امريكا تفضح مرسى وتتهمة بالعميل لصالح المخابرات الامريكية ضد عبد القادر حلمي امريكا تفضح مرسى وتتهمة بالعميل لصالح المخابرات الامريكية ضد عبد القادر حلمي Posted on Monday, December 10, 2012 قصة قديمه تم إحياؤها أمس في الولايات المتحدة . وتتعلق بالعالم المصري المحبوس في أمريكا عبد القادر حلمي ، الذي وشي به الدكتور محمد مرسي عندما كان مقيما في أمريكا .. كما جاء فى بيان اخر منسوب الى حركة تدعى حركة العصبة المصرية لدعم استقلال مصر اتهام الرئيس محمد مرسى ” بالعمالة ” لصالح المخابرات الامريكية و انه قام بالوشاية بالعالم المصري المحبوس حاليًا في السجون الامريكية عبد القادر حلمي في عملية تسمى الكربون الاسود. وقد جاء بالمنشور او البيان الذى يتم تداولة بكثافة وحصلت الصحف على نسخة منه أن العالم عبد القادر حلمي دكتور مهندس مصري كان يعمل فيشركه تيليدين الدفاعية بولاية كاليفورنيا وتم إلقاء القبض عليه متلبسًا بمحاولة تهريب سبائك الكربون الخاصة بتغليف الصواريخ الباليستية المتطورة عام 1989 لحساب القوات المسلحه المصرية وصدر حكم بالسجن علية .. وتسبب ذلك ايضا فى إقالة المشير عبد الحليم أبو غزالة بعد ان اعتبره الأمريكيين المسئول الأساسي عن هذه العملية فقد استطاع عبد القادر بتعديل نظام الدفع الصاروخي باستخدام الوقود الصلب لمكوك الفضاء ديسكفري حتي لايتعرض للانفجار مثل مكوك الفضاء تشالنجر في عام 1982. مما لفت النظر الأمريكيين اليه وتم منحه تصريح امني من المستوي a مما سمح له بالدخول الي قواعد البيانات ومعامل اختبارات الدفع النفاث في جميع انحاء الولايات المتحدة دون اي قيود كما شارك في تصنيع وتطوير قنابل الدفع الغازي والتي تنتمي لعائلة القنابل الارتجاجية وهي بمثابة قنابل نووية تكتيكية دون تأُثير اشعاعي وقام الجيش المصرى حينذاك بتطويرها الى قنابل محمولة علي صواريخ تكتيكية بعيدة المدى تصلي الى 1350 متر بفضل العالم المصرى الذى قام بتسريب التصميمات الكاملة للجيش المصري واكدت واكتشفت المخابرات الامريكية المركزية السي اي ايه بان العالم المصرى عبد القادر المحبوس حاليًا فى سجون امريكا بعد ان وشى به محمد مرسى بانه ظل يقوم بامداد الجيش المصرى بصفة مستمرية ودورية بجميع المعلومات والابحاث والمستندات والتصميمات عالية السرية الخاصة بهذا النوع من القنابل حتي السابع من مارس 1986 . مما اتاح الفرصة للمشير عبد الحليم ابو غزالة باقامة وتنفيذ مشروعا طموحًا لانتاج الصواريخ الباليستية في اوائل الثمانينيات بالتحالف مع الارجنتين والعراق عرف باسم مشروع الكوندور يقتصر فيه دور العراق بتمويل ابحاث صاروخ الكوندور والارجنتين بتوفير الخبرة التكنولوجية والاتصالات ومصر بالدور الاستخباراتي والمعلوماتى في مجال تطوير الابحاث بقيادة اللواء حسام الدين خيرت وهو الاسم الحركى اما الاسم الحقيقي حسام خير الله الذى قام بإدارة شبكة استخباراتية معقدة انتشرت في جميع انحاء اوروبا من خلال مصانع وشركات اجنبية لتنفيذ هذا المشروع. من ملفات وكالة الإستخبارات المركزية الأمريكية :- ****************************** *** عملية الكربون الأسود ... *************** العميل :- محمد محمد مرسى العياط المكان :- ولاية ثاوث كارولينا .. الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الزمان :- عام 1986 الهدف :- عبد القادر حلمى العملية :- إعتقال الهدف او اغتياله . Photo: من ملفات وكالة الإستخبارات المركزية الأمريكية فى ذكرى وفاة المشير ابو غزالة اليوم 6 سبتمبر عملية الكربون الأسود ... العميل :- محمد محمد مرسى العياط المكان :- ولاية ثاوث كارولينا .. الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية الزمان :- عام 1986 الهدف :- عبد القادر حلمى العملية :- إعتقال الهدف او اغتياله =============================================== من نتائج عملية اختراق نفذها الدكتور عبدالقادر حلمي وابوغزاله واحمد حسام خير الله في وسط المطالبات المستعره اليوم بالافراج عن شقيق الظواهري الذي تم احتجازة اثناء وصوله من ايران بعد رحلة هرب فاقت الثلاثين عام .. والمطالبات بالافراج عن الشيخ (الاسير) عمر عبد الرحمن المحتجز في سجون اميركا عقب عمليات ارهابية واسعه النطاق حول العالم بعضها برعياه المخابرات الامريكية نفسها .. ومطالبات باطلاق سراح سجين الرأي مايكل نبيل سند المحتجز في سجن المرج لقضاء حكم بالحبس لثلاث سنوات بتهمه اهانة القوات المسلحة اجد لدي الرغبة في اطلاق حملة لاسترداد سجين اخر يقبع في غياهب النسيان منذ اثنين وعشرين عاما ولا يعرف عنه احد شيئا منذ اخر ظهور له في جلسة استئناف الحكم ضدة في 1991 ولد عبد القادر حلمي في العاشر من فبراير 1948 في قرية الاشمونيين - مركز ملوي - محافظة المنيا تخرج من الكلية الفنية العسكرية في عام 1970 اولا علي دفعته بامتياز مع مرتبه الشرف من قسم الهندسة الكيميائية وتخصص في انظمةالدفع الصاروخي تم الحاقة بالاكاديمية العسكرية السوفييتيه ليحصل علي درجتي الماجستير والدكتوراه في تطوير انظمة الدفع الصاروخي ومكونات الصواريخ الباليستية في زمن كانت مصر تفتقر فيه للصواريخ الباليستية وكان اقصي مدي صاروخي هو 350 كيلومتر من هنأ بدأت العملية .. تم اعفاؤه من الخدمة العسكرية والحاقة بمصنع قادر العسكري لثلاث سنوات قبل ان يتم الحاقة للعمل كخبير صواريخ بكندا في اواخر السبعينات في التوقيت الذي كان فيه اللواء ابو غزالة وقتئذ يشغل منصب مدير عام المخابرات الحربية بعد سته اشهر تم زرعه في شركة Teledyne Corporation المتخصصة في انتاج