Preparations[edit] When Sultan Mehmed II succeeded his father in 1451, it was widely believed that the young ruler, then 19 years old, would prove incapable—and that he would pose no great threat to Christian possessions in the Balkans and the Aegean.[34] This optimism was reinforced by friendly assurances made by Mehmed to envoys sent to his new court.[35] But Mehmeds actions spoke louder than his mild words. Beginning early in 1452 he built a second Ottoman fortress, named Rumeli Hisarı, on the Bosphorus;[36] this was done on the European side several miles north of Constantinople, and set directly across the strait from the similar fortress Anadolu Hisarı, which his great grandfather Bayezid I had previously built on the Asian side. This fortress-pair gained for the Turks complete control of sea traffic on the Bosphorus;[35] specifically, it prevented help from the north, the Genoese colonies on the Black Sea coast, from reaching Constantinople. (The new fortress was also known as Boğazkesen, which held the dual meanings strait-blocker or throat-cutter, emphasizing its strategic position.) In October 1452, Mehmed ordered Turakhan Beg to lead a large force into the Peloponnese and remain there to keep the despots Thomas and Demetrios from assisting their brother Constantine during the impending siege of Constantinople.[37] Byzantine Emperor Constantine XI understood Mehmeds intentions, and turned to western Europe for help; but now the fruits of centuries of war and enmity between the eastern and western churches would be tolled. Since the mutual excommunications of 1054, the Pope in Rome was committed to imposing dominion over the eastern church. Nominal union had been negotiated in 1274, (at Lyon), and indeed, some Palaiologoi emperors (Latin, Palaeologan) had since been received into the Latin church. And, Emperor John VIII Palaiologos had recently negotiated union with Pope Eugene IV, with the Council of Florence of 1439 proclaiming a Bull of Union. These events, however, stimulated a massive propaganda initiative by anti-unionist partisans in Constantinople; and the population as well as the laity and leadership of the Byzantine Church became bitterly divided. Latent ethnic hatreds between Greeks and Italians—stemming from the events of the sack of Constantinople in 1204 by the Latins—played a significant role. Finally, the Union failed, greatly annoying Pope Nicholas V and the hierarchy of the Roman church. In the summer of 1452, when Rumeli Hisari was completed and the threat had become imminent, Constantine wrote to the Pope, promising to implement the Union, which was declared valid by a half-hearted imperial court on Tuesday 12 December 1452.[35] Although he was eager for an advantage, Pope Nicholas V did not have the influence the Byzantines thought he had over the Western Kings and Princes, some of whom were wary of increasing Papal control, and these had not the wherewithal to contribute to the effort, especially in light of the weakened state of France and England from the Hundred Years War, Spain being in the final part of the Reconquista, the internecine fighting in the German Principalities, and Hungary and Polands defeat at the Battle of Varna of 1444. Although some troops did arrive from the mercantile city states in the north of Italy, the Western contribution was not adequate to counterbalance Ottoman strength. Some Western individuals, however, came to help defend the city on their own account. One of these was an accomplished soldier from Genoa, Giovanni Giustiniani, who arrived with 700 armed men in January 1453.[38] A specialist in defending walled cities, he was immediately given the overall command of the defense of the land walls by the emperor. Around the same time, the captains of the Venetian ships which happened to be present in the Golden Horn offered their services to the Emperor, barring contrary orders from Venice, and Pope Nicholas undertook to send three ships laden with provisions, which set sail near the end of March.[39] In Venice, meanwhile, deliberations were taking place concerning the kind of assistance the Republic would lend to Constantinople. The Senate decided upon sending a fleet, but there were delays, and when it finally set out late in April, it was already too late for it to be able to take part in the battle.[40] Further undermining Byzantine morale, seven Italian ships with around 700 men slipped out of the capital at the moment when Giustiniani arrived, men who had sworn to defend the capital. At the same time, Constantines attempts to appease the Sultan with gifts ended with the execution of the Emperors ambassadors — even Byzantine diplomacy could not save the city.