How to Change the World Week 1 – Lecture 2 Genealogy of the - TopicsExpress



          

How to Change the World Week 1 – Lecture 2 Genealogy of the Idea of Social Good (23:08) [MUSIC] >> So who would be the standard bearer for the Communitarian view in, or one of the standard bearers in the, in the tradition. >> Well I think the best examples is, is Rousseau. Rousseau in the discourse on the origins of inequality, explicitly takes on Hobbes. Hobbes supposes that our private goods are inherently conflicting, and theyre inherently conflicting because of scarcity. >> Right. If I want something and you want it, we become enemies. >> Right. And because were rational, and this is really an interesting point about Hobbes Because were rational, we can see into the future, and we can recognize that were going to have needs in the future. >> Yes. >> And therefore were going to want to have resources today to meet those needs. >> Right. >> And so, scarcity is augmented by our rationality. If we were not such rational group beings, wed be like dogs. Wed be, wed eat our meal, and then wed fall asleep. >> Yes. [LAUGH] >> Until we got hungry again. >> And Russo challenges this notion of, of rationality and scarcity being linked? >> No, no, he doesnt. He he doesnt approach it quite that way. This is, the first idea is that material, the goods and things that we want to satisfy our appetites are scarce. The second idea is that we, the scarcity is augmented by this for, capacity to look forward. The third idea is that we all have an inherent desire for what Hobbes calls glory. >> Yes. >> Or we might think of it as status. >> Right. >> I want to stand above you. You want to stand above me. The thing with status is that its zero sum by definition >> Right. >> Because my status is a function of how I stand relative to you. So in the beginning of part two of The Leviathan Hobbes supposes the question, why do some social animals live together in societies, he mentions the ants and the bees. >> Yes >> Without some kind of power structure. >> Right. His answer is, man whose joy consists in comparing himself with others can desire only that which is eminent. >> Mh-hm, yes >> And so thats thats the intrinsic scarcity. And Rousseaus critique of Hobbes is to say, look, these kinds of desires arent hardwired. >> Right. These kinds of desires are a function of the social world in which we. >> Yes. >> If we live in some kinds of social worlds, well develop those kinds of desires, and in those social worlds, there is not much of a common good. Because if your interests are inherently antagonistic. >> Yes. >> Then there isnt going to be a common good between you. But in other social worlds where you come to have desires that are compatible with the satisfaction of other people, and therefore no desires that are based upon invidious distinctions of status, then you can have a common good and you can organize the society in accordance with that. >> So some societies are organized to promote this pursuit of honor or what Rousseau always called vanity. And other, and others, could, they could organize, they could be organized differently. >> Yes. >> Or be disorganized, I guess. >> Is another way, >> Yes, well, and of course to the extent that honor and so forth are drives of the people in that society. >> Right. >> The societies are likely to be characterized by high levels of competition and violence. >> Yes. >> Or practices like dueling and other kinds of practices that. That lead to violence. Pinker makes a big point of this in his book on The Better Angels of Our Nature. >> Yeah, maybe you can say a word about that. Because well be fast-forwarding to, to more contemporary discussions. Steven Pinker, who is a psychologist and and commentator on social and political issues. has, has talked about the potential for overcoming violence, or the, actually the historical evolution away from violence. >> Yes. >> Maybe youll say a word about that. >> Yes, well, Pinkers argument is that we, we have moved away from violence, both within domestic societies and at the world level. As a result of the creation of political structures that secure order for large, for large numbers of people and therefore we, people dont have to, as it were, rely on self help to form some defense. >> Right. >> And so were moving away from the kind of Hobbesian state of nature >> Yes. >> Towards a state of civil order. And he actually draws on Norbert Elias work on the civilizing process too, he discussed that. >> So as you know in this class, weve read someone who was we start off really with someone who was much more pessimistic than Professor Pinker with Garrett Hardins essay on the Tragedy of the Commons, right? And that seems to echo Hobbes. In the sense that theres, although it may not be about honor in, in Arns case, but theres a sense of, of conflict that you pursue rationally. I mean to go back to this notion of seeing into the future, you pursue things rationally but our very rationality leads us to tragic conflict. >> Right, right, this is the, this is that paradise we were talking about before. From an individual point of view, Im inclined to advance my own private good. >> Right. >> Since youre inclined to advance