Opinions : September 3 - 9, 2006 No, Kony cannot be a winner. By David Tinyefuza The backward forces, contrary to what some apologists have tried to advance, go beyond nationality or ethnic group like the Acholi people. These are forces that want to reverse the achievements of the African peoples in their struggle for emancipation, writes David Tinyefuza In 1986, the National Resistance Movement/Army decisively defeated the fascist forces that had held the people of Uganda hostage. This change in Uganda’s political landscape was fundamental and irreversible. With the defeat of these fascists, the people of Uganda had set for themselves a new agenda. This agenda was to dismantle the neo-colonial state, build new structures of governance, which would enhance the process of national integration, but above all, re-establish and consolidate the sovereignty of our people. With these in place, we would embark on the road to develop this country. A lot has been achieved. However, the fascist forces or what has been referred to as the old backward forces were to make a counterattack and try to reverse these fundamental achievements. The backward forces referred to, contrary to what some apologists have tried to advance, go beyond nationality or ethnic group like the Acholi people. These are forces that want to reverse the achievements of the African peoples in their struggle for emancipation. In our case, these forces, backed by Sudan, made a counterattack on the August 28, 1986 just a few months after their final defeat. The ex-UNLA soldiers and their backers who attacked Bibia had intended to capture Gulu, Kitgum and Lira and use them as springboards to recapture power in Kampala. By 1988, these forces had been largely neutralised compelling the remnants to negotiate peace in 1988. This resulted in the peace agreement of June 1988 between NRA and UPDA. As a result, more than 2,000 UPDA combatants were absorbed into NRA. The rising of Kony However, some elements of UPDA opted to continue fighting. These were led by Brig. Odong Latek. This breakaway group was also defeated with the death of Brig. Latek. Other elements from former UPDA were again organised under Holy Spirit Movement of Alice Auma Lakwena. Lakwena fled to Kenya after the defeat of her rebellion in Busoga. The remnants of her forces were later to be re-organised and led by Severino Lukoya, Alice Lakwena’s father who was also later captured. The point here is that the counterattack was defeated; the people’s gains through their liberation remained unaltered. Hence the fascist forces had once again been defeated. Still, the remnants of Lukoya force metamorphosed into what is now LRA. This was under an altar boy called Joseph Kony. The rising of Kony as a leader of a rebellion in itself shows the crisis and near desperation of the fascists. During this same period, Peter Otai started the UPA (Uganda People’s Army) in Teso. The FOBA (Force Obote Back Again) was also created in parts of eastern Uganda. Otai’s UPA and FOBA were defeated in 1992 and many of their organisers pardoned, just as our practice has been. If the enemies of our people cease hostile activities, then they should be pardoned and availed opportunities to participate in the governance of the country. Many of these are now leaders in this government. In the West Nile region, once again, Sudan and Mobutu of Zaire sponsored the West Nile Bank Front (WNBF) led by Juma Oris. There was also UNRF II (Uganda National Rescue Front) of Ali Bamuze eventually negotiated its surrender in 2001. The WNBF of Oris was annihilated by UPDF in the jungles of Southern Sudan. In the west of the country, the National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU) emerged in late 1980s under the command of Obote’s former Deputy Minister Amon Bazira. That too was defeated. In 1996, Sudan and Mobutu again sponsored another terrorist group in the west of the country, the ADF. This was led by Jamil Mukulu. This group attacked the districts of Kasese, Kabarole, Bundibugyo and threw bombs in Kampala. This group was defeated forcing the remnants to flee to DR Congo where they had their bases. The UPDF followed them in the operation code-named ‘Operation Safe Haven’, cut off their external support and decisively defeated the group in 1998. In central Uganda, Maj. Herbert Itongwa had started his National Democratic Army/Movement in Kiboga and Luweero districts. SUDAN BACKED KONY: Gen. Tinyefuza This rather useless rebel outfit was easily crushed. Hence, the people of Uganda in all these victories had asserted their sovereignty. It should not surprise people that the NRM government has faced all these rebellions. The NRM was a new force. Its survival meant the death of the old fascist forces. Nothing dies willingly. Indeed for NRM, it was an important process because it ensured the completion of a process of “assimilation and rejection”. The aim of these rebellions was to recapture power. Secondly, they were intended to halt the process of development and thirdly, like in the case of Kony, it was intended to make the north and north-east ungovernable but in all three, the NRA/M won. The NRM ably defended the people’s revolution against all the numerous counterattacks, in all forms. Secondly, despite all the challenges, the country continued to register profound progress, not only in the political field but also in the social and economic spheres. The economy grew by leaps and bounds, at an average rate of 7 percent. Inflation was brought down from 240 percent to between 5 percent and 7 percent, while all other sectors registered growth. The health services were rehabilitated