was not stable. Therefore, truth must also be in a constant state of transition. “This is an unsettling position for philosophy. Philosophy has treated the inability to have fixed and eternal truth as a fundamental flaw in the human character. To overcome this weakness, Western philosophers since Plato have created the illusion of stability. This error continues within the modem traditions in philosophy as well. “Modem culture has lost touch with the tradition that Stirner identified with sophism and scepticism. It has sought the safety of the fixed idea. By a fixed idea Stirner means a concept, principle, or maxim that represents some aspect of the human character or that elaborates an ethical norm or standard which is not subject to historical circumstance. Fixed means eternal, unchanging, and absolute.... “In the modem period human beings have abandoned the sophists notion that truth does not present itself in absolutes. Stirner lays much of the blame for this illusion at the doorstep of Christianity.... “When human beings invented the idea of spirit in order to give themselves spirituality, the foundation was laid for the fixed idea....The spirit transcends the body and the finite character of corporeal existence. But spirituality teaches humans not to respect what is in the individual, but to care only for the image of Man as a higher enduring essence (p.42).... ... “In a similar fashion to Christian thought, Kants creation of a transcendental foundation for thought establishes the basis for a universalist morality.... “Law can be constructed according to transcendentally conceived notions that have no relation to experience, historical condition, or social custom. Reached transcendentally, conclusions regarding the law are not subject to critique based on any experiential knowledge. Morality and law have been divorced from actual lived sensation. The result is that the fixed transcendental idea now has the power to shape human life. From an anarchist perspective, real human beings are now under the power of that which is only an aberration. This is precisely how Stirner approached the issue. “This naive transcendentalism also produces political consequences. Universal ethics also provides the basis for a universal conception of human history. In the case of Kant, it is argued that human beings have the same basic characteristics, especially the equal power to engage in reasoning. Based on this assumption, a transcendental moral system can be discovered through reason by which individuals can order their lives. Further, if human beings have the same character and are subject to the same unchanging, a priori principles of action, it is now possible to create a universal society and a universal history based on that fact. “Stirner rejected such a strategy. It moves in precisely the wrong direction. The type of universal society described by the liberalism of either Kant or Marx is an affront to the ownness that can only be within the individual. What is needed, according to Stirner, is not a society of men, but a union of egos (p.179). Only such a union could really validate the distinct character of each individual. Only such an organisation could really respect the differences represented by each unique being. III. POSTSTRUCTURALISM AND THE EPISTEMOLOGICAL PROBLEM WITH THE FIXED IDEA “The stress on the uniqueness of the individual is a cornerstone of Stirners work, but it is not the complete picture. Stirners confrontation with the fixed idea represents a confrontation with all philosophic and theological transcendentalism in the Western tradition.... The fixing of ideas makes us prisoners to thought rather than creators of thought.... Ultimately the idea has subjected the human being to itself (p.43). “Stirners epistemological position is not an isolated aberration. His argument is a modem formulation of an epistemological attack on the Western tradition in metaphysics and philosophy that extends from the ancient sophists to the twentieth century. To fully understand what Stirner is trying to say it is useful to examine what comes after Stirner in this tradition. Of critical importance to this task is Fredrich Nietzsche.... “Nietzsche shared Stirners distaste for both transcendentalism and the Christian tradition in morality. What Nietzsche adds to the discussion is the genealogical method by which the material origins of moral belief can be identified as products of history and culture.... ... “Stirner, Nietzsche, and the contemporary poststructuralists assert a similar criticism of the fixed idea. All deny the possibility of demonstrating the validity of fixed, transcendental, universals. There can be no demonstration of universals that cannot be shown to have its validity rest on the assumed validity of another universal. With no validating mechanism other than the connection to other transcendental assertions back through history, such texts have no original moment in which their truth can be verified. All such fixed ideas, therefore, lack epistemological validity. “...However, Stirner never developed the language to go into greater depth on the construction, functioning, and consequences of the fixed idea. Language for such an inquiry is introduced by Nietzsche, but carried to its full fruition with the poststructuralists. “...Nietzsche gave a naturalist interpretation to this claim, suggesting the human need to interpret the world as an act necessary for survival. But Nietzsche makes it very clear that interpretation is something linked to history, context, and need. Perceptions, logic, and reason, developed because they were useful for life, not because they were true or accurate portrayals of a transcendental reality. Thus, like Stirner, Nietzsche claimed there can be no basis for maintaining the belief in fixed ideas. “Nietzsche also confronts this issue in a slightly different manner in The Use and Abuse of History. There Nietzsche makes reference to the problem of epistemological closure in speaking of the shifting horizon of truth. Epistemological closure is created when an object is given a stable identity. The representation of objects always commits an error of omission. Something is always left out in order to close the system of identities. If there are only interpretations of the world, there is