VietNamNet’s columnist Viet Lam talks with Prof. James Dale Bindenagel, former US Ambassador to Germany and now with the US-based Boston Global Forum, and Dr. Nguyen Hong Son, Deputy Director of the Institute for the East Sea Studies of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs about China’s rise and Vietnam’s choices. Below is the full content of the talk.Viet Lam: I would like to start our discussion today with an event that has captured the world’s attention in recent months. That is the placement of the Chinese oil rig in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Though China withdrew the oil rig and de-escalated the tensions, some say that the incident has changed the world perceptions of China’s rise fundamentally. Do you agree with the comment? I do not know whether the world perceptions towards China have changed or not, but the regional perceptions towards China have certainly changed because all of a sudden, China has conducted very assertive activities against one of its closest neighbors that is supposed to be a comprehensive strategic partner. So, the region and the world may wonder if China could do that to Vietnam, what it could do to other neighboring countries such as the Philippines, Japan, South Korea or the ASEAN in general. And huge questions were raised on whether and how China is going to rise, whether it continues to rise peacefully, whether it is going to seek peaceful solutions to its disputes with its neighboring countries, whether it is going to abide by the international laws, whether it is going to be a responsible stakeholder as it rises. So there are huge uncertainties regarding China after the oil rig incident in the South China Sea (East Sea). Prof. Bindenagel: I would like to say that I am very pleased to be here and to enjoy together this conversation, a very important and very timely one. For the Americans, with regard to China and its attitude towards China, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs last year did a regular survey of American attitudes toward foreign policy. With regard to China, 69% of Americans want to engage peacefully with China. That is the indication that we have to seek the peaceful rise that China has stated – and to encourage that and to engage with China because it is very important for the U.S. With regard to the South China Sea, or as you might say the East Sea or we might say the Western Pacific, there are obviously critical issues that have been raised in terms of sovereignty over islands, over regional issues beyond the South China Sea and the Senkaku Islands with regard to Japan. When you have the issue of sovereignty, it raises immediately the historical and political issues of the rise of a major power. In the rise of a major power, it is normally seen with conflicts, and the counter reactions from another major power that is challenged. In our case, as I said, the U.S. has tried very hard to engage peacefully and to support the peaceful rise of China. When the Senkaku Islands were challenged by the Chinese and the President of the U.S. came to Japan in April, he made it very clear that the U.S. covers the Senkaku Islands with the security arrangement with Japan, which helped to de-escalate the tension around the Senkaku Islands. But immediately then, the Chinese effort to assert its national sovereignty over regional islands, which are in conflict not only with Vietnam but with others in the region and that the China National Oversea Oil Company moved its rig into that disputed area, were a very clear sign that something was a myth, something was being challenged. It obviously raised attention in the region and raised for us the question why, what is motivating it. There are several reasons that could be possible. One is the status of the rise of China that Xi Jinping has made clear that there are three questions, three hopes for China that fit in their priorities, obviously with the Senkaku Islands, Taiwan and the South China Sea that is China’s Dream, as Xi Jinping put it. So the question is why is now, at this moment. I would look to and try to understand the dynamics inside China as well as an element of what is happening. So, with the priorities set by the national government in Beijing, individual actors such as the China National Oversea Oil Company or People Liberation Army and others have the freedom to act. And try to understand more deeply that perhaps the China National Oil Company decided to move not necessarily at the direction of Beijing but maybe under the priorities of their own. For me, it raises the question that allow us not to predispose what the answer is but try to understand what the dynamics are and give us the ability to say to the Chinese, the Vietnamese and the Filipinos, particularly in the online discussion here and sovereignty issues, what are the options, not for closing what they are by deciding that this is an aggressive action that is somehow contained in an aggressive policy. Viet Lam: I asked this question because if we observe the Chinese activities in the East Sea in a systematic way since 2007, we can see that China has been more and more assertive and aggressive in pursuing their territorial claims. A Chinese scholar said that these activities reveal a general pattern: China is building or formulating a new grand strategy. So we want to know more which characteristics of this emerging grand strategy that we can predict and observe now? Well, certainly, as China rises, it wants to have a better or higher status in the international stage. One of the interpretations of China’s dream is that China would like to become a global leading superpower. From what we observed from China’s pattern of behavior, we could tell that China is heavily obsessed by what they see as a threat from the U.S. and they would like to be able to counter that threat. And one of China’s dreams is to be able to avoid or escape the threat from the U.S. and be on par with the U.S. From what we see, that interprets China’s Naval Dream to become a naval power in the sea. And to be able to become a naval power, China is increasingly investing in its naval military assets and increasingly asserting its power at sea, asserting its claims both in the East China Sea and the South China Sea or what we call the East Sea. According to some scholars, China has set its objectives maybe not directly from the top leadership but from various groups of interests inside China — that by 2021, by 100 years’ anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, China would like to be able to monopolize or fully control the water space within the