Issues that will shape presidential poll (1) January 13 , 2015 Written by Adekunle Ade - Adeleye In April 14 , 2014, Boko Haram insurgents invaded Chibok in Borno State and attacked a Girls ’ secondary school where they abducted some 219 schoolgirls writing their final examinations . They have since been held in captivity : married off to militants or sold into slavery , as Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau said, or kept somewhere safe , as the distraught parents of the girls hope. The abductions , which will doubtless weigh heavily on the February 2015 presidential poll , are an eerie reminder of the catastrophic manner the Iran hostage crisis of 1979- 1980 destroyed the electoral chances of President Jimmy Carter in the 1980 United States presidential election . In November 1979, a group of Iranian Islamist students and militants had held 52 American embassy staff hostage months after the fall of the friendly Shah Reza Pahlavi government. An April 1980 US commando raid to rescue the hostages had failed disastrously , leading many Americans to blame Mr Carter for the national crisis of confidence that ensued and the mood of pessimism that enveloped the country . He lost the election to his opponent, Ronald Reagan , by a landslide. At no time in Nigerian history have Nigerians felt such a sense of impotence and helplessness as they feel now under the government of President Goodluck Jonathan . Added to that impotence is the even more depressing sense of governmental ineptitude , where the federal government appears confused on what steps to take, or, worse , has resigned itself fatalistically to a sense of inevitability in grimly enduring terror attacks . The Jonathan government repeatedly affirms that terrorism is a global phenomenon, and that this is simply Nigeria ’ s time to share in the destructive effects of terror campaigns . More , the government has appeared to finally reconcile itself to its inability to do anything extraordinary to defeat terror . Its methods are the same day in, day out, and its approach futile and predictable both by beleaguered citizens and terror groups themselves. Immediately after the abductions , which revealed the weak underbelly of the Nigerian military , especially its blunted response time , the Jonathan government stunned the public by doubting the abduction story, thereby losing valuable time in tackling what was fast developing into a huge national crisis. The presidency ’s scepticism revealed something else more disturbingly fundamental: that the intelligence system was either compromised , weak or virtually inexistent. The president’ s wife, Dame Patience, embarked on farcical and melodramatic manoeuvres over the abductions , casting aspersion on those who blamed her husband for both the lack of security that aided the abductions and the government ’ s impotence in facing up to the tragic development . Nearly three weeks after the abductions , when Boko Haram had virtually determined exactly what nefarious things to do with the schoolgirls , the Jonathan government woke up belatedly to doing what it should have done in the first instance . It empanelled a 26 - member security /intelligence panel to investigate the circumstances of the abductions , and to establish the number , names , and background of the victims . Headed by Brig. Gen Ibrahim Sabo ( rtd ), the panel confirmed the abduction of 219 schoolgirls out of the 276 originally reported . But even after the confirmation of the abductions and the magnitude of the crime dawned on everyone , the Jonathan government ’ s response was still shambolic. There was no presidential crisis meeting on a scale that matched the tragedy , and the president did not feel sufficiently provoked or empathetic enough to visit the school where the horrendous crime took place, nor visit the distraught parents of the schoolgirls . Even when civil society groups organised the # BringBackOurGirls movement to draw world attention to the unprecedented crime , the government was more concerned about not politicising the Chibok abductions. It accused the opposition All Progressives Congress ( APC ) of fueling the crisis and mischievously influencing the protesters to embark on street protests or sit- ins . Soon after, also , the police attempted to disperse the protesters at a time when an outraged world was marshalling resources and efforts to focus attention on the girls . As some of the protesters alleged , the government ’s attitude was probably influenced by the fact that none of the daughters of highly placed presidency officials were among the victims . Roused into action by the horrifying scale of the crime , the world mobilised their armies and intelligence networks to assist in locating and rescuing the girls . But after a few weeks , according to their own confessions, they were shocked to discover that the Nigerian military had become unprofessional , unwilling to fight, poorly equipped , and corrupt. They grudgingly withdrew; and Nigeria itself lost interest . The joint winner of the 2014 Nobel Peace Prize , Malala Yousafzai , had to travel down to Nigeria to egg on President Jonathan to do something about the girls . It was only then that he promised to meet the Chibok parents . That meeting , sadly, took