[35] Restored Walls of Constantinople Fearing a possible naval attack along the shores of the Golden Horn, Emperor Constantine XI ordered that a defensive chain be placed at the mouth of the harbour. This chain, which floated on wooden logs, was strong enough to prevent any Turkish ship from entering the harbour. This device was one of two which gave the Byzantines some hope of extending the siege until the possible arrival of foreign help.[41] This strategy was enforced because in 1204 the armies of the 4th Crusade successfully circumvented Constantinoples land defenses by breaching the Golden Horn Wall. Another strategy employed by the Byzantines was the repair and fortification of the Land Wall (Theodosian Walls). Emperor Constantine deemed it necessary to ensure that the Blachernae districts wall were the most fortified because that section of the wall protruded northwards. The land fortifications comprised a 60 ft (18 m) wide moat fronting inner and outer crenellated walls studded with towers every 50–60 yards.[42] Map of Constantinople and the dispositions of the defenders and the besiegers Strength[edit] The army defending Constantinople was relatively small; it totalled about 7,000 men, 2,000 of whom were foreigners.[43] At the onset of the siege probably 50,000 people were living within the walls, including the refugees from the surrounding area.[44] Turkish commander Dorgano, who was in Constantinople in the pay of the Emperor, was also guarding one of the quarters of the city on the seaward side with the Turks in his pay. These Turks kept loyal to the Emperor and perished in the ensuing battle. The Ottomans, on the other hand, had a larger force. Recent studies and Ottoman archival data point out that there were about 50,000-80,000 Ottoman soldiers including between 5,000 and 10,000 Janissaries,[2][12][13] an elite infantry corps, and thousands of Christian troops, notably 1,500 Serbian cavalry that the Serbian lord Đurađ Branković supplied as part of his obligation to the Ottoman sultan. But just a few months before, he had supplied the money for the reconstruction of the walls of Constantinople. Contemporaneous Western witnesses of the siege, who tend to exaggerate the military power of the Sultan, provide disparate and higher numbers ranging from 160,000 to 200,000 and to 300,000[2] (Niccolò Barbaro: 160,000;[45] the Florentine merchant Jacopo Tedaldi[46] and the Great Logothete George Sphrantzes:[14] 200,000; the Cardinal Isidore of Kiev[47] and the Archbishop of Mytilene Leonardo di Chio:[48] 300,000).[49] The Dardanelles Gun, cast in 1464 and based on the Orban bombard that was used for the Ottoman besiegers of Constantinople in 1453 (British Royal Armouries collection). Ottoman dispositions and strategies[edit] Mehmed built a fleet to besiege the city from the sea (partially manned by Greek sailors from Gallipoli).[12] Contemporary estimates of the strength of the Ottoman fleet span between about 100 ships (Tedaldi),[46] 145 (Barbaro),[45] 160 (Ubertino Pusculo),[50] 200–250 (Isidore of Kiev,[47] Leonardo di Chio)[51] to 430 (Sphrantzes).[14] A more realistic modern estimate predicts a fleet strength of 126 ships, specifically composed of 6 large galleys, 10 ordinary galleys, 15 smaller galleys, 75 large rowing boats, and 20 horse-transports.[17] Before the siege of Constantinople, it was known that the Ottomans had the ability to cast medium-sized cannons, but the range of some pieces they were able to field far surpassed the defenders expectations. Instrumental to this Ottoman advancement in arms production was a somewhat mysterious figure by the name of Orban (Urban), a Hungarian (though some suggest he was German).[52] One cannon designed by Orban was named Basilica and was 27 feet (8.2 m) long, and able to hurl a 600 lb (272 kg) stone ball over a mile (1.6 km).[53] Modern painting of Mehmed II and the Ottoman Army approaching Constantinople with a giant bombard, by Fausto Zonaro The master founder initially tried to sell his services to the Byzantines, who were unable to secure the funds needed to hire him. Orban then left Constantinople and approached Mehmed II, claiming that his weapon could blast the walls of Babylon itself. Given abundant funds and materials, the Hungarian engineer built the gun within three months at Adrianople, from which it was dragged by sixty oxen to Constantinople. In the meantime, Orban also produced other cannons instrumental for the Turkish siege forces.[54] Orbans cannon had several drawbacks however: it took three hours to reload; cannonballs were in very short supply; and the cannon is said to have collapsed under its own recoil after six weeks (this fact however is disputed,[2] being reported only in the letter of Archbishop Leonardo di Chio[48] and in the later and often unreliable Russian chronicle of Nestor Iskander).