Point of View: Paul Biya has been repeatedly told that Anglophones - TopicsExpress



          

Point of View: Paul Biya has been repeatedly told that Anglophones do not accept 20th May as a day to celebrate, and not as a national day. But Biya couldn’t care less A categorical and unequivocal position against the continued maintenance of 20th May as Cameroon’s national day... The nation-wide referendum of 20th May 1972 that resulted in the dissolution of the two-state federation was a political forgery. The plebiscite of 11 February 1961 was for Southern Cameroonians so the referendum to decide on the continued existence of the federation should have been limited to West Cameroonians alone. Forbin calls on Anglophones to unite as a basis for tackling the Anglophone problem. He urges Anglophone traditional rulers to stop the abusive motions of support to Paul Biya and instead begin to issue motions to change the national day, restore the missing symbols like the second star on the national flag. Gerald Ndikum puts the questions Another 20th May was celebrated in Cameroon again as national day against Anglophone feelings. Isn’t that one more evidence that the Biya-regime cares little about Anglophones? Paul Biya surely enjoys this kind of confrontational politics. He knows and he has been repeatedly told that Anglophones do not accept 20th May as a day to celebrate and not as national day. But he couldn’t care less. The true national day of Cameroon should be 1st October. It is on that day in 1961 that the people of Southern Cameroons formally united with the Francophone Republic of Cameroun to begin the United Republic of Cameroon. 20th May you recall was the day of the referendum which led to the dissolution of the two-state federation. The referendum was a political forgery. That referendum should have been limited to the people of West Cameroon alone if Ahmadou Ahidjo had cared to assess the true feelings of Anglophones about the union of 1961. It should have been limited to West Cameroonians alone because it was they alone who had voted in a 1961 plebiscite to join the Francophone Republic of Cameroon. Ahidjo knew what answer he wanted and did just what he knew would give him that answer ie. conduct a nation-wide referendum. That was politically wrong and unacceptable. Anglophones haven’t pardoned him for that. Admittedly, the federation was doomed to die because West Cameroon was a state in perpetual financial crisis. Again, this was a deliberate manipulation of Ahidjo so that he could use that as his reason when the appropriate moment came to dissolve the state. That moment came in May 1972. Ahidjo’s main argument against the continued existence of the federation was that it was expensive to run, and he was quick to point to the perpetual financial crisis of the state of West Cameroon.? That’s why I use the expression deliberate manipulation. Ahidjo had long conceived the death of the federation. What he needed was to undertake long -term programming. The federal treasury in Yaounde was awash with cash in those 60s and 70s years because the economy was okay growing at a steady 7 per cent for all of Ahidjo’s 22 years in office. Another proof of the enormous buoyancy of public finances in those days is that government paid the heavy cost of running its many parastatal companies which were chronic money losers. So you can see ill-will in the situation ie. the deliberate attempt to kill West Cameroon by starving it of funds on the one hand and the generous bank-rolling of money-guzzling corporations on the other hand. Ahidjo was particularly obnoxious about the way he treated West Cameroon. He made it look like West Cameroon depended upon his personal salary. He would deliberately delay the periodic budgetary allocations that should normally have been transferred automatically. The late J.S. Epale who was Permanent Secretary in the Buea Ministry of Finance would travel to Yaounde to get the transfer effected but would be kept there for days on end and made to look like a begger. You can see that the political will to keep West Cameroon alive did not exist. You have referred to an “appropriate time” to dissolve the federation. What made May 1972 appropriate? One of the terms the 1961 union, which, you must always recall, was UN-sponsored, was a review of the state of the union after ten years. This 10-year review clause was intended to allow either party or both parties to make a complaint to the U.N about important grievances they had about the operation of the union. That way the UN would be able to come in again and refocus the union based on the original terms. Well before the ten year mark that was 1st October 1971 John Ngu Foncha and some of his close aides like Bernard Fonlon and Augustine Ngom Jua had addressed formal memos to Ahidjo to draw his attention to glaring violations of the accords of union. It is doubtful if Ahidjo ever replied to any of them. It appears that Anglophone elite under Foncha came together to discuss the ten-year clause and what to do about it. The story goes that after the meeting or series of meetings, one of them played Judas the traitor and reported the initiative to Ahidjo. Ahidjo’s reaction, according to the account, was to preempt the move by going right ahead to end the federation. Let me admit that though I have heard this story more than once since 1972 I have never checked it for its truth value, and so far cannot guess who must have played Judas were the story to be true. I have once heard of this 10-year clause and that it actually allowed the possibility for Anglophones to denounce the union and pull out of it as a bad bargain. I am not sure the UN would have encouraged such an option at that point. Things were bad but could be corrected. And there was no shooting war, so I doubt that the UN would at that point have encouraged secession. What I guess instead is that the UN would have worked out a better-functioning federation - and straightened out the problem of funding the state of West Cameroon. I think the prospect of having the federation reinforced and having the UN oversee its functioning for say another ten years must have frightened Ahidjo terribly. He must have intimidated or even threatened Foncha and his colleagues to cool it; and then gone right ahead to shut down the federation so that there wouldn’t even be talk about returning to it again; how much more reinforcing it. Remember, Ahidjo was a bully. Ahidjo seemed to have violated every important condition of the 1961 union. One key condition, not to forget, was that the