the ineffectual form of inviting the mourning Chibok parents to Abuja, where another scandal of money payments broke out. The abductions have become drawn out. It is now approximately nine months since the teenage girls were taken . It is unlikely to be resolved before the February poll. Both the abduction itself and the Jonathan government ’ s lackadaisical attitude to it persuaded the world that the Nigerian government was weak , ineffective and incompetent . Three African leaders spoke derisively of the Jonathan government ’s lily- livered approach, and the world press wrote scathing editorials to underscore their disgust . The abductions, more than any other factor , have persuaded angry and embittered Nigerians and even former presidents and heads of state that the government in Abuja is paralysed and overwhelmed . The Chibok tragedy will perhaps be the most important factor , outside the economy , to influence the outcome of the February poll. Insecurity in Northeast and elsewhere President Jonathan has consistently argued that he was not responsible for the outbreak of the Boko Haram insurgency, and that his inability to effectively deal with it was not just a question of incompetence but that it went back to previous governments, as far back as even the Gen Muhammadu Buhari regime , which refused to kit and arm the military to enable it fight wars . It is not clear whether these are not just political statements to garner votes and sympathy, for it is established that it was in the early 90s that Nigeria led ECOMOG troops to battle insurgents and keep the peace in Liberia and Sierra Leone . Financial and material provisions were budgeted and deployed to kit and arm the military in the process . However , it is true that the Boko Haram menace predate the Jonathan government . The sect began fomenting trouble in 2002 , metamorphosed and became openly violent in 2009 , while President Jonathan took office in 2010 . But five years is a long time in the life of any government . It is more than enough to give an indication of the government ’ s ability , its understanding of the forces predisposing the country to peace or war , and what the solutions are . The time is more than enough to show whether the Jonathan government is making an impact on the crisis or worsening it . All available evidence show that the crisis is worsening , in fact becoming intractable. President Jonathan has no new ideas to combat the menace other than looking for money to arm the military . He has no workable strategies or futuristic plans to tackle the problem . And given his only trip to Maiduguri when the crisis was still at its infancy, where he railed against the region ’ s elite , accusing them of conniving at the revolt, it was clear the president had no idea what the forces shaping the revolt were . The military is making very heavy weather of fighting the insurgents. In many areas at the epicentre of the Boko Haram revolt, the military is barely holding on. Many local governments , estimated to be over 30 in the entire Northeast, have been ceded to Boko Haram, with no indications they will be regained in the foreseeable future . Indeed , Boko Haram has often seized the initiative , its militants better motivated and armed , and its cause eliciting excitement in the hearts of the sect ’s warriors . On the contrary , President Jonathan has not been able to inspire his troops or rally the country behind him . He is often too angry to see clearly , and sometimes when minded , prefers to blame every other person and political party , including the media , for his failure to make a dent on the crisis . Some politicians , including the impeached former Governor of Adamawa State, Murtala Nyako , believed President Jonathan was deliberately refusing to fight Boko Haram because he wished to depopulate the North and cripple its economy. Others felt since the president knew he could not hope to win the Northeast, he left the crisis to smoulder so that elections would not hold there . While these suppositions are far -fetched , they do not detract from the fact that President Jonathan ’s counterinsurgency methods are ineffective , and his record on insecurity almost hopeless. Whether the Northeast votes or not, a larger section of the country is bound to hold the president responsible for the malaise . If the Northeast votes, they will get a marvellous chance to register their disapproval of the president. If they don’ t or can ’t , others in the North will likely record their disapproval of the president on their behalf . But insecurity is not limited to the Northeast. It has become a national phenomenon manifesting in kidnapping, armed robbery and other major local and highway crimes. The police are weak , compromised and poorly funded . In fact, other than salaries, most states equip the police in order to make them even minimally effective . Yet, the constitution puts police squarely under federal government control. Most murders are left unsolved , hired assassinations abound , and festering social and political crimes go undetected . Gangs are taking over inner cities , Fulani herdsmen , whether from within Nigeria or outside , run riot in many communities , and revenge killings don ’t even elicit response of any