first chain of islands, from Japan to Okinawa, Taiwan, Philippines down to the South China Sea. That is why China is undertaking several activities to assert their claims and enhance their presence within these borders of waters. We are looking at the oil rig incident but that is not just one incident. We also have to be mindful of other incidents south of the South China Sea such as the land reclamation of several features in the Spratly areas, of China’s enhanced activities in the western and eastern part of the South China Sea regarding the features which are controlled by the Philippines as well. So, looking at it systematically, we could see that, although China may not have a strategy formulated by the top leadership or directed from the top leadership, the top leadership supports the plan or the activities initiated by various groups within China. That is the dangerous thing because they do not stop it or undertake any activities to stop it, although they know that there is something wrong with it. Prof. Bindenagel: I think that is the reason why analysis of where China is coming from. I think it is to point out strategically what is a dramatic shift from an earlier time and the Chinese have a historic concern over the last 150 years of humiliation and colonization and land issues, including the Vietnam War or American War as we call it, and the Korean War. That shift is from their historical position and the land wars to what we have and now they really turn to the sea because the conflicts that we have now are not on land, but on sea. If you look widely, what are the capabilities that are being developed? Not only the capabilities or the positioning of the places around the Spratly and in the Scarborough and the others, but rather what they are doing with the military build-up to support that. Viet Lam: Let us see from China’s perspective, you know about China’s dream and their argument is that China is an economic power and they could surpass the U.S. in around 10-20 years. Every country wants to benefit from economic ties with China. So why do we not welcome China’s dominance?Dr. Nguyen Hung Son: Let me say that nobody opposes China’s rise. They might have some concerns over how China rises but I do not think there is anyone who is afraid or who does not expect China to rise. I think it is a common consensus in the region that China is and is going to continue to rise. That is fully expected. What is not expected is that in the course of its rise, it is going to change the rules of the game altogether or is going to change the status quo to the extent that nobody is going to know what the rules of the game are, or they unilaterally change the rules or the norms of the region that countries in the region are so accustomed to and are so supportive. And that is essentially the system of international relations created after the World War II. So, I think, on the one hand, countries welcome China’s rise, especially economically rising China, but on the other hand, they also have certain expectations of China and China’s rise, especially in political and security fields. It is the common wisdom of the region that China is going to listen to the expectation of the international community and stay within the framework that they think is beneficial to China as well. Prof. Bindenagel. Prof. Bindenagel: That is a kind of structural discussion that actually leads to the question that who is dominating and we all understand that the name Middle Kingdom is not between us and them but between heaven and us, and I understand quickly I am wrong. I learnt here just the past few weeks that Vietnam now feels that they are too close to China and not close enough to heaven. I am not sure that is right but maybe that is a way to understand the question of dominance and where your position is. We need a chance to talk about it rationally but openly without regard to hurting feelings for just trying to understand and not miscalculate. Viet Lam: You mentioned what we call the Middle Kingdom syndrome, which refers to the obsession not only in Vietnam but in many regional countries.Prof. Bindenagel: I studied Mandarin at college over one year. That is the last thing to understanding. And to understand that syndrome, it is very important to frame the way that you approach the issue. I am not an expert on China, but I have been in and out of China for years and I understand that this is an opportunity. I mean, China does have grievances. Many of which are cleared for the last 150 years but they are not only with the region in Southeast Asia. There is an issue that they lost territory to the Russians in 1890 and the western colonial powers. But what I find it interesting (because I am about to be Henry Kissinger professor at Brown University) is that the attitude from China, as I understand, toward Germany was that same question: How did Germany rise over 150 years ago. Not to make the analogy with China, but how did rising Germany have its disaster in the 20th century, losing two World Wars and today has a high standing as its position in the world is respected. How did that come about? Maybe there are some lessons that the Chinese could learn from the German case. To respect human dignity is the fundamental issue in the German constitution. Maybe, there are lessons that could go beyond the region and globally, and will make contribution to that discussion in the following years. Dr. Nguyen Hung Son: Japan with its role in WW II is still being still accepted by the region. Is it also a good lesson. Prof. Bindenagel: That is also a mixed lesson because in the question of nationalism, the motivating factor for nationalists in Northeast Asia and East Asia is nationalism and what the Japanese students in the World War II had not been accepted by those two regions. Acceptance is very important to make the future as well. Remember that it is important, what happened, we need to remember the Vietnam War: How we came to that, why we did this. We also need to move into the future and how do we get there. We do not do it by taking pieces of history and using them against peace. I found that one of the last impressions that I have in the weeks that I have been in Vietnam is that there is a strong future orientation here and the people that I meet. Remember what happened when I was speaking to the Americans from that era; it is very interesting to see the openness and the willingness to look towards the future to have some good lessons from Southeast Asia. To be continued…VietNamNet
Posted on: Fri, 15 Aug 2014 07:38:55 +0000
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