Match, Cash Joseph Bonas 25852 McBean Parkway #748 Santa Clarita, California 91355 January 15, 2012 President Obama Secretary Janet Napolitano (Dew) A. Hale, Barbara Homeland Security Washington, D.C. 20528500 William E. Bordley, Esq. U.S. Department of Justice United States Marshal Service 2604 Jefferson Davis Highway Alexandria, VA 22301-1025 Re: Illston’s 12-20-12 Direct Overcharge Fee Award Orders Bordley et al, In context of prior briefings, this is about a big problem with the above order(s). To lay foundation for standing, this big money case directly affects every screen purchase made all sectors of the United States armed forces over the past decade or so. It also impacts every civilian purchase made by America’s Government Service Agency, among others. The court order states a pivotal untruth about this standing challenge: No objections to the [Fee] Motion were filed. I. Challenge Formally Made The subject order incorrectly reads that no objection was made to counsels’ most recent attempts for even more tens of millions of dollars than has already been paid. This is a certifiably false statement. It is the central finding distinguishing the validity versus the invalidity of the order’s terms. On 04-13-12 Bonas formally filed a brief that clearly fronts artificial “loadstar cross-check” issues. The brief specifically identifies direct purchasers’ counsel (Lief Cabraser – Saveri-Alioto). It states in key part: This comment/objection is based on these client memos, e.g.: A) 04-11-12 Bonas to counsel - chain price protocol pass-on proof B) 04-09-12 Bonas to counsels association - price crime epidemic C) 04-07-12 Bonas to price counsel- overcharge damage math D) 04-05-12 Bonas to counsel on the fixed one third protocol adopted In the court’s 12-20-12 order not a single load star (hourly rate price tags) cross check issue was addressed. Not a single conflict of interest point received was attended to. Instead, Illston pretends these issues do not exist. She unprofessionally and inappropriately acts as if she owes no fiduciary duty to acknowledge, analyze and rule. II. The Courts’ Duty and Affirmation Contrary to what it has done here, the court represents to citizens of the Republic that its staff (like Judges Illston, Patel, Marshall and Feess) observes these objectives: Above all, we will remember that the court is the servant of the people, and we will approach our duties in this fashion. … 1. We will make reasonable efforts to decide promptly all matters presented to us for decision. Preamble In its purest form, law is simply a societal mechanism for achieving justice. As officers of the court, judges and lawyers have a duty to use the law for this purpose, for the good of the people. Member of the legal profession are bound to strive to this end. … The high court has clearly advised about this problem, noting that It will be an evil day … if the theory of a government outside supreme law finds lodgment in our constitutional jurisprudence. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way; namely, by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure.” Duty in mind, the rubber stamp signing of these words in this 12-20-12 order triggers a strain of perjury: 3. The amount of attorney’s fees requested is fair and reasonable under the “percentage” method. This is confirmed by a lodestar “cross-check”….” Judge Illston did no check to determine a “reasonable markup” to justify any “fairness” of the sticker price tags and hours billed here. She did not operate under the “supremacy” rules presented in Bonas’ brief. The record is empty on this central issue. There is no analysis nor reference to any hourly pricing obligation owed and complied with by fiduciary counsel. Based on nothing, she avows that she undertook some “fair and reasonable” crosscheck. Her hollow conclusions belie logic. Her attempted transfer of this additional millions in fees is a political gift; it cannot legally be sanctioned under any color of American court authority when presented to a higher power. III. The Firms’ Market Allocation (Direct and Indirect) To isolate the fusion between this direct and the indirect case(s) here, the leading counsel (a family de Corleone) first artificially created (1977’s Illinois Brick case) and then artificially allocated these “Siamese twin” like case market sectors. Co-leads (Guido and Joseph Saveri - formerly of Lief Cabraiser) are close relatives of Fran Scarpulla and Joseph Alioto. Back door, these gentlemen met, talked and agreed to create, divvy up, pool, split their cases by copying Justice’s work - the fruit of this and all cases like it. a. Taboo Case Market Assignments 101 The law forbids those in the same