انظمة الدفع الصاروخي لصالح وزارة الدفاع الامريكية وانتقل للاستقرار في ولاية كاليفورنيا وطيلة الفتره منذ مغادرة مصر في السبعينات وحتي 1984 بقي الدكتور عبد القادر حلمي عميلا نائما .. ساعده ذكاؤة الفذ واتقانه للعمل علي تعديل الخلل في منظومة الدفع الصاروخي باستخدام الوقد الصلب لمكوك الفضاء ديسكفري حتي لايتعرض للانفجار مثل مكوك الفضاء تشالنجر في عام 1982 مما لفت النظر اليه وحصل علي تصريح امني من المستوي A سمح له بالولوج الي قواعد البيانات ومعامل اختبارات الدفع النفاث في جميع انحاء الولايات المتحدة دون اي قيود شارك في تصنيع وتطوير قنابل الدفع الغازي المعتمده علي الوقد المعروفة باسم FAE BOMB (Fuel/air explosive bomb) والتي تنتمي لعائلة القنابل الارتجاجية concussion bombs وهي بمثابة قنابل نووية تكتيكية دون تأُثير اشعاعي يصل تأُثير القنبله ذات الرأٍس الالف رطل منها الي دمار كلي في محيط 50 متر ودمار جزئي في محيط 850 متر (لاحقا طورها الجيش المصري لتصبح قنابل محمولة علي صواريخ تكتيكية بعيدة المدي تصلي الي 1350 متر) وقام بتسريب التصميمات الكاملة لها للجيش المصري واظهرت تقارير السي اي ايه انه ظل يقوم بامداد دوري مستمر لاخر ابحاث هذا النوع من القنابل لصالح مصر حتي السابع من مارس 1986 بمستندات وتصميمات عالية السرية علي صعيد موازي كانت اللواء عبد الحليم ابو غزالة قد بدأ مشروعا طموحا لانتاج الصواريخ الباليستية في اوائل الثمانينيات بالتحالف مع الارجنتين والعراق عرف بأسم مشروع الكوندور يقوم العراق بتمويل ابحاث صاروخ الكوندور وتقوم الارجنتين بتوفير الخبرة التكنولوجية والاتصالات وتقوم مصر بالدور الاستخباراتي في مجال تطوير الابحاث في مرحلة متقدمة قام اللواء (عقيد انذاك) حسام الدين خيرت (الاسم الحقيقي حسام خير الله) الملحق العسكري المصري في سالزبورج - النمسا بادارة شبكة استخباراتيه معقدة للدعم اللوجستي انتشرت في جميع انحاء اوروبا وادارت مصانع وشركات اجنبية لاتمت بصله لاي اسم مصري لتوفير العتاد وتصنيع قطع الغيار والقطع المطلوبة للدعم التسليحي الفائق للجيشين المصري والعراقي والتي كان من ضمنها تطوير تصنيع المدفع الاسطوري العملاق بابل الذي كان مدي قذيفته الف كيلومتر وقادر علي اصطياد اقمار التجسس الصناعية والتشويش عليها .. ولهذا قصة اخري عند هذه المرحلة كانت مراحل التصنيع وصلت لذورتها وتوقفت عند احتياج المشروع لبرمجيات عاليه السرية وحساسة لتوجية الصورايخ وضبط اتجاهاتها , عندها قام الدكتور عبد القادر حلمي بالتعاون مع اللواء خيرت ولواء اخر هو عبد الرحيم الجوهري مدير مكتب تطوير الاسلحة الباليسيتيه بوزارة الدفاع والمسؤول الاول عن عملية الكوندور بتجنيد عالم اميركي اخر هو جيمس هوفمان الذي سهل لهم دخول مركز قيادة متقدم في هانتسفيل - الولايات المتحدة الامريكية تابع للقيادة المتقدمة الاستراتيجية ومسؤول عن تطوير برمجيات توجية انظمة باتريوت صائدة الصواريخ الباليستية كانت المركز يتعاون مع مؤسسة تقنية اخري هي Coleman ويشرف عليها عالم برمجيات اميركي اخر هو كيث سميث تم تجنيد كيث في ابريل 1986 لصالح شبكة اللواء خيرت والدكتور عبد القادر والحصول علي نسخة كاملة ونهائية من برامج منظومة توجية الصواريخ الباليستية والانظمة المضادة لها والناتجة عن تطوير خمسين سنه كاملة من برنامج حرب النجوم الامريكي وبذلك تم اختراق تصميمات شبكة الدفاع الصاروخي الاولي للولايات المتحدة بالكامل استطاع اللواء خيرت والدكتور عبد القادر اتمام المهمه بنجاح بل والقيام بالتعاون مع قسم السطع الفني في المخابرات العامة من القيام بهندسة عكسية لمنظومة الرصد والتوجية وبرامجها الخاصة ليكتشفو ان منظومة باتريوت تستطيع رؤية صاروخ الكوندور واصطياده في الجو لحل هذه المشكلة اكتشف الدكتور عبد القادر وجود ابحاث في مركز اخر تابع لقيادة سلاح الجو الاميريكي لصناعه ماده من اسود الكربون تقوم بتعمية انظمة الرادار وتخفي اي بصمة رادارية له لتحول الصاروخ الي شبح في الفضاء لايمكن رصده كما انها تقلل احتكاك رأس الصاروخ بالهواء بنسبة عشرين بالمائة وبالتالي ترفع مداه القتالي وبدأت عملية محمومة للحصول علي هذه المادة وشحنها الي معامل الابحاث والتطوير هي ونوع خاص من الصاج المعالج الذي يتم طلاؤة بها ليكون جسم الصاروخ كانت الكميات التي اشرف عبد القادر حلمي علي الاستيلاء عليها بالشراء او باساليب اخري ملتوية مهولة تجاوزت الثمانية اطنان وكان يتم شحنها في صناديق دبلوماسية بالتعاون مع السفارة المصرية في واشنطن وهنا اصبحت الرائحة فواحة لايمكن احتمالها خاصة مع تردد اللواء حسام خيرت في رحلات مكوكية علي الولايات المتحدة واختفاه تماما عن المراقبة لعده ايام قبل عودته مع مهارته العالية في التمويه وهنا فتحت المخابارات الامريكية والاف بي اي تحقيقا وتحريا فيدراليا موسعا عنه في سكرامنتو - فبراير 1988 في 19 مارس 1988 قام دبلوماسي مصري يدعي محمد فؤاد بالطيران الي واشنظن , التقي الدكتور عبد القادر حلمي وقاما بشحن صندوقين سعتهما 420 رطلا من الكربون الاسود الخام عبر سيارة دبلوماسية تابعه للسفارة المصرية بقيادة عقيد يدعي محمد عبد الله وتحت اشراف اللواء عبد الرحيم الجوهري لنقلها الي طائرة عسكرية مصرية من طراز سي 130 رابضة في مطار بولايه ماريلاند في الثالث والعشرون من مارس 1988 تكررت العملية في 25يونيو في نفس العام رصدت المخابرات الامريكية مكالمة هاتفيه تتحدث عن مواد لايمكن شحنها دون رقابه صادرة من دكتور عبد القادر حلمي لحسام خيرت ثم رصدت مكالمة اخري يقال انها