Nozick and the Fallacy of Composition (once more) Paul - TopicsExpress



          

Nozick and the Fallacy of Composition (once more) Paul DeHart: Let me bracket nominalism and individualism for the moment (I tend to think that individualism versus communitarianism is a false dichotomy anyway--that, and the term individualism as coined had none of its contemporary resonance: it meant something more like local communalism). I want to go back to composition. Now I think Nozick is clearly guilty of the fallacy--as clearly guilty of it as John Stewart Mill when he infers that pleasure is the good of the aggregate of persons just because it is the good of each person. If Mill doesnt commit the fallacy, then I cant see how anyone else does. And I think the same of Nozick. Its as straightforward a commission of the fallacy as one could wish for (in the famous debate about Gods existence between Russell and Copleston, I dont think Copleston committed the fallacy because I dont think Russell rightly described Coplestons position or the cosmological argument--but if Russell had aptly described Coplestons position, then I think Copleston would be guilty of composition; that is to say, the position Russell described seems really to commit the fallacy while Coplestons actual position does not seem to commit the fallacy). Now, back to the green rug. As I see it, the rug is green and the fibers are green. One is guilty of composition if one says that the rug is green because each fiber is green. The rug is green and each fiber is green. However, I dont think the conjunct is arbitrary or willy nilly. Indeed, I can hold that this proposition commits the fallacy of composition--if each fiber is green, then the rug is is green (just because each fiber is green--and that there is some causal relation between the two. I think one is guilty of composition when infers as follows: if x is true of each part, then x is true of the whole (for any x) OR x is true of the whole if and only if x is true of each part. That, the fallacy is committed whenever something being true of each part is treated as sufficient or as necessary and sufficient of its being true of the whole. And this Nozick clearly does--he treats each persons holdings being just as sufficient for the set of holdings to be just. But I submit his argument actually goes no farther than this (and so also with the green carpet): Nozicks at best establishes a necessary condition of a just set of holdings. Likewise, each fiber being green is at best essentially constitutive of the rug being green. But I cant see how each fiber being green is sufficient or necessary and sufficient for the rug being green. But Ive always been a fan of that old Proverb that had tremendous medieval resonance--that a cord of three strands is not easily broken. The assumption of the text is that a cord of one or two strands may be easily broken. But even if each cord is easily broken, it doesnt follow that the three cords would together are. Now, if the fallacy of composition is so tricky and only sometimes applies, I submit that its unclear whether the position Russell wants to reject in the debate with Copleston really commits it . . . Douglas B. Rasmussen: The fallacy of composition requires confusing a part with a whole. But the type of reasoning that Nozick engages in does not necessarily involve this. As said, what is deemed a part and whole is not always clear, and in some cases (e.g., the fibers of the carpet) the fomal cause of a whole just is its parts. Indeed, a whole is simply all the parts grapsed indisinctly and implicitly. All the parts are simply the whole made distinct and explicit. (John Wild, INTROUDUCTION TO REALISTIC PHILOSOPHY, 183.) So, we must be careful not to reify the whole (e.g., I cant see how each fiber being green is sufficient or necessary and sufficient for the rug being green) or in this case society. Now if society were best understood as a team, then Nozick might be accused of this fallacy, but as I said earlier this may be the basic issue. That was the point of my mentioning Oakeshott distinction between society understood as an enterprise association and as a civil association. I am more sympathetic with Copleston than Russell re their debate, but I think that issue must be left to another venue.
Posted on: Tue, 05 Nov 2013 04:00:55 +0000

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