business arena from assigning any part of a business segment among the controlling players; it’s a species of criminal price fixing: i. Market allocation agreements are classic per se antitrust violation[s]. Courts … treat-- as unlawful market allocations agreements assigning particular [case like] territories …. ii. [A]ssigning certain customers [direct and indirect] to certain vendors [Saveri and Alioto-Scarpulla]. iii. Capping total [settlement] sales volume of the market and assigning participants fixed shares of that total volume. This is exactly what counsel in this line of “copy cat” indictment cases do. By way of example, Guido and Fran first estimated and then agreed upon a split of the total amount of direct and indirect settlement figures. Guido and his camp roll direct case. Francis and his camp roll indirect. Their joint objective is to pad time. It’s a billing racquet. They entered this pact long before this case – their own case lists prove it. b. The Niche Ring – They Rope In Other Firms Central to how Guido and Fran split and pool the cash in allocating direct and indirect cases that spawn from Justice Indictments was noted by Toshiba’s trial counsel: During summation at trial, Toshiba’s counsel argued: “There was a price conspiracy.… The guilty pleas reflect it. Participants in the … meetings were caught. They faced criminal consequences.… What the plaintiffs … do in … litigation is to rope in another company that did not participate in the Indictment alleged … Meetings.” … DOJ’s criminal prosecutions aided Plaintiffs, [then] they … pave their own path. Plaintiffs … establish a case … significantly broader than the government’s case, particularly with respect to … conspirators whom the DOJ accused of far more limited conduct than the industry-wide conspiracy Plaintiffs prosecuted. IV. District Court “Pay Day by Order” Fraud 101 Being now on actual notice of the above information, these “money order words” signed by Illston give rise to direct or indict collateral action: 4. The amount of … fees requested is fair and reasonable under the “percentage-of-the-fund” method. This is confirmed by a lodestar “cross-check”….” … 11. Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and DECREED that: (a) Co-Lead Class Counsel are awarded attorney’s fees for distribution to Plaintiffs’ Counsel in the amount of $20,400,000, equal to 30% of the $68,000,000 added to the Settlement Fund. Co-Lead Counsel may be paid 30% of $58,000,000 immediately upon entry of this Order; and may be paid 30% of the $15,000,000 to be paid by AUO on or about January 3, 2013, as soon as those funds are received without the need for any further order from this Court. V. Ending In $100,000,000 criminal “obstruction of justice by esquire perjury in fee papers for money” action, U.S. Attorney George S. Cardona correctly observed this rule of law: “A [lawyer] conspirator can withdraw from a conspiracy by: (1) Disavowing the unlawful goal of the conspiracy; (2) Affirmatively acting to defeat [to kill] the purpose of the conspiracy; or (3) Taking definite, decisive, and positive steps to disassociate himself from the conspiracy.” My Steps To Defeat To Kill The Bar Con About the court’s back door price fixing pacts (and Wall Street clients), a conflicted (but nevertheless brave man) publicly stated: I dont care who your clients are. Im going to make their bones bleach in the desert. Thank you for attending to this facially void court payday order. Kind regards, Cash Joseph Bonas Exhibit A, 12-20-12, Illston Direct Fee Award Order at page1, lines 17-18. Exhibit B, 04-13-12 Bonas Direct and Indirect inflated loadstar cross check objection. Downs v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901). Boyd v. United, 116 U.S. 616 at 635 (1885). Exhibit A, 12-20-12, Illston Direct Fee Award Order, at page 2, lines 10-11. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). See United States v. Brown, 936 F.2d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 1991). Palmer v. BRG of Ga., Inc., 498 U.S. 46, 49-50, 111 S. Ct. 401, 112 L. Ed. 2d 349 (1990) (per curiam). White Motor Co. v. United States., 372 U.S. 253, 83 S. Ct. 696, 9 L. Ed. 2d 738 (1963). United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 666-68 (7th Cir. 2000). Exhibit C, 10-26-12 LCD Direct Motion for Fees by Lief Cabraiser et al., at page 16, lines 6-10. Exhibit A, 12-20-12, Illston Direct Fee Award Order, at page 2, lines 10-11. United States v. Kilby, 443 F.3d 1135, 1139 (9th Cir. 2006). The King of Pain Is Hurting, by Peter Elking (September 4 2000). https://youtube/watch?v=T4pTMZuAux4
Posted on: Wed, 10 Dec 2014 18:27:17 +0000
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