your own private good, we could end up actually creating a situation thats worse for both of us even though were being very, were rationally pursuing our own private goods. And Hardin specifically talks about common property situations. So, an example would be ocean fisheries. The weve seen for example the exhaustion of many of the richest, worlds richest fish stocks. This is a result of the fact that individual fisher Fishers. >> Fishers. [CROSSTALK] [LAUGH] >> Go into these waters and take up as much fish as they can. >> Right. Its in their self-interest to do so. >> Exactly. Right. And, and so as a result of everybody acting this way, The sustain, they, their total yield exceeds the sustainable level of harvesting and over a while, the fish stocks begin to die off. Now they, their, their mutual interest to self, to back to self-restraint, but they cant do it as individuals, because if I restrain myself and you dont, >> Right. >> I pay the full cost. Of that self restraint. >> Right. >> I have a smaller catch, and I dont get any of the benefits. >> So its rational to assume that the other guy would, would be a free rider >> Exactly. >> Or would take advantage of the situation. And so, to prohi, to prevent that, or to mitigate its effects. One pursues ones own self interest, but the result is that everyone is worse off. >> And we all, and we all spiral down, exactly. And thats the same dynamic that Hobbes thought would characterize the state of nature where were concerned about security. I want to, to secure myself and so therefore I see you as an, as an enemy and so therefore It makes sense for me to strike first to get you before you can get me. >> Yeah. >> But its exactly the same on your part, and so as a result of this, were both extremely insecure. And for both Hobbs and Hardin, the only way that they could think of of getting out of the situation is to erect. A form of authority >> Right >> That will limit our choices and sanction us, coerce us. >> Right >> If we violate those surfs because otherwise well all be defecting, well all be free riders. And well fail to bring about the common good. >> So, so the, you cant, from that perspective you cant discover or you dont discover the common good, or the social good on your own. It has to be drilled into you, so to speak by a, by a, an outside authority. >> Absolutely, and specifically talking about an an institution that wields coercive power, the ability to ultimately back up those rules that require our self restraint. With force. >> Yeah. >> So that it becomes in our own private interest to act in accordance with a rule. >> Right. >> That promotes the, the interests of the group as a whole. >> So we dont have to deal with the authorities who have the power of violence, or the power to fine us, or, or imprison us. >> Yeah, of course thats, thats the problem. [LAUGH] >> You have a new problem. >> You, you erect the authority to control this problem and then you hit a new one that the authority then becomes exploited and so forth. >> So this is in some ways the flip side of the Adam Smith version, right? Or where they, where that the pursuit of our individual interest is mutually reenforcing in a way that everyone benefits to everybodys, the tide comes in, everybody rises. >> Right, and the first law of social science is some are, some arent. >> Right. >> So, and so what we really need to think about, and what is done in a lot of our courses here at Wesleyan and especially in, in the Social sciences, economics in particular, sociology, political science, are what we call government here. >> Right. >> It is to try to understand the conditions under which spontaneous self-interested behavior generates good outcomes. >> Yeah. >> For the group as a whole, and conditions under which it doesnt. >> Right. >> And so, this goes back to Hardens point about the tragedy of the commons. The first commons you could say is the is, is the land itself. >> Right. >> And if you think about say the way a hunter-gatherer society operates, they treat the land as a commons. They dont actually take physical possession of the territory. >> Right. >> They harvest the, the goods and certainly, the foods, >> Stuff. >> The berries [LAUGH] and so on that they find in nature. And thats fine as long as the carrying capacity of the land is greater than the population of hunter gatherers. But if the population of hunter/gatherers begins to grow, they will begin to over harvest >> Right, right. >> Just like the fishers in the ocean fisheries, and as a result of this, it will degrade the carrying capacity of the land and everybody will be badly off. The solution to that problem is privatization and this is, this is The argument that we find first made in this form by John Locke. >> Right. >> In the Second Treatise of Government. If we divide up the land, >> Right. >> And we move into settled agriculture, the land becomes so much more productive. That we will be able to support a much larger population than we could have supported by treating the land as a commons and we wont degrade it because every individual propriater has an interest in a, as in insuring that the future flow of product from the land will be high. Because they pay the full cost