ON THIS DAY 150 Years Ago - Thursday, September 1, 1864 Near Jonesboro, Georgia, South of Atlanta All hands have been kept busy tearing up the railroad. Toward evening the Fourteenth Corps (Davis) closed down on the north front of Jonesboro, connecting on his right with Howard, and his left reaching the railroad, along which General Stanley has been moving, followed by Schofield. General Davis formed his divisions in line about 4 p.m., swept forward over some old cotton-fields in full view, and went over the rebel parapet handsomely, capturing the whole of Govan’s brigade, with two field-batteries of ten guns. I checked Davis’s movement, and ordered General Howard to send the two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps (Blair) round by his right rear, to get below Jonesboro, and to reach the railroad, so as to cut off retreat in that direction. I also dispatched orders after orders to hurry forward Stanley, so as to lap around Jonesboro on the east, hoping thus to capture the whole of Hardee’s corps. I sent first Captain Audenried (aide-de-camp), then Colonel Poe, of the Engineers, and lastly General Thomas himself (and that is the only time during the campaign I can recall seeing General Thomas urge his horse into a gallop). Night is approaching, and the country on the farther side of the railroad was densely wooded. General Stanley has come up on the left of Davis, and is deploying, though there could not have been on his front more than a skirmish-line. Had he moved straight on by the flank, or by a slight circuit to his left, he would have inclosed the whole ground occupied by Hardee’s corps, and that corps could not have escaped us. But night comes on, and Hardee escapes. HDQRS. MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI, In the Field, near Jonesborough, Major-General THOMAS, Commanding Army of the Cumberland: In order that no doubt may exist as to future operations, I wish your army to press directly after the enemy southward with all the speed and vigor possible till we reached Griffin, where I will make new orders. I regret to learn that General Stanley remained today for hours on the railroad awaiting orders, when he heard firing heavy to his front and right. I may be in error, but such is reported to me by Captain Audenried and Captain Poe. I knew you had given him orders, and think we should not overlook it. I don’t know why Stanley could not have pushed along the railroad while General Davis was heavily engaged, and absolutely enveloped the enemy in Jonesborough. Now the enemy has time to fortify, and we may be compelled to modify all our plans. If General Stanley lost a minute of time when he should have been in action, I beg you will not overlook it, as it concerns the lives of our men and the success of our arms. General Davis’ attack, though some hours later than I expected, was still spirited and good, and was measurably successful. I suppose now Stewart has made his junction, which improves our chances at Atlanta, but gives us harder work out here. Please renew your orders to General Slocum to make a dash at Atlanta before the enemy has time to haul off the artillery and stores. Hood has at least 2 corps in Jonesboro and possibly 3. If this is the case, Slocum could take Atlanta and stop the removal of their heavy guns. I am ordering a reconnaissance in force tomorrow. Kilpatrick is to head south with his cavalry and nip at the flanks of the enemy as they move that way. Kilpatrick Reports: A citizen came into my lines near the burnt bridge over Flint River on the Jonesborough road. He has been sent to General Howard’s headquarters. He came from Macon last evening and left Jonesborough at sunrise this a. m. He reports that the rebel army is strengthening and extending their lines about Jonesborough; that no troops are moving down the railroad, but all are in position and busily at work; that the railroad as far down as Griffin is guarded by cavalry only; that last evening General Hood was in Atlanta with one corps of regular troops and the Georgia militia, and that Hardee with his own and Lee’s corps was at Jonesborough, and although the repulse was quite disastrous, Hood intended to hold Jonesborough and if possible Atlanta. For the last hour the enemy has been extending his works along the line of railroad in direction of the bridge on Fayetteville road. Several regiments can be seen at work. I do not think from all I can learn that the enemy is at present retreating. Rest assured that I will not be slow to strike him when an opportunity offers. I write to Howard at Jonesboro: In order that you may act advisedly, I will merely state that Jonesborough is of no value to us, but we are now trying to cripple and destroy the army now there. Thomas will push him in the direction of the railroad south. Schofield will operate on the east and you on the west of the railroad. If he retreats we will follow without halt or delay, if possible, to Griffin. If he remains in Jonesborough we must envelop him and destroy his communications south, as they are already destroyed north. Your troops are now well disposed, and Blair can do good service by feeling out and reaching the railroad if possible. He should not be content with a cavalry break, but one of some extent, and well done. Send word to Osterhaus to have his artillery officers listen for the cars tonight, and if heard to open artillery on them at random. If the enemy retreats I think you could make best progress by marching rapidly to Fayetteville, and then toward Griffin, falling on the flanks of the enemy. I suppose the bridge is destroyed, but General Thomas has a pontoon train that could march there in one day. This train is at Renfroe’s, eight miles from Fayetteville, from which there are several roads across Flint River, the one fulfilling most conditions being the one toward Fayette Station. Still, if you can learn of roads east of Flint River that will be available and yet not bring you in contact with Thomas’ troops it would be the safest as all the army will then be together and no part separated by an impassable stream. Should the enemy remain in Jonesborough tomorrow, hold your line as now, and give to Blair’s movements all the force you can. I write Schofield: I have yours announcing the destruction up, including Rough and Ready. I want all your troops down on Stanley’s left, and the cavalry very far to Atlanta. Slocum is ordered to watch Atlanta from the bridge. If there be anything more at Jonesborough than Hardee’s and Lee’s corps nobody knows it, and we have here plenty of prisoners from these two corps and no others. These corps are not intrenched farther than a straight barricade this side of and parallel to the railroad. If Stewart comes down he will come round by Decatur and McDonough. By moving quick we can prevent this, and that is one reason. Inasmuch as your troops, have pushed the enemy beyond Rough and Ready, let Cox follow Hascall at once, keeping your corps in the nature of a strong left flank, prepared to swing round east of the railroad. I sent you a sketch showing Howard’s position. Hardee cannot move south now without our seeing him, and if all of our army is concentrated on him we should make quick work. Hardee reports 35,000 men, but no one believes he has more than 20,000. Howard disabled 4,000, and has the dead and a great many wounded. Two hundred and fifty will cover his whole loss. The prisoners say they were assured before the attack that we had no intrenchments, whereas the trenches were good and strong. From reports of my staff I think enough of the railroad has been broken until we have conquered the army now lying at Jonesborough. We had pretty hard fighting with them this afternoon, and I think had all our force been engaged we would have beaten them, but now Stewart’s corps will effect its junction and the enemy will fortify. Yet he may underrate our strength, and I wish you tomorrow early to get over to the northeast of Jonesborough and approach from that quarter, and should the enemy retreat follow him with energy, hanging on his left flank; follow roads east of the railroad as far as Griffin. Thomas will follow the railroad substantially and Howard will keep to the right. I don’t see any reasons why the enemy should elect to hold Jonesborough defensively, as we have broken his road, so if you find him intrenched don’t assault, but feel below the town. Howard has Blair’s corps, with Kilpatrick cavalry, across Flint River, feeling out for them around by the east from Atlanta and to see if they joined Hood at Jonesborough. You may order Garrard up to act with you around to the south of Jonesborough, but if there be anything to our rear keep him holding all roads by which Hardee or Hood-both are now represented as present-can receive re-enforcements from the rear. At all events call Garrard close up that he may be within reach if needed, which will be the case if the enemy retreats to-morrow. His movements are so slow that you had better send to him to-night specific orders. Now that the army is united you are of course subject to no one’s orders but mine. But if fighting occurs, or you have a chance to attack, the orders are always to attack. We don’t care about Jonesborough, but we want to destroy our enemy.
Posted on: Mon, 01 Sep 2014 10:55:51 +0000
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