Karzai, Frustrated, Wants Firm Pledges From U.S. New York Times By - TopicsExpress



          

Karzai, Frustrated, Wants Firm Pledges From U.S. New York Times By MATTHEW ROSENBERG and AZAM AHMED July 3, 2013 KABUL, Afghanistan - It was not until after the meeting of top security officials had ended, as President Hamid Karzai stood in a corridor with a handful of advisers, that his frustration with the United States boiled over. Washington’s attempt to open peace talks with the Taliban in Qatar, he fumed, was “in reality an attempt to cut him out and make an American deal with the Taliban,” according to one of the officials who saw the outburst. The Taliban’s sudden willingness to talk in June looked like a potential coup for American diplomacy. The result has been anything but — and not just because the Taliban have done more grandstanding than negotiating since opening their Qatar office. Mr. Karzai quickly called off Afghan participation in the talks. And now, two weeks later, persuading him to restore his delegation would most likely take more than the United States would be willing deliver, according to Afghans familiar with his thinking. He wants a firm commitment on the number of American troops that would stay in Afghanistan past next year, and a lead role in peace efforts, the Afghans said, speaking on the condition of anonymity to discuss diplomatic matters. Mr. Karzai also wants a mutual security pact that would compel the United States to protect Afghanistan against Pakistan, and, possibly, even take direct military action against Taliban havens on Pakistani soil, they said. All of that is rooted in one of Mr. Karzai’s core beliefs, according to those who know him: that the central challenge facing his government is not the Taliban insurgency, but rather in bringing the United States around to his way of thinking. “Assurances that America will take care of us will no longer do for the president,” said the Afghan official who witnessed the president’s outburst. To move forward, Mr. Karzai wants “certainties.” The developments around the Qatar peace opening seemed to be ripped directly from Mr. Karzai’s personal nightmare script: that his government would be marginalized in Washington’s endgame in Afghanistan. He has long voiced suspicions about American-orchestrated Taliban talks, and he recently has told those around him that the Qatar process could result in a separate peace deal between the United States, the Taliban and the group’s backers in Pakistan, and perhaps even his political opponents within Afghanistan as well. The fact that the Taliban have pointedly refused to say they would talk with Mr. Karzai’s government even as they state their willingness to talk to the Americans has only reinforced his concerns. He made that clear on Saturday, when after meeting with Prime Minister David Cameron of Britain he told reporters that the two had discussed “the fact that foreigners should not use the Afghan peace process for their goals and objectives.” He did not elaborate. Mr. Karzai’s increasingly harsh response to American initiatives in recent years has struck some officials as verging on paranoia. But Afghans close to him say it is consistent with his view of the United States as an unreliable ally. Afghans have not forgotten how the United States during the 1990s effectively outsourced its Afghanistan policy to Pakistan, which then helped bring the Taliban to power. That perceived abandonment remains a staple of conversation among many here. Mr. Karzai has often told those close to him of going to Washington for help in the 1990s and “having doors slammed in his face — nobody cared,” said another Afghan who has worked with him. “He’s seen this movie before,” the Afghan said. So when the Qatar announcement ran off-script, with the Taliban raising the flag and banner of a government in exile despite American promises that they would not, it was the Americans that Mr. Karzai sought to punish. First he broke off negotiations with the Americans on a long-term security agreement, then he boycotted the peace talks they had brokered. Though the offensive Taliban symbols have since been taken down, a senior State Department official said Wednesday that the Taliban are demanding that their Qatar office be identified as the political office of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan and that the sign with the name be restored. In any case, a member of the Afghan High Peace Council, Said Muhammad Amin Tariq, said that “removal of the flag and sign are not enough.” Mr. Karzai wants more assurances. In particular, he is said to be adamant about pushing the Obama administration to pin down the specific number of American troops it wants to keep in Afghanistan after the NATO combat mission ends next year, as a sign of commitment to his government. Though he suspended talks on the deal that would keep troops here after the Taliban office opened, “he knows he needs the U.S.,” said the Afghan who has worked with Mr. Karzai, describing the move as a bluff. “He’s desperate to get as many soldiers as possible. He wants a number now.” Yet Mr. Karzai and some in his inner circle also seem to believe that the United States needs Afghanistan just as badly, and that they can strong-arm the Obama administration, according to some Afghan officials. American officials say that kind of thinking is misguided. Though many American commanders and diplomats are pressing for a quick decision on troop numbers, some White House officials say they are increasingly uncertain that a security deal can be secured. “People are asking whether that’s something we can live with,” said one administration official. “The Afghans probably wouldn’t like to hear the answer to that question.” Much of what Mr. Karzai wants beyond the troop commitment seems even more unlikely — particularly his demands pertaining to the Taliban talks. Mr. Karzai urgently wants to halt any unofficial meetings that bring together Taliban representatives with his political opponents in Afghanistan, like one that took place late last year outside Paris. That meeting is said to have primed Mr. Karzai to see the talks in Qatar as an end-run around his government. Still, though Mr. Karzai insists on full Afghan control of the peace talks, “the ball is really in the Taliban’s court,” said one Western official in Kabul. The insurgents have derided Mr. Karzai as a puppet for years, and they still have not said they would meet with his negotiators. “Even if there is a one-off meeting, it’s not clear to me that the Taliban will eat its words for the last five years,” the official said. “There are a lot of views in Kabul that it’s not going anywhere.” Sharifullah Sahak and Sangar Rahimi contributed reporting from Kabul, and Michael R. Gordon from Washington.
Posted on: Wed, 10 Jul 2013 07:31:34 +0000

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