صادرة من مكتب المشير ابو غزاله لحسام خيرت تطالب بشحن المواد دون ابطاء مهما كان الثمن وتأمين الرجال قمت الاجهزة الامنية الامريكية بالتحرك وقامت بالقاء القبض علي الجميع في ارض المطار قامت المخابرات المصرية بتهريب اللواء عبد الرحيم الجوهري بعملية معقدة الي خارج الحدود وتمسكت الخارجية المصرية باخلاء سبيل كل من الدبلوماسي محمد فؤاد والعقيد محمد عبد الله باعتبارهما من طاقم السفارة وتم ترحيلهما بالفعل الي خارج الولايت المتحدة شنت السي اي ايه مدعومة بفرق ارضية للاغتيالات من وحدة كيدون بالموساد حملة شعواء في اوروبا لتتبع احمد حسام الدين خيرت انتهت بتغطية من المخابرات المصرية باحراق منزلة وزرع جثث فيه ليظهر انه قد قتل في حريق وتم نقله واسرته الي القاهرة (لاحقا اكتشفت المخابرات الامريكية بعد سقوط بغداد انه علي قيد الحياة وشنت كوندليزا رايس حملة اخري علي مصر لتسليمه ودارت قصة اخري اسقطت الجنرال داني ابو زيد قائد القوات الامريكية في العراق من القيادة من العسكرية كلها لاتزال تفاصيلها سرية لم يفصح عنها ولايزال اللواء احمد حسام خيرت علي قيد الحياة وبخير ) واجهت السلطات الامريكية السلطات المصرية بالتسجيلات واتهمت السفارة المصرية بالقيام بانشطة استخباراتيه معادية علي الاراضي الامريكية واستخدام سياراتها وموظفيها في اعمال اجرامية تخالف القانون وتهريب مشتبه بهم خارج الحدود وغسل الاموال كانت سقطة مريعة للمشير ابو غزالة وظل رجلا حتي اخر لحظة في تمسكه برجاله وحمايتهم سافر الي العراق لانهاء اخر مهمه له كوزير وقام بتدمير اي مستند يشير الي شحن اي مكونات تتعلق بمشروع الكوندور مع الحكومة العراقية وعاد ليجد قرار اعفاؤة من منصبة جاهزا تم اعتقال الدكتور عبد القادر حلمي وجيمس هوفمان حوكم عبد القادر حلمي ب12 تهمه منها غسل الاموال وانتهاك قانون الذخائر والاسلحة وتصدير مواد محظورة شملت هوائيات عاليه الموجة للاستخدام العسكري ومطاط وكربون معالج للصواريخ وانظمة توجية وصاج معالج لبناء الصواريخ ووثائق ومخططات وتم القبض علي زوجته وتم ضم ابناؤه الي اسره امريكية للرعاية وصودرت اوراقه وابحاثة وممتلكاته وحساباته المصرفية صدر ضده الحكم بالادانة السجن لسته واربعين شهرا والمراقبة لمده ثلاث سنوات والغرامة والمصادرة ولايزال قيد الاقامة الجبرية في الولايات المتحدة ..مصيرة هو واسرته مجهول استمرت تداعيات العملية حتي وقت قريب .. تعرض الملحق التجاري المصري في سويسرا علاء نظمي للاغتيال في جراج منزلة واستولي مجهولون علي حقيبة مستنداته السرية في 1995 كما وتعرضت السفيرة المصرية في النمسا لمحاولة اغتيال حطمت وجهها باستخدام قنبله مزروعة في هاتفها المنزلي وردت الاجهزة الامنية المصرية الدم بالدم قبل يتم عقد هدنة في 2002 منعا لانفجار فضيحة دولية رتبتها مصر لاربعه من ارفع قادة الجيش الامريكي لم تغفر اميركا للارجنتين انضمامها لمشروع الكوندور فاسقطت حكم الرئيس كارلوس منعم وحاصرته بالفضائح حتي رضخ وزير الدفاع الارجنتيني في 1993 ووقع وثيقة انضمام بلاده الي معاهده حظر الانتشار الصاروخي شنت الولايات المتحدة حربا علي العراق ادت الي انهيار النظام وتفكيكها بحثا عن ماتبقي من برنامج التسليح الذي تم بالتعاون مع مصر قامت مصر بدعم التصنيع الصاروخي لكوريا الشمالية لصورايخ سكود سي ضغطا علي الولايات المتحدة مما حدا بالاخيرة لطلب الهدنة وقالت كوندليزا رايس في لقاء صحفي ان برنامج الكوندور الذي تم رصد ماتبقي من وثائقة في العراق هو كارثة ولو اكتمل فبقية انظمة الصواريخ بجوارة هي العاب اطفال وحتي الان لم يتيقن احد اذا ماكانت مصر قد اكملت المشروع منفرده فعلا ام لا لكن المؤكد ان عبد القادر حلمي بطل مصري مجهول واسرته التي قاست الامريين طوال هذه المحنة هم ابطال مجهولين لذلك اطلب بذل الغالي والنفيس لاسترداد هذا البطل وتكريمة بالنحو الذي يليق به في بلده بدلا من ظلمات السجون بعد ان قضي فيها 43 عيدا بالفعل النوت مفتوحة .. يمكنكم نشرها ان رأيتم ان عبدالقادر حلمي يستحق منكم هذا ========================================= The complete court order: ORDER RAUL A. RAMIREZ, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Defendants ABDELKADER HELMY and JAMES HUFFMAN are charged, inter alia, with exporting controlled commodities in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. ?? 2751-2794, and with conspiracy to export certain commodities in violation of the AECA and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (EAA), 50 U.S.C. app. ?? 2401-2420. By motion filed January 6, 1989, defendants seek reconsideration of the magistrates order of December 12, 1988, which denied defendants request to discover documents relating to the placement of the commodities at issue on the United States Munitions List of the AECA and the Commodity Control List of the EAA. *fn1 On February 13, 1989, the court entertained oral argument on the various issues raised by the moving and opposing papers. Marcus S. Topel, Esq. and Daniel Cook, Esq. appeared as counsel for defendant HELMY; Clyde Blackmon, Esq. and Dale Drozd, Esq. appeared as counsel for defendant HUFFMAN; Thomas E. Flynn, Assistant U.S. Attorney, appeared as counsel for the government. Having now reviewed the various pleadings filed by the parties, and being mindful of