Islam and Conflict in the Horn of Africa Lecture Delivered at the American University of Beiru Darfur, the western-most province of Sudan that borders Chad and Libya, has been much in the news lately because of the ethnic cleansing, some say genocide, which is occurring there. There are deep and varied historical roots to the conflict. Religion, however, does not appear to be one of them. Virtually all of the parties involved practice essentially the same brand of Islam. American Islamic scholar John Voll explains that Islam and modern state structures are today closely related in Sudan. Muslim movements provide important foundations for the development of a centralized state and modern political system. Islam has not, however, created an inclusive Sudanese national identity. It has served as an alternative for organizing the state and, consequently, it has sometimes led to disunity and conflict. Since the establishment of the Mahdiyya in the late 1880s, Voll notes that the Islamic view of the state, political processes and community identity have played an important and sometimes crucial role in Sudanese politics and society. But Voll argues that Islamic ideals of centralized state and Muslim communal ties divide rather than unify. Sudanese diversity, he continues, makes it impossible for Islam to provide the basis for a Sudanese national identity or a Sudanese nation-state. Somalia offers a very different picture. It does not have the Muslim-Christian-animist divisions that have contributed to fueling a civil war in Sudan. Until relatively recently, Islam has been a significant unifying factor for Somali society. Somalis are highly orthodox and have a deep attachment to their faith. The Somali coast has been in contact with Islam for a thousand years. They are Sunnis of the Shafii rite and comprise three primary Sufi tariqas: the Qadiriyya, Salihiyya and Ahmadiyya. These moderate sects follow the teachings of Islamic mystics and scholars, have no particular political agenda and welcome good relations with secular political authorities. Somalis have traditionally recognized two principal authorities: clan elders and religious leaders. Islam has been assimilated into clan culture. Many aspects of sharia have also been incorporated into clan law, but remain subordinate to it. Islam has traditionally been a benign, positive influence on Somali society. The situation has become more complex over the past couple of decades. Competing movements ranging from neo-fundamentalists to progressive Islamists to Islamic extremists are now part of the picture in Somalia. There are a number of relatively new kinds of Islamist movements in Somalia. The most radical is al Itihad al Islami (AIAI). Its goal is the unification of all Somali territories, i.e. those that are now part of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti, and the creation of an Islamic state. It acknowledged carrying out terrorist attacks against Ethiopia in the mid-1990s and is believed to have had contact with al Qaeda, which probably has several cells functioning in Somalia. Under military pressure from Ethiopia, AIAI became a loose association of followers and has been noticeably quiet lately. ManyAIAI members abandoned militant tactics in favor of private enterprise, social services and proselytizing. Non-violent fundamentalist groups include al Tabliq and al Majma al Islam. They are highly conservative movements based on the teachings of similar movements inIndia and Pakistan. Al Tabliq has become the largest fundamentalist Islamist movement in Somalia. It claims to be non-violent and is known for quiet proselytism. Al Majma al Islam comprises a group of Islamic clerics in Mogadishu who see themselves as the true representative of all Muslims in Somalia. It asserts that no Somali should cooperate with foreign nationals who seek to capture terrorists in the country and that Somali leaders should pursue an Islamic peace conference inside Somalia rather than support the ongoing peace process in neighboring Kenya. Al Islah is generally considered a modernist Islamic organization. It began as a non-governmental organization to interface with Islamic charities in the Gulf States. It claims to seek political liberalization, respect for human rights and construction of a democratic state. On the other hand, it opposes the presence of Western institutions in fields like education. It provides health, education and social services and may control most oftheschoolsinMogadishu today. There is no indication that it engages in violent activity. Ansar-e Sunna is a Wahhabi organization made up of traders and returnees from the Gulf who had close ties to Saudi Arabia. It receives support from Saudi organizations such as the Saudi Red Crescent. Its Wahhabi philosophy has kept it from becoming very influential with Somalias Sufi-dominated population. Traditionalist groups represented by Sufi brotherhoods and Ahlu Sunna WA Jamaa coexist alongside these ideological newcomers. In fact, Sufis created Ahlu Sunna wa Jamaa to counter the influence of the most radical Islamist trends. The movement