no fixed truth and no possibility of stable representation. A priori truths are only provisional assumptions. The result of all this is the conclusion that rather than having only one truth, the world is seen to have countless meanings. “The contemporary movement in French philosophy known as poststructuralism pursues the problem of epistemological closure in its critique of representation. Representation is a structural illusion/plain created by closing off a concept from its multifaceted meaning. This epistemological closure grants power to texts through creating the illusion of stability. Stability generates a clear boundary between meaning and nonmeaning.... From the perspective of Stirner, Nietzsche, the poststructuralists, and the sophists, such stability is epistemologically unsound. Its value is political. Fixing a concept or idea within a closed system of identities and meanings lends authority to utterances. This process is a means of generating power. “What Stirner, Nietzsche, and the poststructuralists claim is that the authority generated by the fixed idea is not the authority of truth, but the authority of power. The fixed idea is a fiction created because it legitimates power. Fixed ideas do not have transcendental validity. They have only a utility function in the nexus of power/knowledge. As a utility, fixed ideas grant authority to words. Transcendentalism in speech is what causes both Stirner and Derrida to identify such fixed systems with theology.... IV. THE POLITICS OF THE SELF “The fixed idea provides the illusion that there are fixed universals around which human life can be constructed. It generates a belief in stable representations and expectations that are naturally human. Fixing a stable representation of the human being is precisely what Stirner meant by the generalised concept Man.(p.75) Once the human being is represented as a stable objective concept he or she becomes replaceable. As objectified subjects, the I has lost its power. There is only a mass.... “...If truth is an historical construction and if it does not have any link to a transcendental ahistorical universal law or condition, then the structures from which truth is generated cannot be separated from the institutions of power which make them possible.... “... Power attaches identities to people. Power imposes a law of truth that ties people to power. Hence, Michel Foucault concluded that the real political battle is not over the content of truth, but over the status of claims to truth. This is precisely what Stirner recognised in rejecting the fixed idea. The state reinforces the fixed idea by imposing a code of conduct and discipline on the population. The generalised concept Man is the bearer of the idea of normalcy. Normalcy provides the foundation for the code of discipline. Discipline takes the form of control over individual bodies.... “Intellectuals have been the bearers of the liberal humanist tradition, and can be identified with its oppression. Denying the possibility of the transcendental removes the intellectual from the privileged place granted since Platos Republic. Since intellectuals can no longer be seen as the bearers of truth, they are seen by Foucault as occupying a specific place in the power hierarchy. They are the legitimators of the totalising concepts within the structure of power, whether in the name of theology or science. “At this point epistemological critique and political commentary come together. If I am not the flesh and blood, thought and desire, that is someone elses I, then I must be unique. According to Stirner, my value is that I am an I (pp.365-66). If this is the case then the entire Enlightenment project, what Stirner would include as both social liberalism and humane liberalism, must be mistaken. I cannot be generalised. What is important in the understanding of I is not universal but unique. The I must generate a politics of difference. “...Thus when Stirner denounces the state and calls for a Union of Egos in its place (p.179), it is a claim in favour of respecting the I not the generalised concept Man. Respect for difference creates a positive political stance toward the individual. It does not degrade human nature by reducing it to the lowest common denominator. It puts human beings beyond the grasp of any single concept. “Any assertion that human beings can be defined by any assertion of essence, identity or human nature must be rejected. Critique does not set dogmas. It crushes fixed ideas and opposes systems (p. 147). What is designated as generalised essence is not me, but is only a name (p.366). I am at every moment creating myself (p. 150). Or, as Michel Foucault put it, each life is a work of art in progress. CONCLUSION “The basis of Stirners claims was epistemological. Therefore, the assertion that he is the culmination of the Hegelian tradition cannot be sustained. Hegels defence of the state as the reflection of universal spirit was, to Stirner, just another fantastic aberration in order to justify the states domination. In the Hegelian state, there can be no I. Nothing could be more abhorrent to Stirner.... “Is Stirner the first postststructuralist? In a sense, this is an absurd question that only has meaning within the confines of linear history. Stirner is part of a perspective that goes back to the earliest Western civilisations. The sophists understood that the mind was to be used as a means to a pleasant life, not to become a source of tyranny against the body (p.17). With transcendentalism came a transformation in philosophy. As Foucault described it, after Plato, the idea of true and false discourse replaced open inquiry. The idea of fixed and universal truth had supplanted dynamic critique. The stage was set for the folly that has been Western philosophy. “Stirner, Nietzsche, and contemporary poststructuralism all share this view. Further, they are concerned for what this condition of knowledge means in social life. They believe that any fixed representation of the human character is both epistemologically flawed and politically dangerous. Ideas cannot be fixed. Truth is plural, dynamic, and contingent....” libres.uncg.edu/ir/asu/f/koch_andrew_1997_max_stirner_crop.pdf
Posted on: Mon, 15 Sep 2014 13:55:24 +0000
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