the oral arguments presented by respective counsel, the court issues the following memoranda opinion which, together with its previous order of February 24, 1989, is intended to resolve all issues raised by defendants in their request for reconsideration. *fn2 BACKGROUND The prosecution alleges that between December 15, 1987, and June 24, 1988, defendants HELMY and HUFFMAN conspired to violate the AECA and the EAA by attempting to ship various listed commodities from the United States to Egypt without first obtaining an export license. The government alleges that the subject commodities included an ablative carbon composite material, a chemical known as hydroxylterminated polybutadiene, microwave antennas, a carbon-carbon material, a rayon based carbon fabric, and missile nose cones -- all of which are allegedly important components of certain tactical and strategic missile systems, including this countrys Pershing, Polaris, Trident, Minuteman, and Poseidon missiles, and the Space Shuttle. In addition to the conspiracy charges, the prosecution alleges that certain materials were actually purchased by HELMY, loaded on to an Egyptian C-130 transport, and flown to Egypt in various shipments occurring between March and June of 1988. On June 23, 1988, a criminal complaint was filed in this court which named, among others, defendant HELMY and HUFFMAN. On June 29, 1988, HELMY and HUFFMAN were indicted by the grand jury of this district. On October 24, 1988, defendant HELMY filed the underlying discovery motion with the magistrate, seeking, in pertinent part, all documents concerning: 1. The placement of the defense articles (approximately 430 pounds of ablative carbon composite materials manufactured by the Fiberite Corporation) listed in Count Two of the indictment on the United States Munitions List (the Munitions List) pursuant to 22 U.S.C. ? 2778 and 22 C.F.R. ? 127.1, and the maintenance of those defense articles on the Munitions List. 2. The placement of the defense articles listed in Count One of the indictment on the Munitions List, pursuant to 22 U.S.C. ? 2778 and 22 C.F.R. ? 127.1, and the maintenance of those defense articles on the Munitions List. 3. As to Requests 1 and 2 supra ; (a) The existence of and the basis for any determination made by the President or his delegated designee to control the defense articles contained in Counts One and Two of the indictment and place them on the Munitions List; (b) The opinions of the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, if any, at to whether the export of the defense articles contained in Counts One and Two of the indictment will contribute to an arms race, increase the possibility of outbreak or escalation of conflict, or prejudice the development of bilateral or multinational arms control agreements, and how the export decisions process was coordinated with the Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; (c) The existence of and the basis for any determination to maintain the defense articles contained in Counts One and Two on the Munitions List. 4. The placement of the commodities listed in Count One of the indictment on the Commodity Control List (the CCL), pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 1979 [ 50 U.S.C. App. ? 2401 et seq.] and C.F.R. ?? 372.1, 375.3, and 387.6, and the maintenance of those commodities on the CCL; (a) The foreign availability of all commodities alleged in the indictment as having been exported or as to which there was a conspiracy to export by the defendants; (b) The existence of and basis for any determination made by the President or the Secretary of Commerce that adequate evidence was presented demonstrating that the absence of export controls on any of the commodities contained in the indictment would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States despite the foreign availability of the commodities; (c) The basis for any determination that all the commodities contained in the indictment would make a significant constitution (sic) to the military potential of any other country which would pose detrimental to the national security of the United States; (d) The existence of any multilateral agreement, formal or informal, public or secret, to which the United States is a party and under the terms of which the export of any commodities contained in the indictment requires the specific approval of the parties to the multilateral agreement; (e) The United States actively seeking the agreement of other countries, which supply commodities comparable to the commodities contained in the indictment, to