The Aims of the Israeli Military Campaign on Gaza ………………………………………………………………………….. Netanyahu wanted to exert pressure on Hamas, its armed wing and its grassroots support in order intimidate it into accepting Mahmoud Abbass treacherous agenda, which had been designed to settle the issue. He also wanted to exploit the reactions of the Palestinian resistance to terrify Israeli public opinion with the consequences of a stagnant political process, which the Netanyahu government seemingly rejects and impedes, whereas the American administration insists on stimulating it in order to register an achievement for Obama and the Democrats in the US. Netanyahu wanted to also invest in the call to regenerate the peace talks, to influence the Jews and polarise support from the Israeli centre-left movement, to please America and soften the position of the extremists in respect of the settlements file, which impedes the advancement of the talks. However, he got caught in the quagmire of the land operation from which he had sought an achievement to please Israeli public opinion and the hawks of his government; thus he set himself a host of easy targets in order to end the military operation so that he may capitalise on its outcomes domestically until the states sponsoring Hamas achieve what the Israeli iron-fisted approach could not achieve, namely stripping Hamas of its ideology and doctrine in relation to the peace process, by offering it a catalogue of sweeteners and executing some of its demands, thus smoothing the path towards integrating it into the political process under the umbrella of the PLO or the national unity government and extracting its recognition in respect of the final status. It is well known that Hamas does not shy away from admitting its acceptance of a long-term truce, of which Israel is keen or seeks to achieve as its attempts to dodge the exigencies of the final status issues; but this does not meet with the approval of America who is seeking a final settlement that would end the struggle on the basis of the two-state solution and defuse the tension that threatens the survival of the regions regimes and her interests. The capturing of an Israeli soldier has cast on the event a fresh dimension that will have a knock-on-effect on the conducting of the struggle. The operation will be exploited to exert further pressure on the Israeli public opinion and the rightwing extremists within the Israeli cabinet to intimidate them into making painful concessions in exchange for taming the resistance, and swallowing the bitter pill of negotiating with government in which Hamas would be a coalition partner. Hence, the Israeli political scene will have a brainstorm about how to haul this crisis out of the bottleneck. A compromise may very likely be reached to end the military operation, as was the case in 2012, but this time through a tripartite mediation involving Qatar, Turkey and the UN, and American guarantees, from which Israel would capitalise to restore its ties with Turkey, accompanied by a rekindling of the talks, but in isolation of the Israeli captured soldiers issue, which is expected to turn into a nightmare threatening Netanyahus political future. The price of his release is expected to exceed a prisoner exchange. Hamas will exploit the issue to achieve a host of political gains. His release may also act as a cover for the Israeli government to offer some political concessions that public opinion would not normally accept. Israel may carry out a host of escalatory manoeuvres and more violent actions against Hamas and its grassroots support in reaction to the kidnapping operation; but the Netanyahu government is unlikely to implicate itself in a long-term occupation even if the army succeeds in making limited incursion into Gaza to restore the reputation of the army and the government. The unprecedented treachery of the Arab regimes and their role in dealing the resistance a heavy blow is evoked by their fear of the Islamic inclinations that have been gaining ground among the masses of the Arab world. This fear has grown into a terrifying nightmare for those regimes, because they are built upon a doctrine that contradicts that of the Ummah, and because they do not depend on the backing of the masses for their survival. These regimes present themselves to the West as the guardians of its interests and the enemies of their Ummah; they prove their loyalty to the West by siding with its projects in the region and executing its agenda in respect of settling the Palestinian issue, to the point where the UAE expressed its willingness to bankroll the Israeli campaign to either annihilate the resistance or weaken its resolve, since it represents one of the main tributaries of the popular support for the Islamic movement, which threatens the collaborating Gulf regimes who realise that they days would be numbered if the willpower of the masses were liberated. This is probably what encouraged Netanyahu, and the and the depraved rulers who capitalised on his criminality and frenzy, to undertake the military operation, thinking that the time was ripe to achieve his aims since the support for the Muslim Brotherhood faded away. However, the Mujahideen have dashed his hopes with their resolves and belief in Allahs victory. Abu Usaid
Posted on: Tue, 22 Jul 2014 22:51:13 +0000
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