[55] Having previously established a large foundry about 150 miles (240 km) away, Mehmed now had to undergo the painstaking process of transporting his massive artillery pieces. Orbans giant cannon was said to have been accompanied by a crew of 60 oxen and over 400 men.[52] Mehmed planned to attack the Theodosian Walls, the intricate series of walls and ditches protecting Constantinople from an attack from the West, the only part of the city not surrounded by water. His army encamped outside the city on the Monday after Easter, 2 April 1453. The bulk of the Ottoman army were encamped south of the Golden Horn. The regular European troops, stretched out along the entire length of the walls, were commanded by Karadja Pasha. The regular troops from Anatolia under Ishak Pasha were stationed south of the Lycus down to the Sea of Marmara. Mehmed himself erected his red-and-gold tent near the Mesoteichion, where the guns and the elite regiments, the Janissaries, were positioned. The Bashi-bazouks were spread out behind the front lines. Other troops under Zagan Pasha were employed north of the Golden Horn. Communication was maintained by a road that had been constructed over the marshy head of the Horn.[56] Byzantine dispositions and strategies[edit] A picture of the Fall of Constantinople by Theophilos Hatzimihail. The city had about 20 km of walls (Theodosian Walls: 5.5 km; sea walls along the Golden Horn: 7 km; sea walls along the Sea of Marmara: 7.5 km), one of the strongest sets of fortified walls in existence at the time. The walls had recently been repaired (under John VIII) and were in fairly good shape, giving the defenders sufficient reason to believe that they could hold out until help from the West arrived.[57] In addition, the defenders were relatively well-equipped with a fleet of 26 ships: 5 from Genoa, 5 from Venice, 3 from Venetian Crete, 1 from Ancona, 1 from Aragon, 1 from France, and about 10 Byzantine.[6] On 5 April, as the Sultan himself arrived with his last troops, the defenders took up their positions.[58] As their numbers were insufficient to occupy the walls in their entirety, it had been decided that only the outer walls would be manned. Constantine and his Greek troops guarded the Mesoteichion, the middle section of the land walls, where they were crossed by the river Lycus. This section was considered the weakest spot in the walls and an attack was feared here most. Giustiniani was stationed to the north of the emperor, at the Charisian Gate (Myriandrion); later during the siege, he was shifted to the Mesoteichion to join Constantine, leaving the Myriandrion to the charge of the Bocchiardi brothers. Minotto and his Venetians were stationed in the Blachernae palace, together with Teodoro Caristo, the Langasco brothers, and Archbishop Leonardo of Chios. To the left of the emperor, further south, were the commanders Cataneo, with Genoese troops, and Theophilus Palaeologus, who guarded the Pegae Gate with Greek soldiers. The section of the land walls from the Pegae Gate to the Golden Gate (itself guarded by a certain Genoese called Manuel) was defended by the Venetian Filippo Contarini, while Demetrius Cantacuzenus had taken position on the southernmost part of the Theodosian wall. The sea walls were manned more sparsely, with Jacobo Contarini at Stoudion, a makeshift defense force of Greek monks to his left hand, and prince Orhan at the Harbour of Eleutherius. Pere Julià was stationed at the Great Palace with Genoese and Catalan troops; Cardinal Isidore of Kiev guarded the tip of the peninsula near the boom. The sea walls at the southern shore of the Golden Horn were defended by Venetian and Genoese sailors under Gabriele Trevisano. Two tactical reserves were kept behind in the city, one in the Petra district just behind the land walls and one near the Church of the Holy Apostles, under the command of Loukas Notaras and Nicephorus Palaeologus, respectively. The Venetian Alviso Diedo commanded the ships in the harbor. Although the Byzantines also had cannons, they were much smaller than those of the Ottomans and the recoil tended to damage their own walls.[48] According to David Nicolle (2000), despite many odds, the idea that Constantinople was inevitably doomed is wrong, and the overall situation was not as one-sided as a simple glance at a map might suggest.[59] It has also been claimed that Constantinople was the best-defended city in Europe at that time.[60]
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