control the exports of such commodities and the basis for the United States decision that validated export licenses or other export licenses are necessary for these commodities pending the concluding of such an agreement. The magistrate issued her order denying defendants motions on December 12, 1988. *fn3 With respect to defendants motion to discover certain documents relating to the placement of the commodities at issue on both the AECAs Munitions List and the EAAs Commodity Control List, the magistrate premised her denial on alternative findings; first, the magistrate held that defendants failed to show that the requested documents would be material; alternatively, the magistrate held that the Secretarys decision to place particular defense articles on the aforementioned lists was an unreviewable political question. DISCUSSION I Two separate rulings are before the court: the magistrates denial of the defendants discovery request for lack of materiality and the magistrates alternative denial under the political questions doctrine. The courts review of the magistrates findings is conducted pursuant to the standard of review as set forth in E.D. Cal. R. 304(f), which provides for the granting of motions upon reconsideration when the magistrates ruling is clearly erroneous or contrary to law. Inasmuch as the issue of materiality is ultimately subordinate to the magistrates findings under the political question doctrine, the court addresses the latter finding exclusively and hereby affirms the magistrates denial under the political question doctrine. *fn4 II The defendants discovery motion involves two separate levels of inquiry: the first is a request to review whether certain commodities and defense articles are indeed on the Commodity Control List and/or the Munitions List; the second is a request to review, if the commodities are in fact listed, whether they are properly listed. On the issue of whether the subject commodities are indeed listed, the Ninth Circuit has recently held that the Secretarys determination as to what is actually on the list is conclusive. In United States v. Spawr Optical Research, Inc., 864 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988), the defendants were convicted of conspiring to export and exporting laser mirrors without a license in violation of the Export Administration Act of 1979, ? 2 et seq., 50 U.S.C. app. ? 2401 et seq. Defendants specifically appealed the district courts decision to accept without review the Secretarys determination that the mirrors were on the list. The Ninth Circuit upheld the district courts deference to the Secretary, stating that, because the licensing issue was not an element of the charged offenses, the Spawrs are not denied due process or the right to a jury trial by deference to the Secretarys determination that the Spawrs mirrors were included on the CCL. Id. at 1473. Present defendants contend that the decision in Spawr Optical is confined to whether a party can challenge the Secretarys conclusion that the commodities were on the list as opposed to the question of whether a court is free to review whether the items were properly placed on the list. Moreover, defendants submit determined arguments that Spawr Opticals language and holding flatly contradicts a line of Supreme Court cases which hold that when an administrative proceeding plays a crucial role in the prosecution of a criminal defendant, the defendant is entitled to some form of judicial review. See United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 95 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1987); Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. Ed. 567 (1946). With respect to a judicial review of the administrative proceedings, several cases are presented as being on point. Defendants cite United States v. Mandel, 696 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Cal. 1988), for the proposition that, despite Spawr Optical, the court is constitutionally required to review listing decisions under the EAA to determine whether they were based in fact. *fn5 The government, on the other hand, cites United States v. Moller-Butcher, 560 F. Supp. 550 (D. Mass. 1983), and United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022, 108 S. Ct. 1994, 100 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1988), for the contrary holding. The cases cited by the government explicitly reject the defendants arguments as they pertain to the EAA. Specifically, in Moller-Butcher, Judge Zobel denied the review of the listing determinations, stating whether particular