Geskiedenis herhaal Posted on October 7, 2013 by Bestuur ‘n Interessante vergelyking van omstandighede wat deur ‘n lid aan ons gestuur is. Ons moet nooit ophou leer uit die geskiedenis nie. ■Die Mossad hoof het nie gedink daar kom ‘n oorlog nie ■Nadat Israel bevestiging gekry het dat oorlog kom het hulle 24 uur gehad om voor te berei ■Die waarde van akkurate inligting en dan disinformasie ■Aman staan vir Directorate of Military Intelligence By mid-1973, Aman was almost completely aware of the Arab war plans. It knew that the Egyptian Second and Third Armies would attempt to cross the Suez Canal and advance ten kilometres into the Sinai, followed by armored divisions which would advance towards the Mitla and Gidi passes, and that naval units and paratroopers would then attempt to capture Sharm el-Sheikh. Aman was also aware of many details of the Syrian war plan. However, Israeli analysts, following “the concept”, did not believe the Arabs were serious about going to war. The Egyptians did much to further this misconception. Both the Israelis and the Americans felt that the expulsion of the Soviet military observers had severely reduced the effectiveness of the Egyptian army. The Egyptians ensured that there was a continual stream of false information on maintenance problems and a lack of personnel to operate the most advanced equipment. The Egyptians made repeated misleading reports about lack of spare parts that also made their way to the Israelis. Sadat had so long engaged in brinkmanship that his frequent war threats were being ignored by the world. In April and May 1973, Israeli intelligence began picking up clear signals of Egypt’s intentions for war, recognizing that it had the necessary divisions and bridging equipment to cross the Suez Canal, and a missile umbrella to protect any crossing operation from air attack. However, Aman Chief Eli Zeira was still confident that the probability of war was low. Nou ons situasie By mid-2013, white conservatives was almost completely aware of the African war plans. It knew that MK & ZANU vets would attempt to cross into white towns and by force gain control, followed by the youth brigade which would advance towards military and army barracks, and to capture all communication installations. White conservatives were also aware of many details of the African war plan. However, Naspers analysts, following “Die Broederbond”, did not believe the Africans were serious about going to war. Naspers & verligte Afrikaners did much to further this misconception. Both the liberal whites and the the West felt that the expulsion of the Julius Malema had severely reduced the effectiveness of the African militia. The ANC ensured that there was a continual stream of false information on number of farmers killed, supporting white ownership of farms and mines. The ANC made repeated misleading reports about lack of support for EFF ideas also made their way to the Afrikaners. Zuma with his songs and Malema with his red beret had so long engaged in brinkmanship that his frequent war threats were being ignored by the world andral whites. Continuously Afrikaner intelligence began picking up clear signals of Africans intentions for war, recognizing that it had the necessary divisions and assistance from Zanu to launch farm invasions and infiltrate white areas , and the support of police and the army to protect any operation from white mans resistance. However, Afrikaner leaders was still confident that the probability of war was low…………
Posted on: Mon, 07 Oct 2013 11:35:45 +0000
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