The minus-US uncertainty Dr Maleeha Lodhi (Geopolitics) / 24 October 2013 Lack of consensus is hampering a security deal for the future For some time it seemed that Afghanistan had slipped from Washington’s top priorities as the Obama administration became preoccupied by the political gridlock at home, fast moving developments in the Middle East, and terrorist threats in Africa. But US Secretary of State John Kerry’s recent trip to Kabul signalled that the US still had important business to transact in Afghanistan. The visit was impelled by the urgency to secure a security deal that would allow for a post-2014 US military presence in Afghanistan. After a year of negotiations between Washington and Kabul, the continuing stalemate on a bilateral security agreement (BSA) made the US deadline of October to conclude the deal appear increasingly elusive. As Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s public statements became more strident, American officials suggested that if no agreement was reached, the US would exercise the ‘zero option’ of complete withdrawal from Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, Kerry’s unannounced visit to Kabul ended in agreement on most of the terms for a BSA. But a key sticking point remained unresolved: Legal immunity for American forces from prosecution in Afghanistan. This meant no final accord emerged. Karzai announced that the immunity issue would be decided by a Loya Jirga (an assembly of tribal leaders), which he planned to convene next month. And Kerry made it clear that “If the issue of jurisdiction cannot be resolved, then there cannot be a bilateral security agreement”. This left an air of uncertainty – and many unanswered questions. When would Karzai, who steps down in six months, call the Loya Jirga? He has already postponed this twice. Would the Jirga endorse the deal, especially in the middle of the country’s election season? Registration of presidential candidates ended earlier this month for the elections due in April 2014. Although the exact terms of what has been described as a ‘partial deal’ have yet to be announced, an important and consequential question is how the BSA will affect future efforts to revive Afghan peace talks, given that the Taleban’s main demand is withdrawal of all foreign forces from their country. In his Eid message, Taleban spiritual leader Mullah Omar rejected the proposed agreement, saying that Afghans would never accept a “document of surrender” rubberstamped by a “fake” Loya Jirga. There is also no regional consensus on a long-term US military presence. Most regional states, especially Iran, Russia and China, have misgivings. As no agreement has been concluded, it leaves Karzai with room to manoeuvre and raises another possibility. What if he plays the BSA down to the wire to bargain for postponement of elections? However improbable, the possibility cannot be ruled out. Any postponement will, however, be unacceptable to all the Afghan opposition groups, provoke internal discord, and also jeapordise Nato’s exit strategy. American officials say Washington would oppose any postponement. But it is yet to be seen how the US will resolve the immunity issue without a trade-off. What will that trade-off be? And what would be the implications, especially for Afghan reconciliation prospects, if all energies continue to be consumed by efforts to conclude the BSA, to the exclusion of addressing other aspects of the transitions ahead? Uncertainty has already deepened about the political, economic and security transitions because the most important prerequisite for their achievement is nowhere in sight – peace talks for a political settlement to end the war. Valuable time has been lost to prolonged wrangling between Washington and Kabul on the BSA. This has also exacted a heavy price – delaying if not derailing peace efforts. It was in June that Karzai suspended talks on the BSA in protest against the US for orchestrating the opening of a Taleban office in Qatar. A promising start to a possible peace process was stopped dead in its tracks by Karzai’s calculation that Washington needed a BSA more than anything else. He linked the two issues and insisted that unless he was at the center of any dialogue with the Taleban he would not let it proceed. As securing the BSA became the overwhelming American priority, the peace process was pushed to the back burner. That is where it remains today. This throws all three milestones ahead into uncertainty, intensifying doubts about a smooth path to 2014 and beyond. A muddle through marks the US-led coalition’s approach to the looming transitions, whereas what is needed is a coherent plan predicated on progress in peace talks.
Posted on: Fri, 25 Oct 2013 20:04:48 +0000
Trending Topics
© 2015