items make a significant contribution to a countrys military potential and hurt our own national security is the quintessential political question. It entails a policy judgment best left to the executive branch, and is incapable of resolution by any judicially discoverable or manageable standard. Id. at 554. In each of the cases cited by the government, the court has failed to address or distinguish the line of Supreme Court cases so staunchly relied upon by the defendants. In fact, Judge Karltons decision in Mandel is the only decision intrepid enough to confront the Supreme Courts decisions in Estep and Mendoza-Lopez, and, as such, resolutely concludes that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution compels the court to grant defendants discovery motions. In light of the complexities involved in distinguishing the holdings in Estep and Mendoza-Lopez from the present motion, the court surmises that the failure of the magistrates ruling and the governments cases to broach the issues raised in Estep, Mendoza-Lopez, and Mandel is more the result of foresight than oversight. At the risk of being accused of lacking the former, the court will proceed to throw its hat into the arena and join brother Karlton in attempting to clarify that which others tend to avoid. *fn6 1. Political Question The Supreme Court has previously and steadfastly held that certain questions are of such an inherently political nature that the judiciary is incompetent to address them. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210, 82 S. Ct. 691, 706, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663 (1962). In this regard, the Court has listed six factors to consider, with the existence of one or more working to qualify the issue as nonjusticiable under the separation of powers doctrine. Those factors include (1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or (3) the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or (4) the impossibility of a courts undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. Id. at 217, 82 S. Ct. at 710; Armstrong v. United States, 759 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1985). Under the AECA, in order to further the cause of world peace and the security and foreign policy of the United States, the President of the United States is authorized to designate those items which shall be considered as defense articles and defense services for the purposes of this section and to promulgate regulations for the import and export of such articles and services. The items so designated shall constitute the United States Munitions List. 22 U.S.C. ? 2778(a)(1). Similarly, under the EAA, the Secretary of Commerce imposes controls on a commodity to the extent necessary to restrict the export of goods and technology which would make a significant contribution to the military potential of any other country or combination of countries which would prove detrimental to the national security of the United States. 50 U.S.C. app. ? 2402(1). *fn7 Although the existence of any one of the factors specified in Baker causes a question to be nonjusticiable, Armstrong, 759 F.2d at 1380, the court is of the view that all of the enumerated Baker factors would, in some way, be affected by the judicial review of a listing decision made under either the AECA or the EAA. The very nature of such decisions makes them political and, thus, nonjusticiable. With respect to the EAA, Congress made clear its intent as to whether the courts should have jurisdiction to overturn an executive listing determination by expressly exempting the Commodity Control List from the judicial review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. See 50 U.S.C. app. ? 2412(a). Moreover, although the AECA fails to expressly preclude such review, the court does not conclude that, therefore, a review of the decisions that make up the Munitions List is warranted. Since the AECA deals exclusively with defense articles, and the listing decisions are exclusively political in nature, the political question doctrine supplants the congressional failure to address the issue. *fn8 With respect to executive foreign policy decisions, the Court has stated: The President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nations organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are neither nor ought to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S. Ct. 431, 436, 92 L. Ed. 568 (1948). Defendants, nonetheless, rely on United States v. Mandel, 696 F. Supp. at 517, for the proposition that the political question doctrine