..it is impossible to become a real communist without studying – really studying – all that Plekhanov has written on philosophy, as this is the best of the whole international literature of Marxism. V.I Lenin.. >>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>> ..One of the first places in the history of thought indisputably belongs to a man who died 60 years ago, on November 14, 1831. None of those sciences, which the French call “sciences morales et politiques,” escaped the powerful and fructifying influence of Hegel’s genius. Dialectics, logic, history, law, esthetics, history of philosophy and history of religion assumed a new aspect, thanks to the impetus given them by Hegel. Hegelian philosophy trained and tempered the thought of such men as David Strauss, Bruno Bauer, Feuerbach, Fischer, Gans, Lassalle, and, finally, Engels and Marx. Even during his lifetime Hegel enjoyed world renown. After his death, from the ’30s to the ’40s, the practically universal enthusiasm for his philosophy became even more intense. But a reaction quickly followed. Hegel began to be treated – to use Marx’s words – “in the same way as the brave Moses Mendelssohn in Lessing’s time treated Spinoza, i.e., as a ‘dead dog’.” Interest in his philosophy disappeared completely among the “educated” circles. His influence in the academic world as well became so weak that to this day it has not occurred to a single specialist in the history of philosophy to define and point out “the lasting value” of Hegelian philosophy in the varied fields of knowledge it embraces. We shall presently explain the reasons for this attitude toward Hegel. Suffice it to note here that in the near future we may expect a revival of interest in his philosophy and especially in his philosophy of history. The tremendous successes of the labor movement, which compel the so-called educated classes to concern themselves with the theory under whose banner the movement is developing, will also compel these classes to become interested in the historical origin of this theory. And once they do become interested in it, they will quickly discover Hegel, who will thereby become transformed in their eyes from “a philosopher of the restoration” into the forefather of the most advanced modern ideas. And for this very reason we can predict that although interest in Hegel will revive among the educated classes, they will never show the same profound sympathy for Hegel as was shown 60 years ago in countries of German culture. On the contrary, bourgeois scholars will zealously occupy themselves with a “critical reexamination” of Hegel’s philosophy; and many doctoral diplomas will be acquired in the course of the struggle with the “exaggerations” and the “logical arbitrariness” of the dead professor. Naturally, from such a “critical reexamination” there will be only one gain for science, namely”: the learned apologists of. the capitalist order will again and again reveal their bankruptcy in theory, just as they have in politics. But not for nothing has it been said that it is always beneficial “to burrow around the roots of truth.” The revival of interest in Hegel’s philosophy will impel unprejudiced people to make an independent study of his works. Such mental labor will not be easy but it will be highly rewarding. Those who really strive for knowledge will find much to learn from Hegel. In this article we shall try to evaluate the philosophic-historic views of the great German thinker. In general outline, this has already been done by the hand of a master in the excellent articles of Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of German Classical Philosophy, which were first published in the Neue Zeit, and later appeared as a separate pamphlet. But we think that the above-mentioned views of. Hegel fully deserve a more detailed analysis. The importance of Hegel in social science is determined, first of all, by the fact that he examined all social phenomena from the standpoint of the process des Werdens (of becoming), i.e., from the point of view of their rise and dissolution. To many this may not appear as a very great contribution since, it seems, it is impossible to look at social phenomena in any other way. But first, as we shall show later, this point of view even now is not really understood by many who consider themselves “evolutionists.” Secondly, in Hegel’s day, those engaged in the social sciences were even further away from this viewpoint. Suffice it to recall the socialists and economists of the period. The bourgeois order was, to be sure, looked upon as a very great evil by the socialists at that time, but they nevertheless considered it as a perfectly accidental product of human errors. The economists, for their part, were delighted by the bourgeois order and were at a loss for words to praise it, but they considered it as no more than the product of an accidental discovery of the truth. Neither the Utopians nor the economists went beyond this abstract counterposing of truth to error although the teachings of the Utopian socialists already contained inklings of a more correct approach to things. To Hegel such an abstract counterposing of truth to error was one of those absurdities into which “rational” thinking so often fell. J.B. Say considered as worthless the study of the history of political economy because prior to Adam Smith all economists had advanced erroneous theories. To Hegel, on the other hand, philosophy was only the intellectual expression of its time. At each stage every “transcended” philosophy was the truth of its time, and for this reason alone Hegel could never have discarded all previous philosophic systems as something worthless, as old rubbish. On the contrary. “In philosophy,” he writes, “the latest [philosophic] birth of time is the result of all the [philosophic] systems that have preceded it, and must include their principles.” [1] At the basis of this view of the history of philosophy lay, of course, the purely idealistic conception that the “Architect has directed the work [i.e., the work of philosophic thought] and that Architect is the one living Mind whose nature is to think, to bring to self-consciousness what it is, and, with its being thus set as object before it, to be at the same time raised above it, and so to reach a higher stage of its own being.” (Ibid.) But the most consistent materialist will not deny that every given philosophic system is only the intellectual expression of its time.[2] And if, in returning to the history of political economy, we ask ourselves from what point of view must we approach it at the present time, then we will immediately see how much nearer we are to Hegel than to J.B. Say. For example, from the point of view of Say, that is, from the point of view of the abstract antagonism between truth and error, the mercantile system, or even the physiocratic system, must and did represent no more than an absurdity which accidentally befell the human mind. But we know today to what extent each of the above systems was the necessary product of its time: If the monetary and mercantile system single out international trade and the particular branches of national industry directly connected with that trade as the only true source of wealth or money, it must be borne in mind that in that period the greater part of national production was still carried on under forms of feudalism and was the source from which producers drew directly their means of subsistence. Products, as a rule, were not turned into commodities, nor, therefore, into money; they did not enter into the general social interchange of matter; did not, therefore, appear as embodiments of universal abstract labor; and did not in fact constitute bourgeois wealth ... True to the conditions as they prevailed in that primitive stage of bourgeois production, those unrecognized prophets held fast to the pure, tangible, and resplendent form of exchange value, to its form of a universal commodity as against all special commodities. (Marx, Critique of Political Economy, pp.216-17) Marx explains the polemic between the physiocrats and their opponents as a dispute over which kind of labor “it is that creates surplus value.” (Ibid., p.64) Is it not clear that this question was completely “timely” for the bourgeoisie which was then preparing to become master of everything? But it is not philosophy alone that appears to Hegel as the natural and necessary product of its time. He regards both religion and law in this same way. Moreover, one has to recognize that, according to Hegel, philosophy, law, religion, art and even technique (Technische Geschicklichkeit) are most closely interrelated: “Only in connection with this particular religion, can this particular political constitution exist; just as in such or such a state, such or such a philosophy or order or art.” [3] This, again, can appear somewhat trivial. Who does not know how closely interrelated are all aspects and manifestations of national life? At present this is familiar to every school child....
Posted on: Mon, 12 Jan 2015 10:24:51 +0000
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