while new units like Kamuli, Kisoro hospitals and many other health centres were constructed. In the education sector, Universal Primary Education was introduced. (Government is spending more than Shs3.2 billion on bursaries for Secondary School students in Northern Uganda). University education has grown from a mere 6,000 students in 1986 to 60,000 students, and from a single government university to more than five government universities and overall 17 universities. Politically, the country has registered fundamental achievements. The people’s own Constitution was promulgated in 1995. Our people have exercised their democratic rights through several elections, both at the national, and local government levels. Hence, the aim of the fascists and terrorists to halt development and create despondency among our people was resoundingly defeated. Kony and other insurgents failed Kony and other insurgents also failed to make the north and north-east ungovernable. For instance, in the 2001 the government spent on local governments in the insurgency areas Shs66.3 billion, 85 billion in 2002, 95 billion in 2003, 108 billion in 2004, 114 billion in 2005 and 109.7 billion in 2006 financial years. Government also spent Shs9.8 billion in 2000/01, 8.8 billion in 2002, 12.9 billion in 2003, 19.9 billion in 2004 and 25 billion on health services in the same areas. Politically, northern Uganda has marched in tandem with the rest of the country, as the people have periodically elected leaders of their choice at the same time with the rest of the country, uninterrupted. The fact that throughout all these elections, 1996, 2001 and 2006 the north has voted against the NRM is in itself a testimony of the political growth in the country. Therefore, the pattern of voting in the north is not a halt of political growth, rather the entrenchment of democracy in the country. Pleasantly, Gulu and Lira are the fastest growing towns in Uganda and one would wonder whether Luweero grew in the same way during the UNLA operations against NRA in the Luweero Triangle. The West Nile region where almost 50 percent of its population had been pushed into exile in 1979 saw the population return soon after the NRM capture of state power and the region has been growing steadily, with a tarmac road traversing through and soon, a hydro-electric power dam will be built. Why then, one may ask, despite all these achievements of NRM, have we not annihilated Kony’s outfit? The reasons for this are both internal and external. Firstly, the Sudanese support. Kony received backing from Sudan. Sudan did not arm Kony but gave them sanctuary in Lubang-tek, Bin-Rwot and other areas in Southern Sudan. In addition to logistics and sanctuary, the Sudanese army gave active, not passive, military protection to LRA. They shared combat intelligence, were sheltered behind the Sudanese military lines and actively sheltered LRA commanders in their units. Thus, to reach LRA, UPDF had to fight the Sudanese army several times. In some of these encounters against LRA, we captured 114 Sudanese soldiers while many others died or fled. The Sudanese claim that they were supporting Kony because we were supporting SPLM/A is a fallacy. By August 1986, there was no SPLA operating along our borders. SPLA was operating along the Ethiopia border. As a matter of fact, when NRA captured Oraba Bridge, we could clearly see UNLA soldiers, their vehicles and families across in Kaya Town just across our own border and between them and ourselves was the Sudanese army. Therefore, to use the SPLA as the excuse for the support of UPDA and later Kony is to say the least, outrageous! In fact, support of SPLA was at a later stage, in 1989. And although we were mindful of the OAU Charter then, it was vital that we should advise our Sudanese brothers that violating our sovereignty and territorial integrity was not a good idea. No doubt, they ultimately got a message. This Sudanese support for Kony was so profound that it covered armament, training, intelligence and actually at one time, Kony was filmed addressing rallies in Southern Sudan. Kony had a population of 5,000 people, 3,000 of them armed at the start of Operation Iron Fist in 2004. He was filmed inspecting his bumper harvest over a 7-mile stretch in Southern Sudan. LRA was training and passing out cadet officers in Southern Sudan. Yet, for those who say that Kony has not been defeated, your Kony has no bumper harvest. Kony no longer has the anti-tank and anti-air capability he had acquired through Sudanese support. Kony today is hiding in Garamba National Park in DR Congo near the border of Central African Republic. The second reason why this LRA insurgency has persisted more than others was ambivalence of the Acholi political elite. Many of these politicians, not the common people of the north, became apologists of the rebellion. They too, like Kony, had tribal lenses! They failed to realise that this was not a north-south affair but, rather, the new forces of people’s emancipation against the old fascist forces of backwardness. This dichotomy of north and south and of presenting the LRA insurgence as a “northerners” defence against the “southerners” was to help prolong the Kony insurgency. But how can this be? Fascism observes no regional or ethnic boundaries. Idi Amin was not from the south of Karuma. When he took over power in 1971, Acholi and Langi were killed in their thousands! (so-called northerners?) When UNLA entered West Nile in 1979-80, they brutalised the people of West Nile, displacing a whole population into exile in Zaire and Sudan (again northerners!) Needless to add, at both times, the