From the tarmac we were herded straight to the customs enclosure where a sprightly team of appraisers had assembled to ‘examine’ our luggage. They had been told that some Indians had arrived from Hong Kong and were waiting to confiscate transistors and opium. I knew then there had been no material change in India and we were in the same old groove. After a cursory and stereotyped de-briefing at Ranchi, I was ordered to meet the chief of Army staff, Gen. J. N. Chaudhuri at New Delhi on 15th May. He asked me to write a report for the personal information of the Defence Minister and himself. The aim was, in General’s words “To teach ourselves how not to hand over a brigade on a plate to the Chinese in future”. He added that we had become the laughing stocks of even countries like ………. And ……….. (I hesitate to name those countries). I welcomed the opportunity afforded by the chief’s instruction for a personal report as this would give me a chance to collect my thoughts. The basic facts had been branded into my memory. To make doubly sure, I had many sessions with Lt-Col. Riki, Commanding Officer of 2 Rajputs and Lt-Col. B.S. Ahluwalia, Commanding Officer of the 1/9 Gorkhas, Major R.O. Kharbanda and Captain T.K. Gupta of my staff. We recounted, cross-checked and authenticated the facts which form the basis for this book. Rankling at our unfriendly reception and the many garbled versions I heard from friends, I wrote a forthright account which I handed over to the Chief personally. I do not know the fate of my report as I was never again asked to discuss or explain it. It may have touched some sensitive nerves. It was soon apparent that the Army had become the centre of much controversy and that the blame for the 1962 fiasco had been cunningly shifted to its alleged “shortcomings”. What was more alarming were the extravagant claims made by some senior Army Officers, who attained eminence only after the 1962 reshuffles, as to how brilliantly they would have handled the situation and defied the authority of Nehru, Menon and Kaul? This attitude made me despair of whether my country people & my colleagues would ever learn any lessons from India’s first attempt at conducting a modern war and strengthened my resolution to tell my story. 1962 was a National Failure of which every Hindustani is guilty. It was a failure in the Higher Direction of war, a failure of the Opposition, a failure of the General staffs (myself included); it was a failure of Responsible public Opinion and the Press. For the Government of India (including the entire Nehru family & congress), it was a “HIMALAYAN BLUNDER AT ALL LEVELS”. The people of India want to know the truth but have been denied it on the dubious grounds of National security. The result has been an unhealthy amalgam of innuendo, mythology, conjecture, outright calumny and sustained efforts to confuse and conceal the truth. Even the truncated “NEFA” Enquiry had been withheld except for a few paraphrased extracts read out to the Lok Sabha on 2nd September 1963. For some un-disclosed reason, I was not asked to give evidence before this body nor (to the best of my knowledge) my repatriated Commanding Officers. It is thus vitally necessary to trace, without rancour and without malice, the overall causes which resulted in the reverses and which so seriously affected India’s honour. Some of the things that happened in 1962 must never be allowed to happen again. There is a school of thought which advocates a moratorium on the NEFA Affair on the grounds that such “PATRIOTIC RETICENCE” is desirable in the context of the continuing Chinese (and Pakistan) military threats. I do not think that this theory is tenable. The main protagonists of this line played a part in the tragic drama, or belonged to the political party which provided the national leadership and their plea for silence does not spring entire from a sense of patriotism. There are others, mostly barren politicians, who use the Nehru’s legend to buttress their failures or in-venerate hero-worshippers, who express irritation at any adverse reference to Nehru’s long spell as the Prime Minister of India. As was said of Lord Chatham, the British Prime Minister, “his countrymen were so conscious of what they owed him that they did not want to hear about his faults”. But it is impossible to narrate a failure, which historically marked the end of the Nehru saga, without critical, often harsh comments on the principle dramatis personae who held high office and who were revered by the people. The magnitude of our defeat could not have been wrought without Himalayan Blunders at all levels. But this is not a “J Accuse”. India has a near unbroken record of military failures through the ages. Our peasantry has always fought gallantly, but it is an indisputable fact that seldom has this bravery been utilised to win battle-field victories and thus to attain our political objectives, due to inept political or military leadership, or both. Need we follow this tragic path interminably? It had fallen to my lot to be associated with the china problem for over 8 years from 1954 to 1962. I was first connected with the Higher Direction of war, in a modest capacity, as a Lt-Colonel in military Operations Directorate. Later as Brigadier-in-Charge of Administration of the troops on Ladakh, i saw, at first hand, what passed for “logistic support”. Finally as Commander of the key sector of Towang, north-east frontier agency, i was involved in our so-called operational planning to defend our borders. The years of higher planning to defend our borders. The years of higher responsibility were complementary and gave me a personal insight into our National Policy as well as our half-hearted military response to the Chinese challenge. I have tried to tell the story as i saw it unfold, over the years, to add to our knowledge. I have included the politico-military background only because this had a direct bearing on our performance in the military field, in 1962. This is a personal narrative- a narrative of what Infantry Brigade was ordered to do and what happened when they attempted to carry out those orders. In all humility i can claim that only i am in a position to explain many nagging questions that need explaining, facts that are necessary. The theme of this writings is the steadfastness of the Indian soldier in the midst of political wavering and a military leadership which was influenced more by political than military considerations. The book records their valour, resolution and loyalty-qualities which are generally forgotten in the mass of political post-mortems which have been served up to the Indian people. This is a record of the destruction of a Brigade without a formal declaration of war-another central fact that is often overlooked- and which coloured the actions of all the principal participants. I have made every effort not to view things in a retrospective light or with the clarity of hindsight. I have recorded experiences, ideas and feelings as they appeared at the time. I have tried to give an objective account of all that happened, of the people involved and of the decisions they took. My opinions as a participant in the climatic finale of September-October 1962must be subjective. The main essential is to know how the principal participants thought and reacted. As Lord Avon (Sir Anthony Eden) says in the preface to his Memoirs, the Full Circle “This book will expose many wounds, by doing so it may help to heal them”. By this book i express my undying gratitude to my Commanding Officers for their trust and loyalty; to the men of all classes and from all units under my command for their selfless devotion to duty; and to my staff whose dedication sustained me in those harrowing days. This book is the fulfilment of my promise to my people of Hindustan, in all walks of life, to vindicate the reputation of those men i had the honour to command. I hope that i shall have discharged my responsibility to all those who gave their lives in the line of duty and whose sacrifice deserves a permanent, printed memorial. “THE ANNEXATION OF TIBET & INDIA’S CHINA POLICY.” IT IS axiomatic that all international disputes which end in war have a historical background and the Sino-Indian-Tibetan problem was no exception. It was the function of the government and of the appropriate desk in the ministry of External Affairs to constantly review the points of dispute with neighbouring countries, seeking to resolve them amicably if suitable opportunities present themselves, or can be created. Failing this the nation must be alerted for the possibility of war. In-action or wishful thinking is inexcusable.
Posted on: Sat, 20 Jul 2013 11:38:32 +0000
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