consists of politically motivated sheikhs who preach social harmony aimed at debunking the beliefs and political views of al Ittihad and other fundamentalist movements. Together with these new politically motivated groups has been an increase in sharia courts, which in Mogadishu have been one of the few structures for maintaining any semblance of law and order. There has also been an expansion in Islamic charities. The mainstream charities have a relatively progressive vision of a future Islamic order in Somalia that they hope replaces the destructive political factions organized along clan lines. A small group of radical Islamic charities has a strong anti-Western agenda. Radical groups increased their strength following the failure of the West in the early 1990s to resolve Somalias political and economic problems. As a result of these new Islamic groups and unpopular Western and/or American policies such as the war in Iraq, there has been a sharp increase in anti-American and anti-Western opinion in Somalia. This situation was not helped when, after the September 11 attacks, the US briefly focused its counterterrorist attention on Somalia. A small country with a tiny population, Djibouti has managed to avoid conflict linked to religious differences. Three Afar opposition groups formed the Front for the Restoration of Unity and Democracy in 1991 and tried for a number of years to topple the government. This group has been inactive in recent years and, in any event, both the opposition Afars and the Somali-dominated government hold similar Islamic beliefs based on Sufism. Djibouti is not immune to the efforts of fundamentalist groups seeking to become influential in the country. Saudi Arabia financed a new Islamic Center and support from Wahhabi groups has significantly expanded the number of mosques in the country. The cleric at the most important mosque in Djibouti City was reportedly trained at the Cairo theological center known for its radical Islamist doctrine. So far, these developments do not appear to have added significantly to religious tension in the country. Eritrea, which is divided about equally between Muslims and Christians, has the potential for religious conflict and, by some accounts, tension is slowly increasing. Perhaps most surprising, however, is the fact that relations between Muslims and Christians are as good as they are. Eritreas struggle for independence suggests that the post-independence period might have been much less harmonious. Muslim pastoralists in the coastal and western lowlands generally supported the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) while Christian highlanders broke from the ELF in 1976 to form the Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front (EPLF). The EPLF prevailed over the ELF in the mid-1980s and took control of the new independent government in the early 1990s. Although Christians tend to dominate the Eritrean government today, Muslims have been brought in. One militant Islamic group created in 1980, the Eritrean Islamic Jihad Movement (EIJM), has as its goal the overthrow of the Eritrean government. The EIJM is the only organization that claims to represent the grievances of Muslim Eritreans. Supported by Sudan, EIJM has had and may still have links with al Qaeda and has conducted terrorist acts inside Eritrea. For its part, Eritrea has supported groups hostile to the government of Sudan, including the Sudan Peoples Liberation Front and the Beja Congress. Asmara also serves as the headquarters for the anti-Sudan National Democratic Alliance. Although most EIJM sympathizers do not subscribe to its militant Islam, Eritrean scholar Ruth Iyob says they resent the governments curtailment of Muslim rights as well as the denial of Eritreas Afro-Arab heritage. Iyob adds that following the defeat of the ELF by the EPLF, most Eritrean Muslims found themselves without political representation. Islam gradually emerged as a form of social protest to fill the void created by secular modernizers. Travel by Eritrean Muslims to Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Sudan has also exposed them to more radical forms of Islam. Eritrea seems to have avoided significant attention by Wahhabi organizations. This is surprising because of its location across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Al-Haramain has established a medical center that provides care for some 200 people daily. There is also little information available that indicates the existence of competition among different Islamic philosophies in the country. As this tension among different Islamic groups’ increases in neighboring countries, it remains to be seen if Eritrea can avoid some of the same challenges. Ethiopia, the most populous country in the region and in many ways the key to stability or conflict in the Horn, is facing a religious watershed in a rapidly changing situation. Arab followers of Islam in danger of persecution by local authorities in Arabia took refuge early in the 7th century in the Aksumite Kingdom of the Ethiopian Christian highlands. The Ethiopians treated them well and