The Search for a Self or Soul In the Samuytta-Nikaaya is the story of Vacchagotta the Wanderer, the man who was concerned with the existence or non-existence of his self. In the Digha-Nikaaya is the story of Po.t.thapaada, an inveterate asker of questions, in search of a soul. It is of interest to note the different response these two inquirers received from the Buddha. Vacchagottas questions remained unanswered, while Po.t.thapaadas doctrinal questions were discussed and answered in full. Both of these inquirers have their counterparts in the West today — those who are concerned with a self, and those who are concerned with a soul. While the two terms self and soul are often used as synonyms and interchangeable, I think that those who use them in reference to themselves have a differential conception of the two words. The seeker for a self is more concerned with the preservation of his ego in the here and now, whereas the would-be possessor of a soul is perturbed as to survival after death. It is empiric that the protagonists of the self theory, or concept, are by nature extrovert and egotistic. On the other hand, those who most ardently cling to the soul concept, are less concerned with asserting themselves before others, but are concerned mainly with their inmost nature — natural introverts. Yet these too in their quiet way are also egotistical, in that they desire to preserve their identity. While the Asian Buddhist world unanimously accepts and adheres to the doctrine of anatta — the absence of an abiding and stable entity — it is by no means uncommon to find nominal Buddhists in the West who are unable to shake off 2000 years of indoctrination of the soul concept, and, as a consequence, bring to their Buddhism preconceived views, often bolstered up by a syncretic admixture of other Indian beliefs. The story of Vacchagotta precedes this article. His questions are akin to asking a man if he has stopped beating his wife. The man may have not have lifted his hand against her at any time, but if he answers Yes, the inference is that he had previously beaten her. If he answers No, the inference is that he still beats her. Had the Buddha agreed that Vacchagotta had a self, for the Buddha did not deny the existence of phenomenon, Vacchagotta could have taken it as a confirmation of the brahmin belief in an eternal atman, or spark of the Divine to survive after death. Had the Buddha agreed that there was not a self in the ultimate sense, Vacchagotta could have taken the reply as an endorsement of the view held by the annihilationists — that nothing survived after death. Vacchagotta was not asking questions idly, but this was an occasion on which confusion could have arisen, and so the Buddha maintained the noble silence and left Vacchagotta to ponder further on the point that was bothering him. He still had not grasped the higher truths of karma and aniccaa under which the conventional self is but a momentary manifestation of ever-changing components to be cast aside at death, and without a stable entity to be carried forward to a new birth. Later, Vacchagotta did grasp these truths, and he finally became one of the arahants. Those who are fond of quoting this dialogue between the Buddha and Vacchagotta to support their theory of a soul seldom, if ever, go on to the Buddhas final explanation to Aananda which closes the passage, and which, incidentally displays one of those flashes of the Buddhas humor that peeps out here and there in his dealings with inquirers. It would be stretching the argument beyond reason to presume that the Buddha was not capable or not inclined to make an assertion on the soul if it really existed, in the light of his many expositions of its non-existence. The commentator, Kumaralabdha, quoted by Dr. Malalasekera in the Encyclopaedia of Buddhism, puts it in a nutshell: If there was an atta (soul), what on earth was there to prevent the Buddha from saying so? For our purpose we can dismiss the self seekers, for while they insist on having a self to satisfy their ego, many of them give at least lip-service to the anattaa doctrine. They have their self that thinks, writes, or teaches, to present to the world. They have their self that strives to lift the self still higher in mans estimation, till it equals or becomes part of the SELF, and some go on to the Overself, or Godhead by another name. These people see themselves as gods in the making, and their word is final — so far as they are concerned. Their concepts are usually derived via Theosophy from pre-Buddhistic Brahmanism, even though they may call themselves Buddhists. Brahman, the First Cause, or Great SELF, was personified as Brahma the Creator, the Self, and all beings were, or had in them, a spark of the Divine, a lesser self, which was still essentially of the same substance as the Great SELF, to which it eventually returned when purified by rites and ceremonies. On the question