Non-alignment 2.0 and Neighbourhood Policy of India Non-alignment 2.0 is an attempt to identify the core values that should anchor the foreign and strategic policy of India over the next decade PROF GULL WANI Much is made out of neighbourhood policy of new government in Delhi. There are of course reasons to understand the fresh movement in India’s strategic thinking and calculus. Prime Minister Narender Modi’s invitation to SAARC leaders to attend his swearing-in ceremony on May 26 had makings of shock and awe tactic. Some people described it as international coup of sorts. PM has also chosen Bhutan as the first foreign destination and his foreign Minister Mrs Sushma Swaraj chose Dhaka, of course, only after having a telephonic talk with Mamta Bannerjee to provide an impetus to India – Bangladesh relations. The latest to all this is PM’s suggestion to ISRO scientists to develop a SAARC satellite that would provide useful applications and services to neighbouring countries. My only objective in this column is how far this new regional initiative is locked in Non-alignment 2.0 – a foreign and strategic policy for India in the twenty first century prepared by a group of experts, and whether India needs to walk extra mile to make its Pakistan engagement more fruitful. Non-alignment 2.0 is an attempt to identify the core values that should anchor the foreign and strategic policy of India over the next decade. It is to enlarge India’s strategic autonomy in uncertain times together with a unified approach to India’s global engagement. After going through the contents of the document and its focus on South Asia I have a feeing that the policy instrument needs some fine-tuning when it comes to dealings with our immediate neighbor Pakistan so that desired results can come. NAM 2.0 states that India cannot hope to arrive at a great power status if it is unable to manage relationships within South Asia. India’s top priority must be to deepen economic engagement in the region which is least economically integrated and where its ability to command respect is considerably diminished. The document states that India needs to go extra mile to reassure its neighbours and be prepared for more unilateral concessions on trade, investment and aid. In the specific Pakistan context the document states that India’s approach to Pakistan has periodically swung between the extremes of comprehensive engagement and almost complete disengagement. The main concern of experts as reflected in the NAM 2.0 is to look at Pakistan not as an autonomous entity but as an extension of china’s strategic competition with india. The document states that: Pakistan’s all weather friendship with china shields it against adverse international fall-out from the pursuit of its anti-India policies. Rising china will shield Pakistan in spite of the fact that China has concerns regarding Jihadist fundamentalism in Pakistan. China may at best show annoyance to Pakistan and the latter can even quickly deliver on China’s concerns. The policy document states that it is incorrect to assume that we can cooperate with China in stabilizing Pakistan or in dealing with the Jihadist threat emanating from it. If anything, as American presence in Afghanistan ebbs out and as the Pakistan army’s ability to assert control over its territory diminishes, we are likely to think of Pakistan as a subset of the larger strategic challenge posed by China. We should certainly engage China on this, because it is able to put some pressure on Pakistan. But we should recognize that this is of tactical value and of limited utility”. It is precisely here that some policy correction is needed even if it may involve lot of diplomatic exhaustion and political cost. India under Modi should keep lines of communication open with Pakistan all the time in spite of provocations. India’s willingness to engage in discussions will have the advantage of stopping external intrusion in india-Pakistan engagement. Ram Madhav of RSS has a point in saying that “Indian government enjoys one advantage in India-china relations, that of the ignorance of the masses in India about the complexities in it. In the case of Pakistan, the people of India are aware of the sensitivities, forcing government’s options to a limited few. In the case of China, no such constraint in the form of popular backlash is going to happen’’. The phone call from Nawaz Sharief on the victory of Narender Modi is politically sensational compared to one by premier of China. In 1962 Mao told Zhou Enlai that India and China should practice not peaceful co- existence but armed co-existance. For some strategic experts in India diplomacy for China is an art of deception. Even Narender Modi during election campaign stated that China has expansionist mind-set. The fact is that unless India stabilizes its relationship with Pakistan it will not see rest of the world taking it seriously. NAM 2.0 has to take some insights from, by now remote, Gujral Doctrine 1996. The Gujral Doctrine was based on the understanding that development of every country in the sub-continent should be the key goal of India. It had no intimidating message and only looked at possibility of emergence of India from the region. The cooperation was seen as a type of political investment that India has to make. Former PM Atal Behari Vajpajee was also closer to it when he stated that friends can change but not neighbours who have to live together. His visit to Minari-Pakistan was also a fundamental shift. There are three essential things that must go in fine- tuning the NAM 2.0 as far as engagement with Pakistan is concerned. First, the new government in Delhi should understand that there is no war to end all wars. The democratic transition in Pakistan does not mean the army is ready to surrender its control over security and foreign policy. But it surely means the impatience of common people in Pakistan. The Longer Range Future theorists working at Boston believe that demography, technology and globalization are powerful forces making common people strong social, economic and political agents. The fact is that the opportunities and challenges for India and Pakistan are common. Second, despite Modi’s invitation to Nawaz Sharief there is a lurking fear in Pakistan after the new government has taken over in New Delhi. While as Vajpayee did his best to remove it, the new government may have to do certain things quickly and unilaterally. The first Prime Minster of India Jawaharlal Nehru had to do it immediately after the partition of India. In a speech at Aligarh Muslim University in 1948 he said, “If by chance today I were offered the reunion of India and Pakistan, I would decline it for obvious reasons. He said I do not want to carry the burden of Pakistan’s great problems. I have enough of my own.” Third, and more importantly, how should Modi-led government remove the sense of siege in an area like Jammu & Kashmir. All these things will help in increasing the salience of a strategic policy document like NAM 2.0. If all these factors are brought into the policy vision Fehmida Riaz- the rebellious Pakistani poetess will be found incorrect in her estimate. She wrote on BJP ruled India: TUM BILKUL HUM JISEY NICKLY (you turned out to be just like us). Author is Director, Institute of Kashmir Studies, Kashmir University gullwani@gmail
Posted on: Tue, 08 Jul 2014 03:41:27 +0000
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