permitted them to practice their religion. Consequently, the Prophet concluded that Ethiopia should not be targeted for jihad. Christian-Islamic relations remained generally cordial until a series of Islamic raids began to plague the Christian highlands in the late 15th century and continued through the first half of the 16th century. Subsequent incursions by the forces of the Khedive of Egypt and from neighboring Sudan further hardened the views of Ethiopian Christians. As a result Christian-Muslim relations have been delicate ever since. Islam expanded gradually in Ethiopia, especially in the lower lying parts of the country. Most Ethiopian Muslims belong to indigenous ethnic groups; they are not the descendents of Arabs. Always treated as a secondary religion, Islam emerged in the shadow of Christianity and Muslims experienced discrimination. There were, however, only brief periods when Christian rulers tried to suppress Islam. There were other occasions, especially the period of rule from Gondar in the 17th century, when Muslim communities had considerable autonomy. Over the past 100 years, Muslim-Christian relations have been generally cordial. This relationship was subjected to increasing stress, however, following the policy by Sudans Islamist government in the 1990s to export fundamentalism and the more recent efforts by Wahhabi organizations to influence Islam in Ethiopia. These activities have not been well received by the majority of Ethiopian Muslims who follow Sufi beliefs. As the Wahhabi try to instill their creed in Ethiopia they encounter strong opposition from traditional Sufi Muslims. Nevertheless, many Ethiopian Muslims welcome the financing provided by the Wahhabi for mosques, schools and clinics, especially in areas where the government and other international donors have not met local needs. Gulf state charities have also provided social services and modest quantities of emergency assistance. During a meeting in 2003 with the Secretary-General of the Muslim World League, the President of Ethiopias Supreme Council of Muslims praised the Saudi charities for their assistance, particularly those relating to the teaching of Islamic values and culture to the new generation of Ethiopians. But this needed assistance comes with a price. Wahhabism is not accepting of differing beliefs and tries to stamp out traditional Sufi practices. Wahhabi influence has led to the destruction of mosques of Muslims who follow Sufism. They have also destroyed tombstones, anathema to Wahhabis, in parts of Ethiopia. The Ethiopian Supreme Council of Muslims has struggled with Wahhabism in its ranks. For the time being, Sufis are in firm control. But it is an inescapable fact that Wahhabi proselytism has contributed to religious tension in Ethiopia. One should also note that overly zealous Protestant fundamentalists have had a similar impact on the relative religious harmony in Ethiopia. But that is a lecture for another occasion. Ethiopia must take account of Islam from two perspectives. It continues to be a largely Christian-led country nearly surrounded by Muslim countries and/or peoples. Historically; periodic attacks from Somalia, Sudan and even Egypt have made the Ethiopians wary. Ethiopia has at the moment reasonably cordial relations with Sudan and does not consider the Sudanese government an imminent threat. This has not always been the case and could change again. Ethiopia has worked hard to encourage development of a friendly national government in Somalia. For the moment, this policy seems to be working but this situation could change without warning. Relations with Egypt are also good but there is no guarantee they will remain so. Ethiopia is the source of 87 percent of the water reaching the Aswan Dam. The Nile is Egypts lifeline. Egypt and Sudan negotiated an agreement on Nile water usage; Ethiopia is not party to the document and according to its terms has no rights to the water in Ethiopia that eventually reaches the Nile. This situation obviously has the potential for conflict if not resolved by negotiation before there is a flash point. In addition to the implications for Ethiopia of its Islamic neighbors, Ethiopia must consider how to ensure cordial relations among its diverse Christian, Muslim and animist population. This will require a deft balancing of political power and equitable sharing of economic and social resources among the different groups. In a country where poverty is high and key resources are scarce, this is an enormous challenge that the international community would be well advised to monitor and provide assistance for. Ethiopia must also decide how to handle the inroads being made by the Wahhabi. The government has taken some steps to curb their influence, but this is done at the risk of losing important assistance from the Wahhabi charities.There is an especially interesting situation that illustrates the Wahhabi-Sufi competition and also involves Lebanon. Ethiopia conquered Harar, the old capital of Islam in the Horn of Africa, in 1887. Middle East scholars Mustafa Kabha and Haggai Erlich note, in a manuscript