of a soul, Po.t.thapaada and his friends were discussing the importance of consciousness, its arising and its ceasing. One had put forward the theory that: States of consciousness come to a man without reason and without a cause, and so also do they pass away. At the time when they spring up in him, then he becomes conscious. This was rejected by a second speaker who protested: That, sirs, will never be as you say. Consciousness, sirs, is a mans soul (attaa). It is the soul that comes and goes. When the soul comes into a man, then he becomes conscious; when the soul goes away out of a man, he becomes unconscious. Seeing the Buddha approaching they decided to ask his opinion on the matter, and Po.t.thapaada outlines the pith of their discussion and the various arguments that have been put forward. The Buddha refuted the former view by stating that it was precisely through a reason, by means of a cause, that states of consciousness come and go. By training some states of consciousness arise. By training others pass away. Through training one sort of consciousness arises, and through training another passes away. The Buddha illustrates his meaning by a lengthy discourse on training, showing the causal origination of consciousness as a consequence. He then goes on to the cessation of consciousness dependent on the cessation of ideas as the adept in meditative practices achieves the various trance states of the jhaanas. To him neither thinking anymore, nor fancying the ideas, the states of consciousness he had pass away, and no others, coarser than they, arise. So he enters in jhaana. Thus it is, Po.t.thapaada, that the attainment of the cessation of conscious ideas takes place step by step. The first proposition of the independent arising of ideas leading to consciousness having thus been disposed of by the Buddha, Po.t.thapaada admits to not having heard this explained before, but I now understand what you say. He then proceeds to the second opinion that had been expressed by his fellow mendicants: Is then, Sir, the consciousness identical with a mans soul, or is consciousness one thing and the soul another? But what then, Po.t.thapaada? Do you really fall back on the soul? queries the Buddha. Po.t.thapaada replies that he takes for granted the existence of a soul of some kind. Maybe a material soul, he suggests tentatively, but without much conviction. Failing that, what about a soul the exact copy of the body, but so subtle in texture that it could only be described as being made of mind. No? Well then a soul without form, and made of consciousness. To all of these suggestions the Buddha has but one reply. Suppose you did have a soul conforming to any of these descriptions, still some ideas, some states of consciousness, would arise to the man, and others would pass away, so you can see how consciousness must be one thing, and the soul would be another. However Po.t.thapaada was still not convinced that he was totally lacking in a soul. On that point he had a closed mind as is shown by his next question. He does not ask: Is there, or is there not, a soul?, but is it possible for him to ever understand what the soul is. Is it possible for me to understand whether consciousness is the mans soul, or is the one different from the other? The Buddhas reply to Po.t.thapaada is equally applicable to the soul-seekers of today; those who accept the Buddhas teachings with reservations — the right to reject what does not fit in with their preconceived notions, beliefs, and views. Hard it is for you, Po.t.thapaada, holding as you do different views, other things approving themselves to you, setting different aims before yourself, striving after a different perfection, trained in a different system of doctrine, to grasp this matter. Po.t.thapaada abandons his search for a definition of his soul, to which he still clings, and changes the subject by propounding ten questions on the imponderables. The Buddha bears patiently with him, and in answer to each question replies it is not a matter on which he had expressed an opinion, for such questions were not calculated to profit, were not concerned with his Dhamma, nor to the attainment of Nirvana. But Po.t.thapaada has not exhausted his propensity for asking questions. Then what is it that the Exalted One has determined? I have expounded what Dukkha is; I have expounded what is its origin; I have expounded what is the cessation of Dukkha; I have expounded what is the method by which one may reach the cessation of Dukkha. The Buddha departed with dignity, while Po.t.thapaada was subjected to the jeers and sarcasm of his fellow mendicants for having failed to obtain the answers to his later questions. It is worthy of note that to the doctrinal questions the Buddha gave serious and ample replies, sufficient to remove any reasonable grounds for differing from the Dhamma he taught, but he refused to be drawn into any discussion