CONTINUATION OF U.S. Supreme Court Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) Mapp v. Ohio Federal-state cooperation in the solution of crime under constitutional standards will be promoted, if only by recognition of their now mutual obligation to respect the same fundamental criteria in their approaches. However much in a particular case insistence upon such rules may appear as a technicality that inures to the benefit of a guilty person, the history of the criminal law proves that tolerance of shortcut methods in law enforcement impairs its enduring effectiveness. Miller v. United States,357 U. S. 301, 357 U. S. 313 (1958). Denying shortcuts to only one of two cooperating law enforcement agencies tends naturally to breed legitimate suspicion of working arrangements whose results are equally tainted. Byars v. United States,273 U. S. 28 (1927); Lustig v. United States,338 U. S. 74 (1949). Page 367 U. S. 659 There are those who say, as did Justice (then Judge) Cardozo, that, under our constitutional exclusionary doctrine, [t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. at 21, 150 N.E. at 587. In some cases, this will undoubtedly be the result. [Footnote 9] But, as was said in Elkins, there is another consideration -- the imperative of judicial integrity. 364 U.S. at 364 U. S. 222. The criminal goes free, if he must, but it is the law that sets him free. Nothing can destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence. As Mr. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, said in Olmstead v. United States,277 U. S. 438, 277 U. S. 485 (1928): Our Government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. . . . If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. Nor can it lightly be assumed that, as a practical matter, adoption of the exclusionary rule fetters law enforcement. Only last year, this Court expressly considered that contention and found that pragmatic evidence of a sort to the contrary was not wanting. Elkins v. United States, supra, at 364 U. S. 218. The Court noted that The federal courts themselves have operated under the exclusionary rule of Weeks for almost half a century; Page 367 U. S. 660 yet it has not been suggested either that the Federal Bureau of Investigation [Footnote 10] has thereby been rendered ineffective, or that the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts has thereby been disrupted. Moreover, the experience of the states is impressive. . . . The movement towards the rule of exclusion has been halting, but seemingly inexorable. Id. at 364 U. S. 218-219. The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties of the people rest. [Footnote 11] Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States, and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore, constitutional in origin, we can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured by the Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him, to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reversed, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. Reversed and remanded. Page 367 U. S. 661 [Footnote 1] The statute provides in pertinent part that No person shall knowingly . . . have in his possession or under his control an obscene, lewd, or lascivious book [or] . . . picture. . . . Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than two hundred nor more than two thousand dollars or imprisoned not less than one nor more than seven years, or both. [Footnote 2] A police officer testified that we did pry the screen door to gain entrance; the attorney on the scene testified that a policeman tried . . . to kick in the door and then broke the glass in the door and somebody reached in and opened the door and let them in; the appellant testified that [t]he back door was broken. [Footnote 3] Other issues have been raised on this appeal but, in the view we have taken of the case, they need not be decided. Although appellant chose to urge what may have appeared to be the surer ground for favorable disposition, and did not insist that Wolf be overruled, the amicus curiae, who was also permitted to participate in the oral argument, did urge the Court to overrule Wolf. [Footnote 4] The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. [Footnote 5] The close connection between the concepts later embodied in these two Amendments had been noted at least as early as 1765 by Lord Camden, on whose opinion in Entick v. Carrington, 19 Howells State Trials 1029, the Boyd court drew heavily. Lord Camden had noted, at 1073: It is very certain that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself, because the necessary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust, and it should seem that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. There too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty. [Footnote 6] See, however, National Safe Deposit Co. v. Stead,232 U. S. 58 (1914), and Adams v. New York,192 U. S. 585 (1904). [Footnote 7] Less than half of the States have any criminal provisions relating directly to unreasonable searches and seizures. The punitive sanctions of the 23 States attempting to control such invasions of the right of privacy may be classified as follows: Criminal Liability of Affiant for Malicious Procurement of Search Warrant. -- Ala.Code, 1958, Tit. 15, § 99; Alaska Comp.Laws Ann., 1949, § 66-7-15; Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann., 1956, § 13-1454; Cal.Pen.Code § 170; Fla.Stat., 1959, § 933.16; Ga.Code Ann., 1953, § 27-301; Idaho Code Ann., 1948, § 18-709; Iowa Code Ann., 1950, § 751.38; Minn.Stat.Ann., 1947, § 613.54; Mont.Rev.Codes Ann., 1947, § 94-35-122; Nev.Rev.Stat. §§ 199.130, 199.140; N.J.Stat.Ann., 1940, § 33:1-64; N.Y.Pen.Law § 1786, N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. § 