Is Russias Destiny Autocratic? Global Affairs Wednesday, February 19, 2014 - 04:07 Print Text Size Global Affairs with Robert D. Kaplan Stratfor By Robert D. Kaplan In 1967, the late British historian Hugh Seton-Watson wrote in his epic account, The Russian Empire, 1801-1917, If there is one single factor which dominates the course of Russian history, at any rate since the Tatar conquest, it is the principle of autocracy. He goes on to explain how the nations of Western Europe were formed by a long struggle between the monarchial power and the social elite. In England, the elite usually won, and that was a key to the development of parliamentary democracy. But in Russia it was generally agreed that rather than granting special privileges to an elite, It was better that all should be equal in their subjection to the autocrat. This profound anti-democratic tradition of Russian political culture has its roots in geography, or as Seton-Watson prefers to explain it, in military necessity. Between the Arctic ice and the mountains of the Caucasus, and between the North European Plain and the wastes of the Far East, Russia is vast and without physical obstacles to invasion. Invasion of Russia is easy, and was accomplished, albeit with disastrous results, by Napoleon and Hitler, as well as by the armies of the Mongols, Sweden, Lithuania and Poland. As Seton-Watson argues, Imagine the United States without either the Atlantic or the Pacific, and with several first-rate military powers instead of the Indians, and you would have a sense of Russias security dilemma. Whereas in America the frontier meant opportunity, in Russia, he says, it meant insecurity and oppression. Because security in Russia has been so fragile, there developed an obsession about it. And that obsession led naturally to repression and autocracy. Russias brief and rare experiments with democracy or quasi-democracy were failed and unhappy ones: Witness the governments of Alexander Kerensky in 1917 that led to the Bolshevik Revolution and of Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s that led to Vladimir Putins neo-czardom. Truly, Russias fare has been autocracy, and given the utter cruelty of czars and communists, Putin is but a mild dictator. When Western pundits and policymakers say they are unhappy with his autocratic arrangement, they are basically making a negative judgment on Russian history. For by Russias historical standards, Putin is certainly not all that bad. Putin now represents an autocrat in crisis, a familiar story in Russia. His problems are, for the most part, unsolvable, like those faced by Russian autocrats before him. And there are many of them. Controlling the ultimate destiny of Ukraine is of paramount importance to him, for reasons both geographical and historical. Russia grew out of ninth century Kievan Rus, located in present-day Ukraine. Ukraines population density (compared to immense tracts of Russia) and geographical position make it a crucial pivot for the Kremlin, if it wants to permanently dominate Eastern Europe and the Black Sea. Yet, Putin finds that he cannot wholly control Ukraine or further undermine its sovereignty. There is simply a very substantial element in Ukrainian politics and society that demands a shift closer to Europe and the European Union. Putin has various tools to undermine Ukraine, such as erecting trade barriers and rationing deliveries of natural gas. But it is hard work, and he probably can never achieve an outright victory. Putin fears the westward, pro-NATO and pro-EU stirrings inside the former Soviet republics of Georgia and Moldova. He fears unrest in former Soviet Central Asia, where reliably autocratic, Soviet-style regimes may soon face increasing turmoil at the hands of Islamic fundamentalists -- the very force Putin fears could destabilize Russia itself. Russia needs stability and compliance in its near abroad, and both will be increasingly at risk in Central Asia: Witness Kazakhstans recent currency crisis. Putin not only worries about Russias possible deteriorating position in world energy markets in the long term, but of the rising demographic weight of Muslims in Russian society over the long term, too. Putin worries about an American-Iranian rapprochement, given how the estrangement for so long between those two countries has been so convenient to Russias interest. Oh, and heres what Putin really isnt happy about: internal interference in Russian politics by American, pro-democracy nongovernmental organizations. What the United States considers human rights activity, he considers foreign subversion. And that goes for what American NGOs are doing in Ukraine also. Putin wants to engage in cynical geopolitical deal making; instead he often gets lectures on morality from the West. Could Putin actually be toppled? Not likely. The unhappiness with his rule that the Western media fervently wants to believe in is probably manageable, and a really free and fair election today in Russia would probably return him to power. He is only 61 years old and lives a relatively healthy life, unlike Yeltsin, who drank to excess. Sure, Putin is under extreme levels of stress. But you dont rise to his position in a place like Russia without the ability to handle levels of intrigue and anxiety that would psychologically decimate the average American politician. The United States has every right to hate Putin for the Snowden affair alone. But, as Ive indicated, Washington may be dealing with Putin for many years yet. As his dictatorship continues, he is liable to become more embattled, and rather than move toward reform, he is more likely to retreat further into a corrosive, authoritarian model. For that is a Russian historical tendency -- something Seton-Watson would have understood. If that is the case, Russian institutions and civil society, such as they exist, will further deteriorate. And with that, a post-Putin Russia, whenever it comes, could be a Russia in some substantial degree of chaos. Putin is not like Spains Gen. Francisco Franco, who in his latter years methodically laid the groundwork for a less authoritarian, post-Franco era. He is not like the collegial autocrats of present-day China, who have made their country -- with all its problems -- a relatively safe and predictable place for foreigners to do business and thus aid the development of the Chinese economy. While Russia, with its high literacy rates and quasi-European culture, cannot be compared with the much less developed Arab world, Putins Russia does contain a scent of the thuggery and benightedness that characterized former regimes in Tunisia and Egypt. Because Putin is not a modernizer -- he is building neither a civil society nor a 21st century knowledge economy -- he is leading Russia toward a familiar dead end, from which only chaos or more autocracy can issue. Russia is not fated to be governed illiberally forever. Geography is being tempered by technology, and individual choice can overcome -- or at least partly overcome -- the legacy of history. Though one cannot speculate about which future leader or group of leaders can save Russia, one can outline the shape of a less autocratic yet stable power arrangement. And that shape must feature decentralization. Because of Russias very vastness -- nearly half the longitudes of the earth -- democracy in Russia must be a local phenomenon as well as a Moscow phenomenon. The Far East, oriented around Vladivostok, must be able to carve out its own political shape and identity, the same with other parts of Russia. The center must become by stages weaker, even as the whole Federation becomes more vibrant because of the emergence of a rule of law. Such a Russia would draw in a near abroad united by a legacy of Russian language use from Soviet and czarist times. Centralization is not the opposite of anarchy; civil society is. Thus only civil society can save Russia. A Chronology of Russias Military and Defense Strategy Feb 19, 2014 Is Russias Destiny Autocratic? Feb 14, 2014 A Chronology of Russias Relationship with Former Soviet States Article Author Robert D. Kaplan Robert D. Kaplan is the author of Asias Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific, which will be published by Random House in March 2014. In 2012, he published The Revenge of Geography: What the Map Tells Us about Coming Conflicts and the Battle Against Fate, and in 2010, Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. In both 2011 and 2012, he was chosen by Foreign Policy magazine as one of the worlds Top 100 Global Thinkers. View Full Biography Editors Choice Ukraine: On the Edge of Empires The Mythical El Chapo The Future of Russias Military: Part 1 Stratfor What is Stratfor? Stratfor provides global awareness and guidance to individuals, governments and businesses around the world. We use a unique, intel-based approach to analyze world affairs. About Us About Our Analysts FAQs Stratfor In The News Careers Client Solutions Copyright © 2013 Stratfor | 221 West 6th Street Suite 400 - Austin, TX 78701, USA
Posted on: Sun, 23 Feb 2014 14:52:24 +0000
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