can be avoided altogether by limiting the scope of review to whether the listing decisions under the AECA and the EAA were based in fact. *fn9 With this proposition, the court respectfully disagrees. To begin, the court is of the view that it is singularly ill-equipped to delve into pure foreign policy determinations on even the most cursory level. Again, any listings are the very product of a national security analysis. Couching a judicial review of the determinations made under either the AECA or the EAA as one merely concerned with whether the Secretarys decision was based in fact does nothing to alleviate the folly of such an endeavor. Political determinations that flow directly from foreign policy and national security assessments, are, the court would suspect, more frequently derived from the shadows and subtleties of international tensions and alliances than from any identifiable logic or immediately discernible reality. As such, they are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111, 68 S. Ct. 431, 436, 92 L. Ed. 568. Thus, with respect to such determinations, the court is firmly unwilling to arbitrarily demarcate were fact begins and were it ends. Such a task is, in and of itself, a function of policy. As the Supreme Court stated, such decisions . . . are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry. Id. (citations omitted). *fn10 For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the placement decisions made under the AECA and the EAA are nonjusticiable pursuant to the political question doctrine. Having so found, however, the inquiry only begins. The court must next address whether denying the defendants request to discover documents relating to the formulation of the lists under either the AECA or the EAA is a violation of the defendants right to procedural due process under the fifth amendment. The court begins its due process analysis with an acute awareness of the rights of the accused and an unwavering resolve to guarantee a fair trial. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has noted that, the Constitution entitles a criminal defendant to a fair trial, not a perfect one. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681, 106 S. Ct. 1431, 1436, 89 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1986); United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 508-09, 103 S. Ct. 1974, 1980, 76 L. Ed. 2d 96 (1983). By its nature, due process requires a balancing of both individual and governmental interests, *fn11 and it is well settled that no governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the nation. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307, 101 S. Ct. 2766, 2782, 69 L. Ed. 2d 640 (1981); see also Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 509, 84 S. Ct. 1659, 1665, 12 L. Ed. 2d 992 (1964). Thus, within the realm of national security, the courts have frequently adjusted the requisites of due process. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. at 309, 101 S. Ct. at 2783; Halperin v. Kissinger, 257 U.S. App. D.C. 35, 807 F.2d 180, 187 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Accordingly, since procedural fairness is a function of the circumstances, and since both AECA and the EAA involve exceptional issues of national security, the present motion proffers its own unique calculus. As noted supra, the Supreme Court has addressed a criminal defendants procedural due process rights in the context of dissimilar administrative procedures. Specifically, the cases of Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 66 S. Ct. 423, 90 L. Ed. 567 (1946), and United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828, 107 S. Ct. 2148, 95 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1987), are cited for the proposition that when an administrative proceeding plays a crucial role in the imposition of criminal sanctions, due process requires some form of judicial review. In Estep v. United States, the defendant was indicted under ? 11 of the Selective Training and Service Act for intentionally failing to submit to the draft. Defendant proffered the defense that he had been improperly classified as available for military service. The Court addressed the issue of whether the defendants original classification was subject to judicial review and held that, despite the Acts silence on the issue of judicial review and regardless of the fact that the determinations under the Act were deemed final, fundamental concepts of fairness mandated some form of review. The Court held that, although the term final could act to restrict the customary scope of review, fundamental concepts of fairness to the accused mandated a judicial determination of whether the board exceeded its jurisdiction by having no basis in fact for their induction classification. Estep, 66 S. Ct. at 427-28. In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, the Court applied its reasoning in Estep to the realm of immigration. In Mendoza-Lopez, defendants were indicted under 8 U.S.C. ? 