What about free will in a deterministic universe? Or in a - TopicsExpress



          

What about free will in a deterministic universe? Or in a indeterministic one? According to philosopher Colin McGinn, either determinism is true or it is not. If it is true, then every event is determined by events preceeding it. Our action is predetermined and we have no say in the outcome and subsequently free will does not exist. In the case where the universe is not deterministic, or in other words, it is indeterministic, random events could not be the results of our concious choices. The reason being that some events occur causelessly, or are not subject to law, or only to probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices, ( as quoted from Wikipedia on Standard argument against free will.) Again, free will does not exist. At this point, I would like to raise a few questions: If an event is indeterministic, must it be random? Again, what is randomness? If an event is indeterministic, must it occur causelessly? Here, again, we must go back to look more carefully at what is being deterministic: A deterministic universe is one that is determined by physical laws. If quantum randomness results in a nondeterministic universe, it simply means that the universe is not deterministic through any known physical laws. Randomness? As I have discussed before, a random quantum process is nothing more than a stochastic one, which is unpredictable. To claim that quantum events are causeless, or are not subject to law, ( as for probabilistic law, we have yet to define the term,) is taking things too far, at least, from a philosophical standpoint. What scientific research in quantum theory has thus far established is that the quantum world is stochastic. If we take anything probabilistic as something that is truly not governed by any law, a stochastic process, as I have previous discussed, could be totally deterministic or totally probabilistic. In view of the fact that it is impossible to discern processes that are only analyzable by statistical means, the true nature of a stochastic process may well be somewhere in between. Let us study one of the prevalent interpretations of quantum theory: Many worlds. In the paradigm of the many worlds, all qantum possibilities, that is, all possible realities, are realized. ( I do not pretend to fully grasp the physical meaning of the previous statement.) As such, it looks as though the theory is totally deterministic, ( as well as local, but that is another story.) Then, what about conciousness? True, hard determinism would take conciousness as entirely illusional; free will is totally absent. Our conciousness may be illusional, however, where our illusionary conciousness lies is very real, in that, a photon that passes through the left slit, in the non-interference case of a Young slit experiment, never passes through the right in our reality. As far as our illusionary conciousness is concerned, it resides in a world where the photon passes through the left slit, an outcome just as unpredictable as in any other interpretations. Some may say that since conciousness does not really exist, it does not really matter through which slit the photon goes. Well, my answer to that is, tell that to the cat, yes, Schroedingers cat. We are subjective being living in an objective world. It may be an objectively valid view that our world is totally deterministic in that it is equally real that the photon passes through the left slit and triggers a bomb that kills a person and the same photon passes through the right slit and does not trigger the bomb. (The slit experiment example is chosen for convenience only. The fact is any of the many valid quantum experiments on entangled states can be chosen. If anyone objects to the choice for this one being not really quantum, by all means, choose another one.) The experiment ends with the first detection of a photons passage through the slits. Both of the events happen in some of the many worlds. Clearly, it would be very difficult to argue to the person killed by the bomb that there is no difference whether this person dies or not. The person would certainly ask the question, Why me? Why is it that I was the one whose conciousness resided in the body that was blown into bits by the bomb? The answer that conciousness is not real but an illusion, is not in any way comforting. To that person, the universe is probabilistic without governing laws of any sort. The only way out is not to take the chance. Yes, when I mentioned Schroedingers cat, I meant that person. Probabilistic law There are subtle philosophical issues concerning whether the universe is probabilistic in a many-worlds situation. At this moment, I do not want to get too involved in the argument. For now, I would like to comment on the statement some events occur causelessly, or are not subject to law, or only to probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices. The first term in the statement I would question is probabilistic law. If I may be so bold to say that probabilty is the least understood concept in mathematical science. Take coin tossing for instance, given the chaotic behaviour of the process, an honest and fair toss always gives a 50% probability for each outcome. Some may argue that the process is still random because we have no control over the magnitudes and attributes of the forces applied. I do not think I need to argue about that also: There is a great number of supporters for a deterministic world who would be too glad to supply an argument against a probabilistic one. The thing is, it is beside the point. We can never claim that it is impossible that the coin turn up heads only twenty out of twenty tosses. What is more peculiar is that, in the event of getting twenty heads, we should not expect that the score be evened out with twenty straight tails; after all, it may or may not happen. What does the law of probabilty say about all these? While certain outcomes of events are considered unlikely, they