that could not lead to finality, such matters being outside of the Dhamma taught by him. The Buddha taught his doctrine of soullessness — anattaa — in two ways, and by two methods demonstrated its truth and necessity if the major purpose of his teachings was to be accomplished — the cessation of Dukkha. One was by the analysis of constituents of personality, the other was that any belief in a permanent self would conflict with the causal law, and so deny the possibility of escape from the wheel of becoming. In regard to the analysis of personality, there are so many passages that deal with this method that lack of space prevents more than a passing mention of them. Those who wish to clarify their thinking on this point will have no difficulty in finding them. The most common formula is to proceed with those who regard body as the self, or the self as being in the body; so with feelings, with perception, with activities, with consciousness. Such ones become obsessed with the idea, I am the body. The body is mine, or I feel, I perceive, or there are activities, I am conscious. Feeling is mine, perception is mine, activities are mine, consciousness is mine. But when these change and alter, owing to their unstable nature, then arises sorrow, woe, and grief, due to their impermanence and instability. In SN 3.147, prior to an analysis as above, a certain one asked of the Buddha: Pray, Lord, is there any body, feeling, perception, activity, or consciousness that is permanent, stable by nature, lasting, unchanging, like unto the eternal, so that it will stand fast? Then the Exalted One took up a pinch of dust on the tip of his nail, and said to that brother: Even thus much material form, brother, is not permanent, stable, eternal, by nature unchanging, like unto the eternal, so that it will stand fast. If even thus much material form, brother, were permanent unchanging, then the living of the holy life for the utter destruction of suffering would not be set forth. But inasmuch as even thus much material form, brother, is not permanent, stable, eternal, by nature unchanging, therefore the living of the holy life for the utter destruction of suffering is set forth. — SN 3.147 We have on previous occasions written that no one doctrine taught by the Buddha stands in isolation from any other or all of them. The Buddhas reply to Po.t.thapaada quoted above as to what he expounded is the key to them all, and the connecting link between them — Dukkha, its origin, its cessation, and the way to its cessation — was the Buddhas only concern. All his doctrinal dissertations climaxed in moral perfection as the way to Dukkhas ceasing. The purpose of the analysis in expounding the anatta doctrine is to understand the functioning and the impermanence of the five aggregates that constitute the phenomenal person. If this be accomplished, the major delusion of a self that obsesses mankind generally will be eliminated. With the elimination of this illusory self, the root-cause of our unhappiness is eliminated. The eternal thirst to satisfy its demands, the grasping after sense-pleasures to please it, the clinging to phenomena that must fade and die, is the source of Dukkha. So the doctrine of Anattaa becomes a coordinating link with all other doctrines leading to the ethical life, and sorrows ending. — From Metta, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1968). Personality It is in vain that we return to the places that once we loved. We shall never see them again because they were situated not in Space but in Time, and because the man who tries to rediscover them is no longer the child or the youth who decked them with the fervour of his emotions. The classic philosopher assumes that our personality is built about a hard and changeless core, is a sort of spiritual statue which stands like a rock against the assaults of the external world. Such is man as viewed by Plutarch, by Moliere, and even by Balzac. But Proust shows us that the individual, plunged in Time, disintegrates. The day comes when nothing at all remains of the man who once loved, who once made a revolution. My life, as I saw it, wrote Marcel Proust, presented me with the spectacle of a succession of periods so occurring that, but for a brief space of time, nothing of that which had been ones sustaining force continued to exist at all in that which followed it. I saw human life as a complex from which the support of an individual, identical, and permanent self was so conspicuously absent, was something so useless for the future, so far extended into the past, that death might just as well intervene at this point or that; because it could never mark a conclusion that was other than arbitrary... The successive selves are so different from one another that each ought, really, to have a different name.
Posted on: Tue, 25 Mar 2014 17:49:17 +0000
Trending Topics
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015