On GSA OASIS; “collusion” in compliance with the F.A.R., is in the best interest of Smalls ============================= STRATEGY In compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations: corner the market for GSA OASIS SB awards at the task-order level OVERVIEW Through the use of the MA IDIQ contract instrument, the government seeks to indirectly compel industry Smalls to compete on price before it is in our best interest to do so. However, GSA OASIS presents the first opportunity in the history of federal procurement for Smalls to collude in order to insure that this doesn’t happen. In summary, it is in our long-term interest to go on the offensive by controlling the price parameter upon during initial award in order to compel competition on technical capability alone at the task-order level. Here’s how I propose we do so… BACKGROUND The goal of any federal agency (Demand-side) in issuance of an RFP for MA IDIQ is price compression of the products or services being sought. Simultaneously, the motive of all businesses (Supply-side), Smalls and Bigs - is “Profit Margin” and “Market Certainty”. Therein lays the divergence of interest by both sides in the procurement process. Thus, although we can look at federal procurement personnel as “friendlies” during the build-up to RFP release, make no bones about it, once the RFP has hit the streets, this divergence of our interests becomes more pronounced - at an extreme. By extension, historically, when MA IDIQs have been released - in stark contrast to Bigs, Smalls have pursued them individually rather than as a collective. Largely driven by the sheer number of Smalls in pursuit, the legacy result has been the equivalent of cutting off our collective nose despite our face. This is because winning an initial MA IDIQ award does not correlate to confidence in either our profit motive or market confidence. Indeed, price flexibility enjoyed by all Smalls (winners and teaming partners) at the task-order level is dependent upon (1) the initial price parameter framework and (2) market certainty of what the price parameter is. MARKET CERTAINTY In general, the competitive advantage that Bigs have over Smalls is not their size, per se; it is the sophistication in which they collude with each other in the best interest of Game Theory. Understanding that “competition” is a necessary evil that we must all endure, Bigs recognize the collective benefit of ensuring a level of order and civility in the process – but above all, control of that definition. Thus, through oligopolistic methods, Bigs work together to ensure their collective survival while maintain the allusion of a pure free-market dynamic – legally of course. Through the Teaming Exchange: gsa-oasis.info/, and in compliance with Federal Acquisition Regulations and the rules of engagement outlined in the final GSA OASIS SB RFP release, we will: (1) multiply the number of scheduled initial awards to Smalls (2) insure price parameter certainty upon initial award, and at the task-order level (3) maximize direct (non-competitive) socio-economic awards, e.g., 8(a), SDVOSB, ED/WOSB, and (4) minimize initial winners from being off-ramped due to not generating CAF fees for the GSA. Finally, be assured, we accomplish this using the permanent regulations that are institutionalized in GSA – in other words, even with full knowledge of our approach; the rules won’t be changed. Of course, the confidentiality of our participating members will be permanently guarded with the utmost care. In order to join the Teaming Exchange, you must (1) submit a profile for your company at: gsa-oasis.info/, (if accepted) you will (2) execute a non-binding but confidential Letter of Intent (LoI) in order for further information to be shared. Keep in mind, our on-boarding process is designed to insure only viable and serious Smalls are given clearance. NOTE: Expired or unexecuted Letters of Intent will not be refreshed without legitimate justification.
Posted on: Sun, 04 Aug 2013 17:22:43 +0000
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