are never impossible. I would say that we only pretend to know what we are saying when we say that some events are subject only to probabilistic law. I was not saying coin tossing is necessary probabilistic. I was only using coin tossing to demonstrate what we should expect from something analyzable in terms of probability: There may be an entity called expected value, but we do not really know what to expect. Yes, if you observe that the way I use it, the term probability seems to refer to a stochastic process, you would be right. To be sure, we cannot even expect to identify the nature of coin tossing. We simply do not know if any random event consitutes the cause for the outcome of a toss. It is not only that when there are only two possible outcomes the probability of each of which is half that we do not really know what to expect. There are quantum events that one of its outcome is far more probable than the other. Say, outcome A is a million times more probable than outcome B. If a scientist observe that B occurs, would he say that the outcome is not expected? One can argue that, a probabilistic law is one that says statistically, for sufficiently large number of trials or identical experiments, we can expect that the relative frequency of each occurence of an outcome is distributed according to the relevant pre-determined function. It may not be possible to say what to expect from one such event, but it is certainly possible to say what to expect from a large number of events. That is why it is a law. But would somebody tell me how this definition is different from that of a stochastic process? One might want to try: A probabilistic law has stochastic property but is totally random. Nice try. Now we have to define random. From the dictionary, we have that a probabilistic law has stochastic property but is having totally no specific pattern. Sorry, that will not do. The outcome of a coin toss has no specific pattern. I extracted a definition that may help: A probabilistic law has stochastic property but is totally lacking any governing order. That is certainly one property that the coin tossing process does not have and that the definition is in-line with the property of randomness. However, it is no easy task to demonstrate that a quantum event must not have any governing order. Firstly, there are non-local interpretations that says quantum event is deterministic. Secondly, do we know what totally lacking any governing order truly means? How do we define something that is not defined by any order? The point is that, if one can posit that it is possible that the universe is deterministic, and if another can posit that the universe is probabilistic without any demonstration, why can we not posit that it is possible that the universe is neither deterministic nor probabilistic? That is, the universe may be non-deterministic and non-probabilistic. Yes, I did mention that I prefer the term non-deterministic to indeterministic and now you can see why. A thought experiment Just for argument sake, we can make a slight modification of the magician-dealing-card thought experiment. This time we assume an higher agent who can fix the spin of a photon in our universe and we have no knowlege of such a higher agent. The only restriction is that there are as many left-spin photons as there are right-spin ones. Again, for argument sake, we can assume a limited lifespan for the universe where it can sustain life, for, without life, there can be no one to measure the spin of the photons. We start with a time span twice of that of the life-span of the universe. Within that time period, we can have a total of, say, 2N occurrences of photons with N of them being left-spin and N of them being right-spin. (It is possible to re-cast the experiment in terms of entangled states of some other systems. That does make the job of the higher agent much more complicated, but it is still possible to fix the measured outcomes to agree with quantum physics. To simplify the model for easy demonstration, we will just stick with the spin of photon.) Now, imagine that the higher agent fix all the spins of the photons. At first glance, if the higher agent had fixed that, within a certain 5 second period, all the photons measured are spinning left, we can say, aha, there, we have a pattern. Or, have we? In the event that such a result is obtained, ask any quantum physicists and they would probably reason that there might be a glitch in the experimental set-up. In addition, they will all agree that they would not rule out the possibility of such a freak occurrence, no matter how unlikely it would be. After all, any event is as likely as the next. It is only statistically that it is more likely to have a more or less balanced quantity of left and right spin photons. Anyway, the higher agent may have a method or code to fix all the spins of the photons such that we cannot crack the code with limited observations. If we can take a peek at the code book or cook book of the higher agent, we can predict the outcome of every measurement. If that is the case, should we say that the world is deterministic or probabilistic? Since we do not know of the existence of the higher agent we would have no possibility to access the higher agents cook book, and we would not be able to determine any governing order for the spin of photon. Without any viable governing order, what would we say about the quantum world? It is, or at least it appears to us that it is, random. In other words, the quantum events seem to be subject to probabilistic law. Of all the interpretations of the quantum world, most physicists would pick one that is deterministic. In fact, if possible, they would define the terms in such a way that quantum world be deterministic. But no matter the interpretation, the probability of finding a particle in a certain state obeys the distribution given by the inner product of the state vector of the system. Though we have no idea why, the formalism set by quantum theory to make predictions