J. G. Fichte and F. W. J. Schelling, “The Philosophical Rupture between Fichte and Schelling: Selected Texts and Correspondence (1800-1802)”, Michael Vater and David W. Wood (eds. and trs.), State University of New York Press, 2012, 301pp. Reviewed by Dale Snow, Loyola University Maryland, (2012.07.21). “The title of this book is well chosen, because it evokes the magnitude of the split between Fichte and Schelling, which could be described as one of the watershed moments of German Idealism. The book presents an unparalleled opportunity to observe an important set of their philosophical exchanges and has the potential to affect ones understanding of post-Kantian philosophy in a lasting way.... “The genius of this volume lies in the selection of texts. The book opens with an epigraph from Hegels The Difference between Fichtes and Schellings System of Philosophy, and this difference, simply, is the topic of the book.... ... “The editors provide a wide-ranging introductory essay that sketches the state of German intellectual life after Kant. They succeed very well at re-creating the atmosphere in which so many were able to conclude that despite -- or perhaps because of -- Kants grand achievement, there was still vitally important additional work to be done. It was in this context that Fichte and Schelling understood themselves as engaged in what was essentially the same important project: the completion of what Kant had begun. There are also sections dealing with the atheism controversy in which Fichte found himself embroiled in 1799 as well as the evolution of Schellings views on religion. Finally, the essay offers three candidates for ‘the difference’ between Schelling and Fichte, a difference to which both refer but neither defines.... ... “The introduction to Fichtes texts sets the scene briefly: in 1799, Fichte first lost his professorship at the University of Jena under very unpleasant circumstances and then had to accept the public repudiation of the Wissenschaftslehre [the Doctrine of Science, Y.O.] by both Jacobi and Kant. It is therefore unsurprising that the 1800 Announcement (of a new version of the Wissenschaftslehre) is written in a tone that manages to be both combative and defensive. Fichte writes as if he feels himself embattled and alone, and even the seemingly neutral comment ‘I will not here discuss the extent to which my talented collaborator, Professor Schelling, has been more successful at paving the way for the transcendental standpoint’ (86) was understood as tantamount to a vote of no confidence by Schelling. On the one hand, it could be read as an understandable reluctance to engage with other, extraneous issues in the context of a brief announcement for a forthcoming publication. However, other comments in the Announcement, such as the observation that ‘since Kant some of the more outstanding minds in this domain have continued to speak past each other,’ (91), must have seemed at best odd to Schelling, since Fichtes letters to him in October and November of that year make repeated reference to the importance and necessity of collaborating on editing a journal together. If he, Schelling, was still Fichtes choice as co-editor, why was this not acknowledged? “Schellings estrangement from Fichte has often been seen as a gradual development. According to this narrative, the young acolyte and true believer slowly found his own voice and began to distance himself from Fichte, a distance increasing roughly parallel to the development of the philosophy of nature, without any one definitive break. There is a certain plausibility to this account, since a number of conflicts do seem to be connected with the importance Schelling assigned to the philosophy of nature, which in turn points the way to an entire constellation of related disagreements. For example, in the first letter in which he directly mentions the System of Transcendental Idealism, Fichte says point-blank: I still do not agree with your opposition between transcendental philosophy and philosophy of nature. Everything seems to be based on a confusion between ideal and real activity, which we have both occasionally made; and which I hope to completely clarify in my new presentation . . . Science only makes nature into its object through a subtle abstraction, and obviously has to posit nature as something absolute (precisely because it abstracts from the intelligence), and lets nature construct itself by means of a fiction (42). “Nature, if it has to be posited as absolute, is not nature as an independent reality. For Fichte, then, the philosophy of nature is not a reflection on an independent reality but is at best a reflection on the kinds of fictions the mind constructs in order to represent nature. Of course any and all of Fichtes objections to the philosophy of nature need to be put into perspective; as late as October of 1800, Fichte wrote to Schelling: ‘It almost costs me more effort to work my way into a foreign system than to construct my own. Hence, with regard to the philosophy of nature it has always been and still is my intention to somehow or other work through it myself. I will then be able to correctly understand and pass judgment on your work’ (31). “There is a lull in what had been a fairly regular correspondence in the spring of 1801, during the time when Schelling was finishing the pointedly named Presentation of My System of Philosophy. In this work it is evident that the independence and primacy of nature has become so clear to Schelling that it is presupposed in other criticisms which seem to clearly be aimed at Fichte: ‘But how is it possible for anything to separate itself from this absolute totality or be separated from it in thought, is a question that cannot be answered here, since in its stead we prove that such a separation is intrinsically impossible, that it is false from the standpoint of reason, indeed (as can readily be seen) the source of all errors’ (p. 153-154). ... “This well-conceived and carefully edited volume shines a bright light on a crucial and formative time in the lives of both Fichte and Schelling. Here is ample evidence for the conclusion that the two were initially in close agreement but ultimately grew apart; yet it is hard not to sympathize to some extent with the Fichte who suspects that Schelling never understood him at all. The editors are also successful in using this controversy to trace some of the fault lines and persistent conflicts in German Idealism more generally. For both reasons it should be of interest to scholars as well as open-minded individuals of any background seeking a path to understanding either of these notoriously difficult figures. No victor is declared, and perhaps none can be; however it is a considerable achievement to have so compellingly facilitated a better understanding of what was at stake.” ndpr.nd.edu/news/32038-he-philosophical-rupture-between-fichte-and-schelling-selected-texts-and-correspondence-1800-1802/
Posted on: Sun, 17 Nov 2013 14:50:01 +0000
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