union had only to be a federation. Article 47 of the 1961 federal constitution actually stipulated that the federation should never be dissolved without the express consent of either party. West Cameroonians were not consulted as a separate and sovereign party to the union. That is why that referendum was a political forgery. The question that continues to come to mind with the unfolding story of Anglophone marginalisation is the apparent helplessness of Anglophone elite of the 1960s and 70s under Foncha. Why wouldn’t they have lifted a finger in the face of these repeated gross violations? This question is asked very often. Some ask it to express surprise as you have done. Others ask it to prove that the Anglophone problem is a recent creation and that the founding fathers ie Foncha and Co did not experience it. According to this second view it is they who should since have cried foul. Both views have merit to them. Foncha didn’t just sit back and do nothing as this repeated questioning implies. He did something but he was powerless and much too limited before his adversary. Foncha and Fonlon wrote a series of protest letters to Ahidjo over the years. I think his approach was to appeal to Ahidjo’s conscience and to do so with as little confrontation and public notice as possible. Sorry that the approach failed. For Ahidjo to go as far as he did he needed to have silenced his own conscience. Far from being the dull-witted and passive politician that Foncha is often portrayed to be, the man had a profound sense of his own values by which he lived. He was a very quiet and personable man, Catholic to the core but resolutely non-confrontational. Foncha feared political upheaval and bloodshed to a fault. He also feared the ruthlessness of Ahidjo. These two fears seemed very much to have conditioned his response to Ahidjo’s increasing recklessness in violating the union accords of 1961. WNO Effiom, Paul Biya’s grand chancellor of national orders, who remains loyal to Foncha by his own declaration, explained to this newspaper a few years ago, how much time and energy Foncha spent restraining the young hawks of their party the KNDP from any actions that might give Ahidjo an excuse for bloodshed. But by and large those who judge by results do have a good case against Foncha and the Anglophone elite of that era. Had they been more determined and enterprising the problem would probably not have grown as big as it has since otherwise become. Is there a lesson to draw from this? Yes, an important one. However we now judge the Anglophone founding fathers one thing is clear their turn has passed. Many of them have died already; that’s the case of Foncha, Jua and Fonlon. So it is the present generation that now inherits the Anglophone problem. What do they do about it? Sit back in fear and criticise the founding fathers? That cannot take anyone forward. Or continue to criticise or attack the Biya regime for its anti-Anglophone policies? That’s no use either. The way foward is clear. The problem is one of a wrong power relationship. Through a number of strategic errors in the past Anglophones handed over all their own power to their Francophone rulers - personalised in Ahidjo, then Biya. It is this power that has been used against them. Anglophones can wrest this power back from the oppressor by simply uniting. That unity that generates political power is what they need to do and must do now. They will be surprised how rapidly things begin to work out when they pull together. Anglophone elite have a huge leadership role to play in this regard. The fons and the chiefs are already blazing the trail. This is very commendable. We give them all our encouragement. They are on the right track and need fear absolutely nothing. One thing we must always point out. Nobody, not even Paul Biya, will antagonise any Anglophone for speaking firmly and loudly on their rights. When Anglophone traditional rulers do meet in their coming joint assembly of North West and South West we hope that it wouldn’t be another occasion merely to eat and drink. A good work programme should be adopted to approach the government jointly on Anglophone-related issues. One thing should go and go forever - the idea of sending Paul Biya a motion of support or confidence. These motions mislead the Public an awful lot. Biya himself doesn’t believe in them. The only value he has for them is the misleading effect the motions have on the public. Let the hypocrisy stop and better not make Anglophones believe that the fons and chiefs are with Biya. He is not with them; they are not with him. It is the wider public that gets fooled. Why fool the public? Stop the fooling. Do you think Anglophones can do something about this 20th May date? Once they unite it is hard to see what they can’t do. Instead of the hypocritical motions of support for Biya I believe a strong motion calling on Biya to change the national day from 20th May to another date is a good start. 1st October is a most significant alternative. That was the actual day in 1961 the union became effective. It is on that day that the British flag the Union Jack was lowered for the last time in Southern Cameroons. Commissioner J.O. Fields bade farewell to the Southern Cameroons and left while Ahidjo took over. That is the most appropriate date for Cameroon’s national day. Some have argued that 1st October is also Nigeria’s national day and that it wouldn’t look wonderful for two neighbouring countries to share the same national day. In that case why not adopt 11th February which commemorates the plebiscite in 1961 at which Southern Cameroonians voted to gain their independence by joining the newly independent Francophone Republic of Cameroun. Anglophone elite must owe it a duty to themselves to use all manner of pressure to force Francophone authorities to recognise the importance they attach to these important dates. Avoiding them or distorting them is an attempt to deny the union of 1961 and consequently the place of Anglophones in Cameroon. Anglophones should also address the issue of the change of name by which the word United was taken away from the official designation of Cameroon. The same for the missing star. It should return to the national flag so that the two stars can again symbolise the union of Anglophones and Francophones. You can see there is an awful amount of work to do. These are the issues on which to address appropriate motions to Paul Biya. Not the hypocritical ones of support.
Posted on: Fri, 13 Sep 2013 14:10:41 +0000

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