works like a charm up to the statistical distribution. Statistically it is equally likely to find a photon in either spin and we have a formalism that derives a result in agreement with the fact. Do we have a reason for that other than the fact that it is true empirically? Symmetry? Then why is the universe not symmetric with respect to the numbers of electrons and positrons? One might answer that, according to quantum physics, symmetry breaking occurred. The fact is, we cannot be certain if there were an outside force that tipped the scale in favor of the electrons. As I have demonstrated with the thought experiment of photon spin, probabilistic law is only empirically defined up to the relative occurrence of the different spins. It tells us nothing about how the events are distributed or why they are so distributed. It is not that we do not know everything about [that part of] the law: We simply know nothing at all. (Remarks: Many would be critical of some of the statements I made. Please bear with me. I will sort that out one by one.) I have set up the photon thought experiment with the assunption that there is a higher agent. I even referred to an outside force which tipped the scale. At this point, some might start to think that I was trying to introduce theistic elements into the scientific arena. Granted I am a theist, I have no intention to drag God or any supernatural being into this. All will be clear in due time. I used the term outside force only to imply what little we know about the universe we live in. Scientists are constantly discovering possibilities (not facts, at least not yet) of previously unknown forces (I must say the term is used loosely) at work. Also, light beams that are not polarized are inevitably made up of photons of both spins. As previously stated, I am using the photon spin out of convenience only. The experiment may be framed with measuring through which one of the two slits a photon or a quantum particle passes. To be sure, saying that events are subject only to probabilistic law is like saying that we do not know how the events come by. Personally, I take this statement to be vacuous in meaning. Without any relevant knowledge of the events, we can neither say that such events occur causelessly, nor that they are not subject to law. The fact that we are not able to specify any law only demonstrates our ignorance. I would agree to take the statement [events occur causelessly, or are not subject to law, or only to probabilistic law, is not sufficient for those events to be free choices] as saying that the existence of free choices is not demonstrated. It would, however, be absurd to conclude that free will does not exist since those events cannot be free choices. When we talk about free will, we usually frame it in terms of free choices. When we are free to choose, we have free will. But what really constitutes a free choice? In the movie Sophies Choice, is Sophies choice a free choice? I do not intend to object that it is not. But does Sophie have free will? (I do not think it is inappropriate to treat the fictional choice as an enlightening thought experiment. The incident depicted is realistic. After all, logically, it can happen in the real world.) We can hold the view that Sophies is not free. But I contest that free choices are necessary for free will. While Sophies choice may not be totally free, she exercises her free will to choose. In addition, had she been allowed to choose freely, she would have chosen that both of her children live. The consequence of our choice effected by our free will may not be what we desire, nonetheless, our free will exists. When are choices free? Some may even argue that, in Sophies case (of Sophies Choice), even if she had been given the choice of having both her children live, still, she would not have free choice. She would already have been conditioned to value her children, for example, over a boy standing beside her. Sophie, and, for that matter, every one of us, have been conditioned by some standard of evaluation or judgement, such standard being the consequence effected by causes external to our being. Based on the fact that, during the course of our lifetime, we are constantly indoctrinated with different, ideas, concepts, rules and regulations, etc. As such, as some might argue, every one of our decision is caused and is not out of our own free will. Wether we accept or reject the indoctrination, or how we accept it, depends on the character we are born with, totally determined by factors extant at our inception. These factors are in turn totally caused by other pre-existing factors. This line of argument naturally leads to the conclusion that everything is caused with our free will being an illusion only. Besides the fact that we are subjected to indoctrinations in life, proponents of the non-existence of free will take the view that whoever we are is effected by conditions pre-exsisting before our very own conception. These conditions and subsequently, our indoctrination later, are yet effected by causes existing before them. Our DNA is the mixing of our parents DNA effected by relevant conditions existing at the moment. Every fiber of our being is the consequence of some causes that has existed before then. Who we are is determined before we were born. But it really does not matter whether these conditions constitute the integral cause that builds our physical self, free will, nonetheless, can exist independently. By that, I mean, the existence and the abscence of free are equally consistent with the existence of these conditions or causes. Quantum theory has made possible the argument that these conditions do not constitute in entirety the cause for our identity. Our body is made up of matter, fermions that are ultimately quantum particles, since they must all obey the laws of quantum physics. The fermions band together to form an entity that exhibits remarkable behaviour. They make up the total of our physical self, our brain included. Whether we are a believer