The Ukrainian Revolution: Lessons for EU Foreign Policy Sweden, Poland, and the Baltic States - rather than the EU - were at the forefront of defending European values during the Ukraine crisis. Here, a diversity of voices yielded far better results than Brussels alone ever could have. While a common European foreign policy is a vital part of the argument in favor of deeper European integration, the events in Ukraine complicate this view. Europeans would do well to remember this foreign policy lesson. A democratic parliamentary regime, unthinkable only a few days ago, has put down roots in Ukraine. So has the EUs notion of a major diplomatic victory. Indeed, the protests leading up to the overthrow had been met with enthusiasm by EU politicians eager to renew European unity battered by the political ramifications of the Euro Crisis. The EUs triumphant rhetoric, however, did not result in EU sanctions against members of Yanukovichs clan as many Ukrainians had hoped. This gulf between words and action did not go unnoticed on the streets of Ukraine; while the EU flag still remained a symbol of the revolution, Ukrainians felt betrayed by Europe. Risking their lives for the defense of European values, protesters were deeply hurt by the European refusal to freeze the assets of members of government and oligarchs sitting in European banks. In the Western media, the compromise brokered by the German, French, and Polish Foreign Ministers Steinmeier, Fabius, and Sikorski was hailed as a decisive step towards the end of the bloody clashes in Kyiv. The German daily Die Welt, for instance, referred to the deal as Steinmeiers diplomatic coup. According to this view, it was EU foreign policy that brought an end to violence in Ukraine. In reality, the real reason why Yanukovich is no longer President of Ukraine is because the Maidan protesters did not feel bound by the deal brokered by the EU. Taking the initiative, lower-profile leaders of the movement instead announced that if Yanukovich had not resigned by 10am next morning, they would storm the presidential palace. It is not difficult to see why the compromise was so unpopular in Kyiv. While Yanukovichs grip on power in the country imploded as more and more MPs of his Party of Regions announced their resignation from the parliamentary faction, whole units of Berkut and the ordinary police sided with the people of Western Ukraine. Thinking they had landed a major diplomatic coup, EU diplomats signed a deal with an already powerless despot whose major concession was to hold presidential elections in December 2014 rather than February 2015. It would have been madness for the Ukrainian people to accept such a pseudo-deal after three months of painstaking and bloody protests. As it turned out, the compromise negotiated by Germany, France, and Poland was already obsolete when it was signed. What implications does this major foreign policy failure have for the future? Firstly, we should acknowledge that the Ukrainian rejection of the EU deal was not only understandable, but also consistent with European values. One of the central tenets of Western political philosophy is the Lockean assumption that a government which turns against its own people, in this case by opening fire on protesters, can be legitimately overthrown by force. This a central element of British and American political thought, as both countries are themselves the products of revolutions. Moreover, this ideology is enshrined in Article 20 of the German Basic Law. This the EU did not want. Rather, its foremost objectives were the preservation of (false) stability in Eastern Europe and the maintenance good relations with the Russian Federation. With this approach, Foreign Minister Steinmeier retained the pro-muscovite foreign policy of Gerhard Schröder, Chancellor from 1998 until 2005. During this time, Steinmeier was Schröders chief aide in the Chancellery and one of the architects of his policy towards Russia. This of course does not mean that the EU should adopt a neoconservative foreign policy of promoting revolutions all over the world; the often tremendous unintended consequences of US foreign policy since 1945 are a warning here. Instead, the EU should be consistent with European values and not attempt to intervene on the side of stability where democratic revolutions are impending. The case of the Ukrainian Revolution demonstrates that revolutions do not have to lead to anarchy and instability. Since Saturday, Kyiv has become safer than at any point during the last three months; families with small children are making Sunday trips to the Maidan or Yanukovichs opulent villa on the outskirts of the capital. Looting has been virtually unheard of. Secondly, the Ukrainian Revolution challenges the case for ever-deeper European integration. It is often maintained that the EU should speak with one voice in foreign policy, following the famous lament by Henry Kissinger who wanted to speak to all of Europe by just making one phone call. Granted, this would make things much easier for the great powers of this world. Smaller nations like Ukraine, however, can be glad that the EU has not yet become a United States of Europe. The only countries that really threw support behind the democratic movement in Ukraine were small nations also geographically proximate to Russia, including Sweden and the Baltic States. As such, Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt was often the most outspoken advocate of change in Ukraine during the last three months. Although Poland eventually conformed to the dominant EU doctrine, it had previously been major source of support. What if foreign policy were the sole concern of Brussels? Chances are that there would have been far less support. A centrally directed European foreign policy would serve the interests of big nations like Germany and France. Europeans should realize that while speaking with one voice may seem easier, speaking with many voices that sometimes diverge can be a much more successful approach. Marius Strubenhoff studies History at the University of Cambridge and has lived and worked in Ukraine.
Posted on: Tue, 11 Mar 2014 01:17:51 +0000