Book Review We’ve Learnt Nothing from History: Pakistan-Politics and Military Power by M. Asghar Khan, Oxford University Press, Karachi 2005, pp. 306, Price: Rs. 450.00 The former chief of the Pakistan Air Forces and the founder of Tehrik-i-Ishtiqlal Party (1972), Air Marshall (Rtd.) M. Asghar Khan is a rare political personality. He has been active in Pakistan politics for the last four decades with repute home and abroad as an honest, principled and clean politician. Himself being a politician knew it well that the question of power is the prime factor in politics. Yet he never intends to grab power at the expense of his lifelong cherished values and principles. Fully dedicated to democracy, Asghar Khan was opposed to any kind of autocratic rule be it military or civilian. He is the author of a number of books on Pakistan state, society and politics. His noteworthy works include: Pakistan at the Crossroads; Generals in Politics; Islam, Politics and the State. The book under discussion is his latest work. Besides Introduction, there are twenty chapters and five appendices in the book. Among the chapters, special mention may be made about ‘The Army Enters Politics’, ‘How Bangladesh was Born’, ‘Pakistan Politics and the Role of the ISI [Inter Services Intelligence]’, ‘Corruption’, ‘Jihad and the United States’, ‘Indo-Pak Relations’, and ‘The Future of Democracy in Pakistan’. The author in the book holds army and civil bureaucracy principally responsible for all misdeeds in the country. He did not spare corrupt, autocratic, power-hungry civilian politicians like Bhutto, Benazir, Newaz Sharif either. According to Asghar Khan, in the Pakistan state Bangladesh question was a political problem that warranted political solution. The resolve of the junta to have a recourse to military solution made the problem intractable with catastrophic consequences for which he holds general Yahya and Pakistan People’s Party leader Bhutto squarely responsible (pp. 35-37, 167, 260). In an intimate conversation Bhutto was once reported to have told Yahya, “East Pakistan is no problem. We will have to kill some 20,000 people there and all will be well” (p. 36). Asghar Khan holds the view that the situation could be saved had power been transferred to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, who had emerged as the leader of the majority party and the sole spokesman of the Bangali nation out of the 1970 elections. To many, certainly to the present writer, the prospect for united Pakistan was practically nil at this juncture. The main problem of the Pakistan state was how to accommodate the distinct national identity of the Bangalis within a common state structure. Instead of addressing the question rationally and pragmatically, the West Pakistani rulers perpetrated a kind of internal colonial rule upon the Bangalis including national persecution right from the beginning. Thus the 1970-71 situation was not created all on a sudden. Handing over power to Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, as Asghar Khan suggested, might have halted the process a little, but the break-up of Pakistan, hence, emergence of Bangladesh seems inevitable at this point. Referring to Yahya-Mujib talks, critics argue that Shiekh Mujib was caught unaware of the military preparedness of the junta made under the coverage of negotiations for the final crackdown upon the civilian Bangalis that occurred on the dreadful night of March 25, 1971. The author (Asghar Khan) gives a contrary view. While narrating the conversations that took place between him and Mujib over a meeting at the latter’s residence in early March, Asghar Khan writes, “I asked Mujib what scenario he visualised and how the stalemate could be broken. He replied that the situation was very clear. Yahya Khan would come to Dhaka first followed by ... Bhutto. Yahya would then order military action and that would be the end of Pakistan. About himself, he said, he [Mujib] hoped that he would be taken prisoner, for if he was not, he would be killed either by the Pakistan army or by his own people. It is surprising that the sequence of events was almost exactly as he had forecast” (p. 38). Accusations are often heard against the secret activities of the Pakistan military Intelligence called ISI in the countries of this region including Bangladesh. Based on facts and documents, the author has made a detailed and convincing discussion about the role of ISI in Pakistan politics that includes, among other things, bribes to opposition leaders, splits of parties, election results manipulations and so on. A detailed account of Afghan crisis, Soviet aggression in Afghanistan during 1979-1989, the US-sponsored training and arms supply programme for the Pakistan-based combatant Taleban-Mujahedeen and its consequences have been made in ‘Jihad and the United States’ chapter. Terming the four wars that Pakistan has so far fought with India as an act ‘without a clear objective’ and ‘for no purpose’, the author argues that the future of democracy and prosperity of Pakistan is largely dependent on her relations with India, as he explains, “No matter what political forces emerge in Pakistan, no matter what their performance and no matter how well they conduct themselves, so long as the people of Pakistan perceive India as a threat to their existence, the armed forces of Pakistan will be seen as the saviour, and no matter what the people’s political performances, they will always look forward towards the armed forces for their security and survival” (pp. 251-52). Admitting the force of his argument, it should be borne in mind that internal factors, such as, socio-economic reforms, liberalisation, rule of law, institutional reforms, guarantee of fundamental rights, independence of judiciary etc. need to be met as precondition for democracy. Finally, one will fully agree with the author’s observation that ‘the involvement of the armed forces in the political life of the country in any manner is fraught with grave dangers and must be avoided” (p. 167). Through this work the author has made a significant contribution towards the understanding of Pakistan politics in general and Pakistan under military rule in particular. The book will definitely draw wide readership on its account. About the intent of writing the book, the author M. Asghar Khan in the Preface says, “Having witnessed the events of the last five and a half decades, I thought that I should leave for posterity some thoughts on how Pakistan has fared in the first fifty-six years since its birth, so that we may learn from our follies if we are to survive as a nation in the turbulent times that lie ahead”. One can only hope that it comes true and the Pakistani Generals learn at least some lessons from history after all the years. Harun-or-Rashid*
Posted on: Tue, 23 Jul 2013 03:16:29 +0000
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