of any investment or self-restraint they have to make. But they also get the full benefit. Whereas in the fisheries case that we talked about a minute ago, they pay the full cost but they only get a small fraction of the benefit. So by dividing up the common property resource, thats how Harden is using the word commons. By making it, dividing it up into private property you can so increase productivity, says Locke. >> Yes. >> That well all be better off than we were before. >> So from Lockes perspective we dont need such a strong external authority because its in our self interest to preserve our land for the future. Were seeing into the future, and in this case, seeing into the future actually helps us be more productive? >> Yes exactly, thats, I mean of course, prior to Hobbes, the great philosophers of both the classical Greece and Rome, of the Arab world, of the Christian Middle Ages all thought that reason was the key to human harmony. Because through reason, we could grasp the order of things and see what our, where our duties lay and so forth. So Hobbes has the extraordinary originality to turn that on its head and see reason is actually in some ways the source of our, of our discontent. >> Yes, and Harden, I guess picks up on that in a way, right? Its because from Hardins perspective its also reason in a kind of, its almost, I dont know if its what wed call it game theory at that time, but If you know the rational perspective will lead us to disaster. >> Exactly. >> Why did he think, what was he thinking about at that time? What was the issue? >> Well, he was specifically thinking about the problem of population and at that time, there was a lot of concern that population was growing at unsustainable rates. >> Right. >> And the, and he was saying we should think about population or natality decisions reproductive decisions as really kind of commons, because if the world can only support a certain number of people >> Right. >> Then whenever you have offspring, you are not simply effecting just yourself. >> Right. >> And your immediate household. Youre effecting everybody else in the world. >> That carrying capacity of the planet, I guess. Right? >> Exactly. Yeah, and so he, he thought that the solution would be to adopt some kind of authoritative limitations, perhaps of the sort you saw a few years later in China limiting what people could do in terms of birth. This is a, you know, characteristic kind of Hobbesian solution. >> Right. [LAUGH] >> You pass a law. You enforce the law. [LAUGH] With the police. >> Right. >> And he thought very much along the lines that you were just suggesting that. We cant preach to people and say, you should be responsible, you should practice self restraint, because, those people are be, in effect being being played as chumps. >> Yeah. >> Cause theyll practice self restraint. The other people will go on behaving badly >> Right. >> And over time the self-restrainers will disappear from the population. Its kind of an evolutionary. >> Right, because those other people will be having all thpse children. >> Exactly. Of course theres a lot of assumptions being made there. Like, if I came from a big family Im going to have a big family. >> Right. >> Im a lip breeder. My children will be breeders. But, whatever. >> But I guess that the, the article was you know, its brief, its its it seems in some ways delimited. But it caught on so much, because, perhaps because of this notion that it was our very rationality, the thing were so proud about, that was leading us to disaster. I mean, I guess in some ways, Horkheimer and Adorno made a, a, a, a parallel argument, like its, enlightenment itself is leading to Fascism. That rationality leads to disaster. I mean, theres a, theres a, I guess, in the post war period, there was almost a critique of rationality with. Does that seem reasonable? That >> Yeah. I would actually perhaps say its a critique of instrumental rationality. If you think about say, a Kantian idea of practical reason which involves the idea of finding a rational basis for norms, like the norm of respecting other persons, treating them as ends in themselves. Hob, Kant saw, rather in a pre-Hobbesian way, so to speak. Kant saw the development of the human capacity for reason as enabling them to grasp moral principles and therefor to learn how to live with one another. >> Yes. And to bring a better situation ultimately of perpetual peace in the world. >> So that external authority gets internalized, right? We have the, we have our norms that we conform to because the norms are reasonable, and we restrain ourselves rather than needing the cops. >> [LAUGH] Exactly and in fact, this is Well, we probably need a little bit of cops in the background. [LAUGH] Because you dont want to think, I mean, of course the anarchists, I mean, you think about William Godwin, they thought we could really do the, do, do the whole thing and there was no need for any kind of external authority. For people like Rousseau and Kant and people in that tradition We need to recognize that were imperfectly reasonable and therefore there is slippage. But the idea, the core idea behind this Kantian, and I, actually he got it from Rousseau, I mean he only said that >> Yes. >> Is the idea of, the question of how could we be free, and live in society with others. because if were living in society, the society has to have an order. Otherwise, its just a deglomeration and if it has an order, then there are rules or norms that were going to have to conform to in order to bring, to create that order. But if I have to conform to those rules, then how can I be free? And their answer is, well if those rules are rules that, you, yourself will because you see theyre reasonable. At least thats in Kants terms. Then as rational beings, you are conforming to those rules is conforming to your own decisions. >> Yes. >> And therefore you are free. >> So for when Rousseau says oh, freedom or the highest form of freedom, is obedience to a law that you give yourself, Hardens saying youd be irrational, youd be a chump to give that law to yourself. Because other people are going to be cheating and youre missing out. And worse than that, youll disappear. >> Exactly. Unless of course, theres this external authority thats sanctioning things. The law, yeah. >> So, so tell us a little bit about critiques of Harding. because I, pretty, although it caught on, it was, it, it captured the imagination of people. It also gave rise pretty quickly to critiques within economics, within social theory. >> Yes, absolutely. the, the I think the There are number of critiques. And they begin, they move away from Hardins, or the Hardin/Hobbes kind of H squared, [LAUGH]... >> [LAUGH] >> Position, in an incremental way. Theres no bright line here. So, we might think about the work of Eleanor Ostrom >> Right. >> Who won the Nobel Prize. And she did, actually did empirical studies of how social groups manage commons. >> Right. How farmers living in a relatively semi-arid area for example, managed water resources, and so on. >> Yes. >> And she talked about the, all kinds of social arrangements through which people could create, provide public goods for themselves. >> Mm-hm. >> Without having a centralized system of control and sanctioning. >> Mm-hm. >> Without the, the. >> Yes. >> The, the police. >> Yes. >> So to speak. Now, there are always police in the sense that, if we are involved in a situation that is defined by norms that are specifying forms of reciprocity. >> Right. >> Your failure to conform to those norms will lead your the people that youre cooperating with to withdraw cooperation from you. >> Right. Right. >> And so. Is, to the extent, for example, that your behavior is visible. >> Right, yeah. >> So we can tell whether youre playing by the rules. >> Right. >> And the extent that we already have a normative structure in place. >> Yeah. >> Then, the system can be relatively self-regulating. And we can, because itll be in your long-term self interest. >> Yes. >> To conform to the rules. Uh-huh >> Not alienating my fellows, yeah. >> Exactly, because the opportunities for reciprocity with others make you so much better off than you would be. It doesnt pay to, to take a one off and deviate then and have people withdraw from you. This is the kind of core idea behind the idea of social capital. >> Right. And Bob Putnam, you may know his work >> Sure >> In Italy, where he compares governmental performance in difference areas of Italy >> Yeah. >> And argues that there are areas of Italy where, the civic engagement and political engagement and the self-organizing activities of people in social groups to provide themselves with various goods. Beginning in sort of the late middle ages with security and moving forward into the modern period with technology, knowledge, education and so forth. Creates this high level of social capital and high levels of governmental performance in these areas where other areas it created very low levels of civic engagement and low levels of government performance. The irony is, is that the, the areas with the low levels is, of civic culture Were areas that had the pure Hobbsian solution. >> Yes, yeah. Because they add the problem that create this strong government, which actually doesnt solve the problem, it creates other problem, right? Yeah. >> Right, and it create, it tends to break up the one on one relationships among people. >> Yes. >> That generates these webs of interconnectedness and so forth. And theres an economic basis to this as well. >> Right. >> Because in the North where you had these things, you had small proprietorships and you had, artisanal based economies and that sort of thing. Where as in the South, [COUGH] you had large land owners and plantations, well, what we would call today, plantation style agriculture. And you see the same thing in the United States. Where in the North you have very strong, lots of small independent proprietors developing as Tocqueville noted years ago. >> Yeah >> The associational life where they cooperated together to meet their mutual needs, and so forth. Whereas in the South with the system of slavery and the system on the large plantations and so forth, you didnt have these kinds of things and the North is the bastion of democracy, high levels of social capital and so forth. >> Yeah. >> So.
Posted on: Sat, 25 Jan 2014 10:00:21 +0000

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