Types of predestination. Predestination may be described under two types, with the basis for each found within their definition of free will. Between these poles, there is a complex variety of systematic differences, particularly difficult to describe because the foundational terms are not strictly equivalent between systems. The two poles of predestinarian belief may be usefully described in terms of their doctrinal comparison between the Creators freedom, and the creatures freedom. These can be contrasted as either univocal, or equivocal conceptions of freedom. In terms of ultimates, with Gods decision to create as the ultimate beginning, and the ultimate outcome, a belief system has a doctrine of predestination if it teaches: Gods decision, assignment or declaration concerning the lot of people is conceived as occurring in some sense prior to the outcome, and the decision is fully predictive of the outcome, and not merely probable. There are numerous ways to describe the spectrum of beliefs concerning predestination in Christian thinking. To some extent, this spectrum has analogies in other monotheistic religions, although in other religions the term predestination may not be used. For example, teaching on predestination may vary in terms of three considerations. Is Gods predetermining decision based solely on a knowledge of His own will, or does it also include a knowledge of whatever will happen? How particular is Gods prior decision: is it concerned with particular persons and events, or is it limited to broad categories of people and things? How free is God in effecting His part in the eventual outcome? Is God bound or limited by conditions external to his own will, willingly or not, in order that what has been determined will come to pass? Furthermore, the same sort of considerations apply to the freedom of mans will. Assuming that an individual had no choice in who, when and where to come into being: How are the choices of existence determined by what he is? Assuming that not all possible choices are available to him: How capable is the individual to desire all choices available, in order to choose from among them? How capable is an individual to put into effect what he desires? Univocal concept of freedom The univocal conception of freedom holds that human will is free of cause, even though creaturely in character. These belief systems hold that the Creator (or, in some cases, Nature or Evolution) has fashioned a system of absolute freedom: human volition that features a free and independent nature. On the other end of the spectrum is the position that the Creator (or a foreign Being, object, etc.) exercises absolute control over human will and/or that all decisions originate with some outside cause, leaving no room for freedom. Equivocal or analogical concepts of freedom At the other end of the spectrum are analogical conceptions of freedom. These versions of predestination hold that individual choice is not excluded from the fashioning work of the Creator. Mans will is free because it is determined, boundaried or created by God. In other words, apart from Gods will determining mans will in a divine sense, only chaos or enslavement to mindless and impersonal forces is possible. Mans will may be called free and responsible, but not in an absolute sense; the choice of good or of evil must be uncoerced to be free, but it is never uncreated or uncaused. The likeness of creaturely freedom to divine freedom is analogical, not univocal. It is important to note that among predestinarians there is no significant representation for the idea that human choices are unreal, but merely that they are the direct expression of the Creators will. The analogy implied here means that however else human and divine freedom may be comparable, there is an unlikeness between the free will of the Creator and human freedom, which depends on the Creator for existence and power. With no significant exception, when predestinarians deny that man has freedom of will, it is to deny that mans will is free in the same sense as the Creators will, or to affirm that mans choices are entirely subject to divine causation. That men are responsible without being absolutely original is particularly true in these systems, if they acknowledge a doctrine of Original Sin, whereby every person is understood to be born into a condition of helplessness under the power or the effects of sin; for whom, either through inherited guilt, or the inherited consequences of guilt, a purely free choice of the good is not possible without the aid of Gods undeserved grace. Traditional Islam holds to the powerlessness of human will, apart from the aid of Allah, and yet without a doctrine of Original Sin. Thus, Islam has a simpler version of predestination, viewing all that comes to pass as the will of Allah. And yet, the Quran affirms human responsibility, saying for example: Allah changeth not the condition of a people until they change what is in their hearts. There is no significant view of predestination that entirely relieves man of responsibility for his own choices. Therefore, all significant versions of predestination account for the differences between people (perhaps in life or, in death, or both) by reference to the will of the Creator. Also, all versions of predestination incorporate into the doctrine various concepts of human responsibility, which differ from one another in terms of the kind of volitional freedom possible for the creature.
Posted on: Sun, 02 Nov 2014 08:50:20 +0000
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