The court of appeals held that an intent to defraud is not an element of the crime of forging the signature of a federal judge under Section 505. Id. at 14a-20a. The court began by recognizing that the plain language of Section 505 does not require an intent to defraud, but only requires that a defendant . . . knowingly forge the signature of a federal judge for the purpose of authenticating any proceeding or document. Id. at 15a (quot ing Cowan, 116 F.3d at 1362). The court acknowledged that the common-law crime of forgery required an intent to defraud, but it explained that courts should not as sign a common-law meaning to a statutory term when that meaning is . . . inconsistent with the statutes purpose. Id. at 16a (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594-595 (1990)). The court further noted that the purpose of Section 505 is to protect[] the integrity of a government function-namely, federal judicial proceedings, rather than simply to prevent wronging one in his property rights by dishonest methods or schemes. Ibid. (quoting McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 358 (1987)). Thus, the court concluded, Section 505 should apply whenever an individual forges a judges signature in order to pass off a false document as an authentic one issued by the courts of the United States, because such conduct implicates the interests protected by [Section] 505 whether or not the actor in tends to deprive another of money or property. Id. at 17a.
Posted on: Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:52:52 +0000
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