of the theory of illusory free will or not, we all must agree that the fermions must also make up our conciousness, or ego, or our soul, or whatever one chooses to call it. I do not think I need to convince anyone that our conciousness constitutes our identity, free will or no free will. It would seem that I may have taken a position contrary to that of a theist. No, I have not. All I did was to phrase the subject so that we can concentrate on what is essential instead of the fine-prints. I have taken the liberty to avoid having to argue whether we take the brain to be a vessel of our conciousness or the conciousness itself. The thing is, finally, it would not matter. I have to agree that the process of our making a decision is very complicated. I do not, however, agree that the ethical and moral principles of an individual is the aggregate of years of indoctrination and that our physical being and, thus, our mental capacity is an a priori construct with an algorithm whose outputs are then predetermined if all the inputs are known. In other words, I do not agree that every one of our decision is caused in such a way that our free will has no part in it. We have thus far no satisfactory explanation for our psychological and mental attrubutes such as creativity, artistic faculty and abstract thinking. To me, it is crucial to define what free will is: We have to postulate how our free will comes by. If the sum of our knowledge cannot resolve the question of conflicting deterministic and probabilistic world views, there is no reason why we cannot propose a third view where the world is partially deterministic, partially probabilistic and partially effected by our free will. But where doth lie our free will? I do not think it is necessary to argue for the uniqueness of our identity. But I need to address the issue on the physical aspect. From a scientific point of view, all particles are basically the same. I do not plan to completely qualify my previous statement. Instead I plan to make my point by referencing the fact that all electrons are identical, all protons are identical and that goes for all particles with the same name. The point is, how do we get something unique out of something identical. Ordinary matter is made up of protons, neutrons and electrons. Matter exhibits different properties because these foundamental particles band together in different ways. Still, the similarity traits persist: One carbon-12 atom is identical to the next; a certain amino acid molecule is identical to the next with the same formula. Yet each and every human being is unique. We can have two persons with identical set of DNAs. This happens to identical twins. They are similar in many aspects, but, still, they are two persons, two completely independent individuals. It may still be some time before technology can clone a person. But let us suppose that you can be cloned, I do not think anyone would need any convincing of the fact that the clone cannot be you. Again, we try another thought experiment. Let us ask a question: What would happen if we were able to replicate you completely down to the individual atom? Would the replica be you? If anyone is going to opt for the answer that your identity will reside in two bodies, they should be prepared to propose a new set of laws in physics. Truth be told, if that were true, no one would know how to argue for or against free will, for we have no idea what would happen as we know nothing of the physics involved. Let us keep it simple: Your identity resides in the original body. I think we need to go on with the axiom that our identity is unique and is one and the same with the bulk of the matter that makes up our brain. For those who maintain that our conciousness is an illusion, I must say that their world must have looked very consistent with their view, but it is certainly not consistent with mine. It is necessary to adopt the view that whatever is real must be consistent but we certainly do not have to agree that whatever is consistent must be real. With our conciousness being an illusion, it would not be difficult to argue against free will. But I maintain that conciousness is real. As it is, since each of our conciousness, hence, our identity, is unique, we can convince only ourselves that conciousness is real. I cannot prove to anyone that my conciousness and theirs are real, but neither can anyone prove to me that they are illusions. Of course, one can argue that the event of our world is either determined by a cause or causeless, (which means, our free will cannot be the cause,) and so, conciousness is an illusion. Thus, simply positing that our conciousness is an illusion does not mean that anything has been proved. It is, instead, necessary to rule out any possibility that an event is effected by anything else other than a cause. Events subject only to probabilistic law, as previously demonstrated, cannot be used as argument to rule out cause by free will. If we take a different view of determinism, we can argue for free will. But, since there are quantum phenomena, we can argue from another perspective without redefining anything. All we have to postulate is that, there is a higher agent who can influence the outcome of some probabilistic quantum phenomena as I have previously described in a thought experiment. No, the higher agent is not God, or any supernatural being of the sort: It is we, as a person. Of course, we cannot arbituarily control any quantum event: We control only those related to the matter that is our brain. It may sound surreal, but if our conciousness, our identity, our free will, resides in the quantum realm where we are not bounded by any rule to select a single quantum outcome, except that, overall statistical distribution be consistent, we are in control of the decisions that we make. The quantum pattern is, naturally, generated by our conciousness, our free will. And there be free will!
Posted on: Sun, 04 Jan 2015 00:50:22 +0000

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