Berlin, Tuesday, July 27 Washington, especially the Joint Chief, still isnt’ comfortable with the cost and exposure Operation Vittles is causing. On the 16th, Asst. Sec. of the Air Force Cornelius V. Whitney presented a reasonable view of the Operation’s prospects to the National Security council (NSC). According to Officer Harrington’s report, Whitney finds that the maximum capacity of the 180 American C-54s and 105 C-47s is 3000 tons a day, with the British adding about 1000, far less than the 5300 tone his team calculated was needed every single day and still less than the 4500 ton/day requirement set in Germany. Whitney’s study correctly pointed out that the Templehof runway is breaking up, the plans aren’t getting proper maintenance, the air and ground crew are already exhausted because of the irregular hour demanded of them and lack of comfortable quarters. (He may not even know of the rumors of air crews falling asleep and either straying outside their narrow flight paths, overshooting the city and violating Soviet Zone airspace, or even landing in Western Zone airports, far from the Berlin heading.) Whitney is repeating the Air Force’s very real fear that the Berlin Air Operation would require the USAF’s entire transport reserve if Gen. Clay has his way, which would be easily destroyed in the event of war. Whitney reasonably concluded that “the Air Staff was firmly convinced that the air operation is doomed to failure.” The members of the NSC were in consensus that the Air Operation couldn’t be continued after October and deferred a decision to send more aircraft. But Officer Harrington has just now circulated a report on the follow-up meeting on the 19th among President Truman, SecState Marshall and SecDef Forrestal. The SecState argued that the Soviet setbacks in Yugoslavia, Italy, France, Greece and Finland means that any sign of weakening about staying in Berlin would jeopardize the current trend toward halting Soviet expansion outside the lands in Central Europe they already control. The SecDef, in a briefing afterwards, expressed his belief that although the Air Operation “had begun to demonstrate its power . . . the long term possibilities were formidable.” With me, that counts as excessive optimism, but almost everyone in Washington, especially the Join Chiefs, wants to delay the decision to push an armed land convoy through to Berlin as long as possible. It doesn’t appear that Gen. Clay has planned for how this will take place, in light of how easy it would be to blow up bridges across the rivers and isolate the convoy, or that a train could simply be shunted onto a siding and prevented from going further, as happened a few weeks ago. Privately, the SecDef believes that war is pre-ordained if not imminent. I’m told he’s showing stress, perhaps because he knows that President Dewey won’t retain him after January. This is election time. President Truman is playing the game with the public of showing firmness towards the Soviets but not responding with force to their provocations and apparently calibrated harassment of the Berlin flights, which have recently been continuing with less harassment than before. Gen. Clay met the NSC on the 22nd, and the President was present. As usual, Gen Clay was as forceful to the NSC as he is to us, emphasizing that our intelligence doesn’t show any Soviet troop movements, that the Air Operation could be made to work with 75 additional C-54’s (he actually wants 200 but doesn’t feel this is the time to get all), and could – with the British – deliver the 4500 tons Berlin need daily. Gen. Clay otherwise kept the discussion right on the point the NSC wants to hear. Even though USAF Chief of Staff Hoyt Vandenberg steadfastly expressed his grave concern that the Air Operation would destroy USAF’s vital airlift worldwide capability, Gen. Glay was able to parry Vandenberg’s specific reservations. The NSC may have been most persuaded to approve 75 additional C-54s for the Operation and to reiterate the NSC’s policy and “the determination to remain in Berlin in any event” by Gen. Clay’s stirring conclusion: “The air lift has increased our prestige immeasurably. It has been impressive and efficient and has thrown the Russian timetable off. Two months ago the Russians were cocky and arrogant. Lately they have been polite and have gone out of their way to avoid incidents.” Vandenberg, reluctantly, seems to be all in now and said, “If we decide that this operation is going on for some time the Air Force would prefer that we go in wholeheartedly. If we do, Berlin can be supplied.” From our perspective, then, the Berliners are lucky beneficiaries for the time being of our necessary bloodless confrontation with Stalin. He has cards to play, including winning over the hearts and minds of the Berliners living in the Western Sectors. Smuggling seems to be loosely monitored, and the Soviets are getting B-Marks by passing off manufactured goods for export actually made in the Soviet Zone as “Made in Blockaded Berlin.” If this is to work to our strategic interests, we must find a way to keep the Berliners confident in – but also dependent on the Air Operation – in the face of rapidly plummeting living conditions. We will have to assess what the morale of the population is and how we can direct it to our advantage. BOB
Posted on: Sun, 28 Jul 2013 02:31:17 +0000
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