Current state of my critique of self-ownership... [yes Im a slow writer] The term self-ownership can be used in three distinct ways yet for some reason they are often conflated as the same thing, when they are not. 1) x controls their body 2) x has the moral right to use and control their body 3) x has the moral right to use and control their body exclusively in virtue of the fact that they own their body as property. The question of whether or not (1) is true is a metaphysical and scientific question about free will. The question of whether or not (2) and (3) are true is an ethical or political question. Moreover, (1) does not entail (2) or (3) since we cannot infer an ought from is and the propositions x controls their body and x does not have the moral right to (exclusively) use and control their body are jointly consistent, by which I mean they can both be true and not contradict one another. It is therefore not sufficient in an argument for (2) or (3) to merely point to the truth of (1). Rothbard himself makes this error in the ‘Ethics of Liberty’. In chapter 2 of the ‘Ethics of Liberty’, Rothbard attempts to establish self-ownership. His starting point is Crusoe alone on an Island with amnesia. Rothbard uses this scenario as tool with which to explore what inescapable natural facts confront people as they begin to experience the world. After discerning certain basic inescapable natural facts, Crusoe introspects about his own consciousness and discovers his free will, that is to say “his freedom to choose, his freedom to use or not use his reason about any given subject”. He then also discovers “the natural fact of his mind’s command over his body and its actions: that is, of his natural ownership over his self.” Here Rothbard appears to be arguing that in exercising control over his body Crusoe establishes his ownership of his body. This interpretation is supported by the fact that later Rothbard argues that if Crusoe mixes his labour with unclaimed land he transforms the land, that is to say he exercises control over the land, and thereby owns the land. Thus for Rothbard control of unclaimed objects entails ownership of said objects. Yet this argument makes the error pointed out above. The mere fact that a person does exercise control over something does not establish the normative proposition that they ought to exercise control over it. For example, the fact that a thief controls a bicycle does not negate the fact that someone else owns the bike. This is because ownership is not determined exclusively by control but also by individuals having the normative right to control. In the case of the thief, s/he cannot claim to own the bike not because s/he does not control the bike but because s/he lacks the normative right to do so. It is therefore not sufficient in an argument for ownership to merely point to the fact that a particular individual controls their body or exercises control over a piece of land, rather one must argue that said individual has the normative right to control their body or the piece of land. Rothbard has failed to do this, therefore his defence of self-ownership fails.
Posted on: Wed, 23 Oct 2013 12:06:41 +0000
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