for publication, that Harar became the model of Islamic integration. But Harar is also home for two important, elderly sheiks with very different ideas about Islam. Sheikh Yusuf Abd al-Rahman al-Harari received his education in Mecca and Medina and is now a principal spokesman for Wahhabi ideas in Ethiopia. The other Skeikh, Abdalla ibn Muhammad ibn Yusuf al-Harari, received an Islamic education in Ethiopia and is a firm believer in Ethiopian Islamic-Christian coexistence. Sheikh Yusuf currently lives in Saudi Arabia and Sheikh Abdulla has lived in Beirut since 1950. Through their writings, the two sheiks continue to engage in verbal warfare concerning the future of Islam in Ethiopia. The followers of Sheikh Abdulla call themselves al-Abash. Their number in Ethiopia is not large but Ethiopian Muslims received Abdulla enthusiastically when he returned in 1969 and 1995. His writings are replete with Sufi terms, although he does not emphasize mysticism. He separates religion and state and is known for moderation. This Ethiopian connection with Lebanon is particularly interesting because both countries must walk a fine line to preserve harmony among their Christian and Muslim populations. Having spent 37 years in the US Foreign Service, much of it dealing with the Horn of Africa, I cannot resist a few comments on ways the US could improve its interaction with communities and governments in the Horn of Africa, especially Muslim communities. It is well known that the way Muslims view the US has become significantly more negative in recent years. Much of this is due to differences with American policy in the Middle East. Only more effective policy will significantly improve the situation. But there are some things that can be done even if the policy is unpopular. The US needs to think increasingly of the Horn of Africa (and East Africa) as a region and deal with it in that context rather than each country on a bilateral basis. This requires that people who are responsible for making the policy and those engaging in the implementation of it be thoroughly familiar with the region, including understanding of the fact that there are more Muslims than Christians living in the Horn. This, in turn, argues for personnel who not only understand the culture, history and, ideally, one of the key languages of the area, but have a good understanding of Islam and what it means to the region. My experience in the Horn suggests that the US rarely achieves this goal. It is high time to devote more resources to training and make more appropriate personnel assignments to rectify this lacuna. Good public diplomacy can seldom convince persons opposed to certain policies to accept them, but it can, if done effectively, make clear to detractors why the US is following those policies. Grass roots public diplomacy using personnel who know the issues, region and perhaps the local language will be more effective in making the case. This again puts a premium on more language and area training for public diplomacy personnel. Traditionally, the State Department has only offered language training in Arabic and Amharic for persons going to the Horn and, rarely, does it even provide training in those languages. It is not only necessary to expand the training in these languages but it should offer training in Oromo and Somali, once the US reopens a mission in Somalia. The Oromo, about 55 percent of whom are Muslim, constitute the largest ethnic group in the Horn of Africa. To its credit, the Voice of America offers exceedingly limited programming in Amharic, Oromo and Tigrinya. Not only should that service be expanded, but it should add several languages. The most obvious candidates are Arabic and Somali. Following the creation of Radio Sawa, VOA no longer broadcasts in Arabic. Sawa focuses on the Middle East and reportedly does not even reach the Horn of Africa. Arabic is the principal language in Sudan and spoken widely along the Red Sea and Indian Ocean coasts. It is inexplicable that the US is not broadcasting in Arabic to the Horn of Africa. It is equally inexplicable that the VOA has not yet established a service in Somali, a language spoken throughout Somalia/Somaliland and parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and Djibouti. As the worlds only superpower, one would think that the US could even afford to broadcast in a language like Afar that has listeners in Ethiopia, Djibouti and Eritrea. Working with Ethiopia and Eritrea, which have large numbers of Christians and Muslims, the US should encourage both governments to engage in policies and take tangible steps that improve religious harmony. In some cases this will require financial resources. The US and the international community should be willing to bear a significant part of the cost. At the policy level, there needs to be a meeting of the minds on the propagation of Wahhabism in the Horn of Africa. Most religions engage in proselytism, but if it results in conflict, it is time to reassess the situation A. M.A
Posted on: Fri, 25 Oct 2013 10:00:30 +0000
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