credible amperage anymore . These crimes fester because the Jonathan government has no solution, is not adverting its mind in that direction , and sometimes woefully believes he should not be held responsible . Public anger over rampant insecurity is creating an undercurrent of dissatisfied voters and disappointed electorate who are taking out their frustrations on the government. This undercurrent may snowball into a huge movement if properly harnessed by the opposition . Nigeria seems, therefore, poised on the edge of new beginnings , overwhelmed by a sense of anticipation against the Jonathan government , an anticipation that may well turn into a rout in next month ’ s voting . In February , voters are likely to ask themselves whether they are safer today than they were before President Jonathan was sworn into office ; or whether if they return him to office , he is likely to make them safer than he has done so far . The answers to those questions are not in doubt, and they have made them to begin considering Gen Buhari in much more favourable light than they did in 2011 or are ordinarily inclined to do even now. Corruption as presidential hemlock President Jonathan insists his government has put more suspects on trial for corruption than previous governments did , and that he is establishing a scientific and judicial basis for tackling that crime . Unfortunately , few Nigerians are persuaded he is capable of making an impact in that troubling aspect of national life . They remember the definitional quandary he put himself in when in a moment of exasperation he tried to draw a line between stealing and corruption . He was unsuccessful in convincing anyone that there was a difference . Worse, the people began to believe he was at bottom both ignorant of grammar and tolerant of crime . They began to understand why, having entrapped himself in a normative conundrum, he was polite about the crime and indulgent of members of his government who were alleged to be corrupt. Comparing statistics of those tried and convicted for corruption before and during the presidency of President Jonathan may, however , not tell the whole story . Could more people than before 2010 not be taking to financial crimes under him, believing his government winks at corruption ? It is recalled that he responded angrily when there was a campaign to force the former Aviation minister, Stella Oduah, to resign over a scandal involving the illegal purchase of two bulletproof cars at inflated prices. He also reacted peevishly to campaigns by those who sought to bring Petroleum minister to account over the use of N 10 billion to charter jets . It was not even clear the money was budgeted for . Nor has the president compelled the favoured minister to honour National Assembly invitations , though he could if he were sensitive enough to the widespread sentiments held against his government worldwide and in Africa in particular. And he forced the resignation of the Central Bank governor , Sanusi Lamido Sanusi, for drawing attention to missing oil money estimated to be between $ 10 billion and $12 billion . He justifies his loss of confidence in the CBN boss on the grounds that Mallam Sanusi , now the Emir of Kano, got his figures wrong, having at first alleged that over $ 40 billion was missing . President Jonathan has also made no significant progress in unravelling the true story of how massive corruption inundated the fuel subsidy regime under his government , where a budget provision of about N 285 billion in one year suddenly ballooned to more than N 2 trillion , and where about 19 fuel importers suddenly grew to over 140 in 2011 . A few cases are in court , bogged down and seemingly going nowhere. But the point really made by critics is that President Jonathan has himself not shown outrage over the matter , apparently unperturbed by the scale of the thievery , and hiding behind the country ’ s slow judicial process to excuse his smugness . In fact last week , at a campaign stop , he accused his main opponent in the February poll of embracing brusque, medieval tactics in the anti -corruption war for suggesting that the anti -corruption battle could be waged quicker and more intensely than the Jonathan government has managed . The government has meanwhile ordered a forensic audit of NNPC, which is blamed for the missing money . The report , expected last year , has not been published even though it is suspected to be ready . For now, the government has kept mum in the face of allegations that the Jonathan presidency financed the 2011 elections from monies the NNPC failed to remit . Until the government comes up with satisfactory explanations and credible forensic audit reports , the image of a corrupt Jonathan government is unlikely to be dispelled . Indeed , Nigeria is rated by most anti -corruption watchdogs all over the world as one of the most corrupt countries on earth, 136 th in 2014 , and the third most corrupt in West Africa last year . That unenviable reputation will endure through the elections and , notwithstanding President Jonathan ’ s claims to the contrary , will influence the February polls, particularly the presidential poll .
Posted on: Tue, 13 Jan 2015 08:51:53 +0000
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