Happy Weekend Reading Algerias Government Alters Its Relationship With Islamists Analysis Madani Mezrag, the commander of the FIS disbanded military wing, the Islamic Salvation Army, stated Dec. 8 that the time had come for the group to return to political life in an official manner. After meeting with Ahmed Ouyahia, a former prime minister and now a top aide to Bouteflika, Mezrag also claimed the groups would be part of consultations to amend the countrys constitution. Though a significant announcement, it was not the first instance of political outreach by the government. During the past year, a number of developments have signaled a potential comeback for the FIS: In June, the government invited 15 founding members of the FIS, including the groups chief, Abbassi Madani, and his deputy, Ali Benhadj, to participate in national consultations over constitutional reforms. On Aug. 15, Islamic Salvation Army organized a summer school in Jijel province for hundreds of its ex-members, though the reason for the school remains unknown. In September, on the anniversary of the passing of the 2005 Charter for Peace and Reconciliation, the government announced it would engage in new measures to expand the reconciliation process with Islamist groups, though no specific guidelines have been released. Still, the governments moves to contact the FIS and other banned groups are not without opposition. The Algerian newspaper El Watan bitterly criticized Mezrags meeting with Ouyahia — a sign that powerful factions within the state are against reaching out to Islamist camps. It is unclear how critics will respond to further outreach, but the government will have to overcome such obstacles in order to build a stable coalition. The History of the FIS The Salafist FIS rose to prominence in Algerias first multiparty elections in 1990. The election itself was the outcome of nationwide unrest that led to the collapse of the single-party system that the National Liberation Front had dominated since the country became independent from France in 1962. The FIS gained control of more than 50 percent of municipal and provincial council seats in elections held in June 1990. Eighteen months later, the Islamist movement won a landslide victory in the initial round of national polls, obtaining 188 out of 231 seats in parliament. The National Liberation Front, led by former Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid and incumbent Bouteflika, came in third place with only 15 seats. With the FIS poised to gain an absolute majority in parliament after the second round of elections, the secularist military staged a coup and took direct control of the government. This event triggered a civil war that lasted until the early 2000s. Six months after the coup, then-U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian alluded to the FIS attempt to gain power via the ballot box as, one man, one vote, one time. His words would become a popular phrase for those fearful of Islamists gaining power through democratic means. Remarkably, 20 years prior to the outbreak of the Arab Spring, the FIS was the first Islamist movement to win a large majority in national parliamentary elections. Despite its electoral victories, however, the military government eventually banned the FIS along with many other factions within the Islamist movement. The Islamist Movement Splinters Since the FIS was an umbrella organization of disparate radical Islamist factions, many armed branches reorganized themselves to create the jihadist wing of the Salafist movement after the military crackdown. Among the first to begin fighting the state was the Armed Islamic Movement, which had maintained its distance from the FIS during the elections. Others included the Movement for an Islamic State and al-Takfir wal-Hijra. The most prominent of these factions was the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria, which was responsible for most of the violence, including massacres that left as many as 200,000 dead during the civil war. By 1998, the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria had given way to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, which would evolve into al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb less than a decade later. Meanwhile, less radical elements within the insurgency coalesced around FIS leaders who had not been arrested and formed the Islamic Salvation Army, the groups military wing. However, the group was only active between 1994 and 1997 because both the government and the hard-line Armed Islamic Group of Algeria targeted it. In addition, the Islamic Salvation Army wanted to distance itself from the massacres committed by the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria and declared a unilateral cease-fire in September 1997 before disbanding in 1999. The Muslim Brotherhood Parallel Throughout the civil war, the countrys Muslim Brotherhood movement, which called itself the Movement for Society and Peace, remained loyal to the state. Though much smaller than the FIS, the Movement for Society and Peace had always remained a parallel Islamist trend. In sharp contrast to the Salafist FIS, the Movement for Society and Peace supported the military government despite the 1992 coup and participated in the revived electoral process during the mid-1990s. These differences often put the Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamists at odds. Still, Algiers benefited from both. On one hand, the National Liberation Front-led government had the Movement for Society and Peace and the newly formed secular opposition party National Rally for Democracy within the civilian ruling coalition during the civil war. As this new civilian system developed, the government also made use of the FIS demilitarization to defeat the jihadists in the Salafist Group for Call and Combat. Between the civil war and the alignment of the Movement for Society and Peace with the government, the FIS weakened tremendously to the point where it was no longer in a position to revive