armies committing these atrocities against the people of the north were led, commanded and dominated by people from the north. Therefore this north-south divide has always been used by political opportunists, but in reality does not make sense. The political elite from the north therefore used the Kony rebellion to further their own aims, to try and acquire bargaining power with the government for jobs and contracts and win elections. And for those in the Diaspora, they used the Kony war to secure asylum in Europe and North America, where they had hitherto gone in search of economic opportunities. Acholi rejected Kony Actually, the common people of Acholi and Lango rebelled against Kony and other bandits before him. In Lango the people completely rejected Kony and FOBA in 1988-89. In Acholi the people rejected Kony. That is why Kony was so brutal against the population in the north. Yet, throughout all the time, none of the politicians openly sided with the people to condemn Kony and his atrocities. Their fingers were always pointing to the government which was trying to end the rebellion. It is only during the Kacoke-Madit of July 2005 in Paraa Lodge that all the leaders, religious, cultural and political, unanimously condemned the war! In fact, the political tide in the war against Kony turned decisively when the people of Teso en-mass took on the Kony bandits. This was followed by the resistance of our people in Lango against the Kony bandits. With those uprisings against the Kony rebellion, even those who had all along played the card of ambivalence were forced to come out and denounce Kony and his atrocities. Still, a lot of time had been wasted. Another factor that has enabled Kony to survive has been the small budget for the Defence Forces. I know, the usual apologists of this war will jump and raise issues of ghosts in the army, corruption, etc. These all put together are mere disruptions. The real problem was the fact that we were fighting a war using a peacetime budget. To appreciate this, one needs to look and compare our Defence Budget with those of our neighbours who are peaceful. Uganda, by donor insistence could only spend 1.9 percent of its GDP on Defence. Yet a country like Kenya, peaceful, spends 2.25 percent of its GDP on Defence, Tanzania spends 2.38 percent of its GDP on Defence. In USA, with the war in Iraq and Afghanistan, they are spending $100,000 per minute! When in 1992 NRA carried out a reduction in force, it was intended to reduce strength in favour of equipment. We reduced the army from 100,000 to slightly over 50,000 soldiers. The money saved could not equip even an Air Wing, let alone an Airforce. Therefore, building an army required sufficient funding to put in place the capability required to counter the geopolitical conspiracy headed by Sudan and Mobutu. That is why, with the modest increase in the Defence Budget, the army has been able to decisively deal with Kony. With this modest increase it has been possible to purchase attack helicopters and improve the transport system in the army. It has been possible now to put in place and maintain other infrastructure necessary for the execution of the war against these terrorists. Kony was defeated in northern Uganda, in Teso, in Lango and in Southern Sudan. His weaponry has been degraded to merely hundreds of assault rifles. We have ended his abductions and other atrocities against our people. We have so far rescued 17,910 children in a period of two years. But above all, we have managed to dissuade all his backers against plotting against the Ugandan state. UNRF I of Lt. Gen. Moses Ali In conclusion, it should be noted that the Kony rebellion set out to defeat and replace the NRM. It has failed. It aimed at rendering the north ungovernable, and it has failed. Therefore talks with LRA are not strange in our political development and consolidation of the people’s achievements. We talked to the Okello Junta in 1985. We negotiated with Angelo Okello of UPDM/A. We reached an agreement with UNRF I of Lt. Gen. Moses Ali and then UNRF II of Maj. Gen. Ali Bamuze. We talked to UPA. We have brought back Taban Amin and his people. We integrated UA, UNLA, FEDEMO, FUNA, etc into NRA. Then what is the excitement about talking to Kony and his bandits for? That’s what has made the NRM an insurmountable force. Therefore, to those who think that talking to LRA makes Kony a victor or that there is a “draw” as some quarters have been saying, Kony can never win, for what he is doing many other have done and none won. The government, despite the hopelessness and primitivity of these rebellions, has always given peace a chance. The government has always been mindful of any genuine political interests from all parts of the country. Indeed, several attempts were made to talk to LRA, through mediators like former US President Jimmy Carter, the Community of St. Egidio and others, but LRA was playing games. They always tried to use the talks to gain time to re-arm, replenish their manpower base and survive another day. If this time, however, the LRA is serious, then they are doing what they should have done long ago. For us, talks or no talks, the people of Uganda must be confident that the Movement government and UPDF shall always protect and defend the sovereignty of people and the integrity of the Ugandan state. We have done it in the past, we are doing at present and we shall do it in the future. Alutta Continua Gen. Tinyefuza is the co-ordinator of intelligence services (ISO/ESO)
Posted on: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 03:25:16 +0000
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