NIGERIAN CIVIL WAR 2. Without a doubt we are past insurgency stage. We are in a state of war, a civil war. All pretension of fighting insurgents ought to cease. D era of BH using guerrilla tactics is gone. They now use field manoeuvers to gain ground and annex territory. As it stands we have parts of Nigeria that no govt official can visit. That cuts across d 3 tiers of govt including d president and service chiefs . This is sad and unacceptable . Our military which used to be a symbol of national pride has turned into a source of national embarrassment . No one in service is to take direct blames. D rot begun in d 90s with IBB . Post Gideon Orkar Coup, all forms of training that involved armoured vehicles and live ammunition were stopped . Tank battalions, recce and other armoured regiments were transferred to d fringes of d country. Their ammo were left behind in their previous locations. Men could not go near their tanks even for inspection without approval from d top. The rot had set in. Like NAF after Vatsa Coup, d armoured corps was grounded. Between 1999-2007 OBJ out of fear of military coup deliberately starved d army of funds. He brought in MPRI a consulting firm to help in repositioning d army. His motive was to eliminate all potential threats to his regime. As a result, d army was downsized from 135000 to about 70000. D contracting of d running and reorganisation of d army to foreigners was not taken to kindly by Gen Malu led AHQ. His refusal to yield to what he deemed an unprecedented expose by OBJ cost him his job. Between 1999-2007 contractual terms were agreed for d supply of d following war armaments to NA : 9 Mi 34 helicopters, 6 Mi 35 hels, Mi 24 gunships, 4 M16 utility hels, 7 Augusta hels , 77 T72 tanks , 16 AMX tanks, 50 T55 tanks, 67 MT-LBs, 193 otokar cobra APCs, 70 MOWAG APCs, 18 oto melara 105 mm howitzer, 23 155mm self propelled palmeira, 48 BOFORS 155mm gun howitzers. As at d time of this post not 10% of d expected hels and arms were taken delivery of. So much for OBJs deceit. In addition to starving d army of funds, a deliberate retirement of captains -colonel ranked officer was carried out on d recommendation of MPRI . These were mainly d bulk of officers who fought as peace enforcers in d Liberian and Sierra Leone wars of d 90s. D army is yet to recover from d loss of these crack assets. D bulk of d military commanders fighting BH never saw any live combat action until now. D recruitment policy of d past decade was simply unprecedented . Enlistees were only considered for training at Depot NA if they have 5 credits including English language in SSCE. This was absurd considering d fact that it was same requirements needed for cadet training at NDA. That still remains in place. The quality of soldiering ebbed at recruit level . Natural born warriors were dropped for not having credit in English . Today we see young soldier at d front fleeing from insurgents without shame. Their actions has led to a failure in junior leadership in d NE. It is time we gear our efforts into fighting a war rather than counter insurgency . D agreement entered for d supply of armaments must be revisited. Also worth looking into is how d GEJ N1.3tr 2013 security budget was expended. Whether we like it or not we are in a state of war. D earlier we identify d enemy and our objective d better. We must reinforce our army to as near its 260000 strong post civil war era as possible. Egypt has a 500000 strong army. We must get our priorities right. If we can maintain a 460000 man police force, we can equally maintain a 150000 -200000 army comfortably .
Posted on: Wed, 12 Nov 2014 20:00:22 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015