811; N.C.Gen.Stat., 1953, § 15-27 (applies to officers only); N.D.Century Code Ann., 1960, §§ 12-17-08, 29-29-18; Okla.Stat., 1951, Tit. 21, § 585, Tit. 22, § 1239; Ore.Rev.Stat. § 141.990; S.D.Code, 1939 (Supp. 1960), § 34.9904; Utah Code Ann., 1953,§ 77-54-21. Criminal Liability of Magistrate Issuing Warrant Without Supporting Affidavit. -- N.C.Gen.Stat., 1953, § 15-27; Va.Code Ann., 1960 Replacement Volume, § 19.1-89. Criminal Liability of Officer Willfully Exceeding Authority of Search Warrant. -- Fla.Stat.Ann., 1944, § 933.17; Iowa Code Ann., 1950, § 751.39; Minn.Stat.Ann., 1947, § 613.54; Nev.Rev.Stat. § 199.450; N.Y.Pen.Law § 1847, N.Y.Code Crim.Proc. § 812; N.D.Century Code Ann., 1960, §§ 12-17-07, 29-29-19; Okla.Stat., 1951, Tit. 21, § 536, Tit. 22, § 1240; S.D.Code, 1939 (Supp. 1960), § 34.9905; Tenn.Code Ann., 1955, § 40-510; Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 77-54-22. Criminal Liability of Officer for Search with Invalid Warrant or no Warrant. -- Idaho Code Ann., 1948, § 18-703; Minn.Stat.Ann., 1947, §§ 613.53, 621.17; Mo.Ann.Stat., 1953, § 558.190; Mont.Rev.Codes Ann., 1947, § 94-3506; N.J.Stat.Ann., 1940, § 33:1-65; N.Y.Pen.Law § 1846; N.D. Century Code Ann., 1960, § 12-17-06; Okla.Stat.Ann., 1958, Tit. 21, § 535; Utah Code Ann., 1953, § 76-28-52; Va.Code Ann., 1960 Replacement Volume, § 19.1-88; Wash.Rev.Code §§ 10.79.040, 10.79.045. [Footnote 8] But compare Waley v. Johnston,316 U. S. 101, 316 U. S. 104, and Chambers v. Florida,309 U. S. 227, 309 U. S. 236, with Weeks v. United States,232 U. S. 383, and Wolf v. Colorado,338 U. S. 25. [Footnote 9] As is always the case, however, state procedural requirements governing assertion and pursuance of direct and collateral constitutional challenges to criminal prosecutions must be respected. We note, moreover, that the class of state convictions possibly affected by this decision is of relatively narrow compass when compared with Burns v. Ohio,360 U. S. 252, Griffin v. Illinois,351 U. S. 12, and Herman v. Claudy,350 U. S. 116. In those cases, the same contention was urged and later proved unfounded. In any case, further delay in reaching the present result could have no effect other than to compound the difficulties. [Footnote 10] See the remarks of Mr. Hoover, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, September, 1952, pp. 1-2, quoted in Elkins v. United States,364 U. S. 206, 364 U. S. 218-219, note 8. [Footnote 11] Cf. Marcus v. Search Warrant, post, p. 367 U. S. 717. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, concurring. For nearly fifty years, since the decision of this Court in Weeks v. United States, [Footnote 2/1] federal courts have refused to permit the introduction into evidence against an accused of his papers and effects obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment. In Wolf v. Colorado, decided in 1948, however, this Court held that, in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime, the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. [Footnote 2/2] I concurred in that holding on these grounds: For reasons stated in my dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California,332 U. S. 46, 332 U. S. 68, I agree with the conclusion of the Court that the Fourth Amendments prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures is enforceable against the states. Consequently, I should be for reversal of this case if I thought the Fourth Amendment not only prohibited unreasonable searches and seizures, but also, of itself, barred the use of evidence so unlawfully obtained. But I agree with what appears to be a plain implication of the Courts opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of the Fourth Amendment, but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress might negate. [Footnote 2/3] I am still not persuaded that the Fourth Amendment, standing alone, would be enough to bar the introduction into evidence against an accused of papers and effects seized from him in violation of its commands. For the Fourth Amendment does not itself contain any provision expressly precluding the use of such evidence, and I am Page 367 U. S. 662 extremely doubtful that such a provision could properly be inferred from nothing more than the basic command against unreasonable searches and seizures. Reflection on the problem, however, in the light of cases coming before the Court since Wolf, has led me to conclude that, when the Fourth Amendments ban against unreasonable searches and seizures is considered together with the Fifth Amendments ban against compelled self-incrimination, a constitutional basis emerges which not only justifies, but actually requires, the exclusionary rule. The close interrelationship between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, as they apply to this problem, [Footnote 2/4] has long been recognized and, indeed, was expressly made the ground for this Courts holding in Boyd v. United States. [Footnote 2/5] There, the Court fully discussed this relationship and declared itself unable to perceive that the seizure of a mans private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. [Footnote 2/6] It was upon this ground that Mr. Justice Rutledge largely relied in his dissenting opinion in the Wolf case. [Footnote 2/7] And, although I rejected the argument at that time, its force has, for me at least, become compelling with the more thorough understanding of the problem brought on by recent cases. In the final analysis, it seems to me that the Boyd doctrine, though perhaps not required by the express language of the Constitution, strictly construed, is amply justified from an historical standpoint, soundly based in reason,
Posted on: Thu, 04 Dec 2014 23:58:18 +0000
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