CLC position on TPP CLC’s position on labour provision and the proposed TPP labour chapter Background A number of countries in Asian and Pacific-rim countries including the US have been negotiating the Trans–Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPP) for over two years. Canada also decided to join the negotiations in October 2012. The negotiations have been conducted in secrecy and unions have been concerned about the items on the table based on leaked documents. The agreement will make it difficult for national governments to promote public health and protect the interests of workers and consumers. The Agreement is not just about trade, since most trade tariffs are gone, but touches on issues of importance to the labour movement. For example, multi-national corporations will be able to sue national governments for millions of dollars in damages in secretive offshore tribunals, a number of restrictions on foreign investments will be rolled back, restrictions will be placed on generic medicines, and many more worrisome requirements. The International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) and national unions in the Asian and Pacific-rim region have been engaged in the process. They agreed to focus on the inclusion of a “Labour Chapter” proposal for the TPP. The CLC’s position on what constitutes an acceptable labour provision in an international trade agreement is not addressed in our most recent policy paper, convention composite resolutions or statements on trade agreements. The CLC’s position on what constitutes an acceptable labour provision can be extracted from the CLC’s submission from September 2009 to the House of Commons Standing Committee on International Trade concerning the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Colombia In the CLC’s evaluation of the Labour Cooperation Agreement (LCA) negotiated along with the Canada-Columbia Free Trade Agreement, the CLC questioned some of the key elements of this side-agreement and its effectiveness: * For the CLC, the provisions found in the LCA are part of a side-agreement rather than in the main text of the trade agreement. A side-agreement does not have the same value and enforcement mechanisms as what is found in the main agreement. It is subordinated to the main text of the agreement. * The labour side-deal provides no enforceable rights for workers. The LCA affirms the 1998 ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, while two commitments refer to the ILO’s Decent Work provisions. However, the obligations outlined do not compel governments to make specific improvements in labour law. * The complaint resolution mechanism is also flawed and penalties are limited to fines. * The dispute resolution mechanisms remain entirely at the discretion of the signatory governments. They are premised upon a model of political cooperation among the signatories and, hence, the complaint process is not as transparent as it should be and depends on bureaucracies of the Parties rather than on independent judicial, or even quasi-judicial bodies. * There are no mechanisms for independent action by trade unionists, and the offending governments have wide sway over what happens in any proceedings that are brought by the other Party. * The dispute resolution mechanism is in stark contrast to the rules established for disputes over investments in that the agreement offers no trade sanctions, such as the imposition of countervailing duties or the abrogation of preferential trade status in the event that one of the Parties commits a violation of labour rights and standards. * The LCA allows the Parties to waive labour laws for any other reason. Even if a Party is charged with not enforcing its labour law repeatedly, or in a systematic way, then it is acceptable for that Party to defend itself by saying it simply decided to allocate resources to some other pressing labour need. * The only penalty for labour rights violations under the LCA is, the possibility for a panel to impose a monetary assessment of not more than US$15 million annually, which is paid into a fund to be expended on appropriate labour initiatives in the territory of the Party that was the subject of the review. For the CLC, a labour provision should be part of the main body of these agreements. The labour provision should provide enforceable rights for workers. It should be transparent and provide mechanisms for independent action by trade unionists, with the power to enforce decisions using fines and suspension of privileges. The proposed TPP labour provisions would deal with most of the issues raised in our analysis of LCA negotiated between Canada and Colombia. The proposed labour provisions would: * be part of the main body of the text; * call for the adoption and the maintenance of, at a minimum, the labour obligations/rights referred to in the ILO Conventions rather than the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up (1998); It should also include the full effect of the Inspection Conventions No 81, 129 and 178; * propose a non-derogation clause to prevent any waiver or derogation of labour laws, including core labour rights and acceptable conditions of work, across all trade and investment; * establish that Parties shall ensure that persons have appropriate access to tribunals for the enforcement of the Parties’ labour laws; * provide a detailed dispute mechanism that provides anyone the right to submit a complaint to a Party, and after the review of the complaint, the receiving government must launch an investigation; * provide an arbitration panel comprised of independent labour law experts who review the record and issue a final report, including their findings and recommendations; * these arbitrators would be empanelled to determine if the Party did in fact fail to implement a plan to resolve the issue, and if the Party has failed to implement it, the panel should authorize suspension of benefits up to the level the panel has determined or (if no such decision) the level the complaining Party has proposed. It’s important to note that the Canadian government proposed to introduce a “fine based” enforcement for labour complaints instead of “suspension of trade benefits” approach. The CLC believes that workers would benefit more with the suspension of benefits approach. Attached documents:
Posted on: Wed, 06 Nov 2013 07:13:28 +0000
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