The Case Against God - تكملة الالحاد 230 242,1 But, the theist may argue, without a first cause of change, there would be no second cause, third cause, or presently existing causes. But since causal processes are presently occurring, there must have been a first cause in time. 242,2 This rejoinder is partially correct. Without a first cause, there cannot be a second cause, a third cause and so on. In other words, without a first cause, we cannot assign a numerical designation to each causal process. This does not entail, however, that causal interactions could not presently exist. 242,3 In order to assign a numerical designation (such as second, tenth, one thousandth) to any causal process, one must presuppose the existence of a first cause. After all, to call something the tenth cause means that there were nine causes preceding it, so there must have been a first cause in this series. Consequently, this tactic, since it relies on the prior acceptance of a first cause, must be rejected as blatant question begging. 242,4 From the fact that causal series extend infinitely into the past, it follows that we cannot assign sequential numbers to each causal process. But it does not follow from this that causality cannot occur. The issue of numerical designations is irrelevant to causality. 242.5 In the final analysis, the temporal version of the first cause argument must be rejected as muddled, contradictory and, at times, simply irrelevant. The case for rational theism must look elsewhere for support. 242,6 II The Sustaining First Cause A second version of the First-cause argument, though not generally used by laymen, is popular among philosophical theists (and Thomists in particular). These theists do not maintain that an infinite regress of temporal causes is impossible; indeed, even Aquinas conceded the philosophical possibility of an eternally existing universe. These theists defend another kind of causal argument, one that views causality in a hierarchical sense.
Posted on: Mon, 29 Sep 2014 18:31:47 +0000
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