itself. President Bouteflikas Containment With stability returning, Algeria finally held a presidential election in 1999, and Bouteflika won by running on the platform to end the countrys civil war. He took the dual policy of dealing with Salafists and Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamists to a new level with an amnesty program that released FIS leaders while keeping the movement banned. In his first term (1999-2004), Bouteflika laid the groundwork for this national reconciliation initiative in the form of the Charter for Peace and Reconciliation. The global climate that emerged in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks also helped him deal with jihadists such as the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, who, although significantly weakened, were still a threat to the government. Bouteflika waited until his second term (2004-2009) before operationalizing the Charter for Peace and Reconciliation in the form of a September 2005 referendum that later became law in early February 2006. The new atmosphere of peace enabled him to focus on reviving the economy, which had declined significantly during the civil war. In light of these improvements, the government further lifted restrictions on FIS leaders and members, even though the group remained banned. During this time, however, Bouteflika was first hospitalized, allegedly for the treatment of stomach cancer. Bouteflikas poor health exacerbated rivalries within the ruling coalition, particularly those in the military and the intelligence service. Still, Bouteflika was able to win a third term in 2009. In fact, the government had become so robust that by the time the Arab Spring began in 2010, Algiers was the only government in North Africa largely unaffected by the movement, although some major protests did occur. Nevertheless, the Arab Spring did magnify rifts within the ruling coalition. The governments internal dynamics, especially concerning the Movement for Society and Peace, broke down largely because of the question surrounding the transition of power after Bouteflika. This break weakened the post-civil war political system, and the presidential alliance completely unraveled after the Movement for Society and Peace — encouraged by the success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt — left the government. Instead, the Movement for Society and Peace and the Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamist groups Ennahda and el-Islah formed the Green Alliance to contest the ruling coalition in the 2012 elections. Interestingly, the Movement for Society and Peace won fewer seats as part of the Green Alliance than when it was part of the ruling coalition. Moreover, Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamism splintered further with the emergence of several Movement for Society and Peace rivals such as the Ennahda, el-Islah, el-Adala, Rally of Algerian Hope, Front for National Change and the National Building Movement. Renewing Algeria Despite the unraveling of Bouteflikas coalition, the National Liberation Front was able to gain greater control of parliament in the 2012 elections, winning more than 200 seats. Moreover, in April 2014, Bouteflika won a fourth term — even though his health has sharply deteriorated to the point where he goes long periods of time without being seeing in public. The pending succession is not just a transition to a new president but also a time for the government to renew itself. As factions within the ruling civil-military government compete for power, and the Muslim Brotherhood-type Islamists are not part of the coalition, Algiers is trying to ensure continuity by reaching out to the Salafist FIS. After the Salafist Group for Call and Combat rebranded itself as al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb in 2007, there was internal dissent, and Algiers seized the opportunity to incorporate some jihadists through various amnesty offers. Bringing the FIS into the fold may encourage further defections from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb and could further undermine support for the group among Algerian Salafists. Doing so can also enable the government to deal with the lingering jihadist problem, especially as neighboring Libya and Egypt continue to be arenas for militant groups. The Islamic State factor in Syria and Iraq is also on the minds of Algerian leaders. A faction of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb broke off and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State, calling itself Jund al-Khilafah. By reaching out to the FIS, the government hopes to incorporate the group and make it a bulwark against radical Salafism and jihadism. In many ways, it appears Algeria is trying to replicate the trend within Egypt where the military-backed government has the support of the Salafist-oriented al-Nour Party. The key difference is that Cairo is using the al-Nour Party as a counter to the Muslim Brotherhood, while Algiers is interested in strengthening the ruling coalition by exacerbating rivalries between competing Islamist trends. Reaching out to the FIS ultimately sends a message to the Movement for Society and Peace-led Green Alliance and other Muslim Brotherhood-style Islamist factions that the government can function without them. The FIS re-entry into the political system can create greater competition between the rival Salafist and Muslim Brotherhood factions of an already fragmented Islamist landscape — rendering it more manageable for Algeria. The success of this strategy will depend on the next Algerian presidents ability to rally all the players within the secularist civil-military bureaucracy as the government prepares for Bouteflikas eventual departure. Foto: Algerian Islamic leader Madani Mezrag, former chief of the armed wing of the Islamic Salvation Army, listens to media questions at a press conference in Algiers on Oct. 29, 2006
Posted on: Sat, 20 Dec 2014 20:29:12 +0000
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