1326 of the Immigration and Nationality Act for illegally entering the country after a prior deportation. Defendants argued that the original deportation order was invalid inasmuch as the defendants were not adequately informed of their right to counsel and their right to apply for suspension of deportation. The Court addressed the issue of whether the federal court must always accept as conclusive the fact of the deportation order, even if the deportation proceeding was not conducted in conformity with due process. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. at 2153. The Court began its inquiry by noting that neither the language nor the legislative history of ? 1326 indicated congressional intent to permit a challenge to the validity of the prior deportation in the ? 1326 proceeding. Id. However, the Court noted that the mere failure of the Act to evidence an intent by Congress to make the deportation order contestable did not end the inquiry. The Court held that the constitutional requirement of due process mandated some form of judicial review: Our cases establish that where a determination made in an administrative proceeding is to play a critical role in the subsequent imposition of criminal sanction, there must be some meaningful review of the administrative proceeding. Id. at 2154. (emphasis original) (citations omitted). Were the court to conclude that Estep and Mendoza-Lopez are directly analogous to the present case, it would compel the finding that due process and the political question doctrine were presently at odds. Additionally, the broad language of the ruling in Mendoza-Lopez might even suggest that, despite the factual and administrative differences of the present case, some sort of judicial review of the listing decisions is constitutionally mandated. However, it is a maxim, not to be disregarded, that the general expressions, in every opinion, are to be taken in connection with the case in which those expressions are used. If they go beyond the case, they may be respected, but ought not to control the judgment in a subsequent suit when the very point is presented for decision. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat,) 264, 399, 5 L. Ed. 257 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.). Thus, neither Estep nor Mendoza-Lopez necessarily control the present defendants requests to challenge the validity of certain listing decisions taken under the AECA and the EAA. To begin, although the instant discovery motion is an attempt to review documents pertaining to unreviewable administrative proceedings, the particular agency actions taken under the AECA and the EAA are functionally distinguishable in that they directly involve the nations security. This distinction is present despite the national security implications of both the immigration policies dealt with in Mendoza-Lopez and the induction policies addressed by the Court in Estep.12 Additionally, both cases present situations where, although the underlying policies may affect national security, the individual considerations involved in the administrative proceedings do not directly involve national security concerns. Thus, although the court is competent to review purely administrative matters that influence national security -- whether a previous deportation proceeding was in fact legal, whether the classification of an individual for the draft conformed in fact with routine statutory considerations -- it is wholly incompetent to second guess the executive branch on whether a particular piece of technical hardware was correctly listed as having the requisite impact on world peace and national security. Since due process is a function of both individual and governmental interests, the court, in its determination of what is fair under these particular circumstances, must consider the governments need to make criminal the unlicensed exportation of certain defense articles without the government thereby forfeiting its right to keep the underlying national security assessments secret. The court is loath to find that due process necessarily prohibits Congress from drafting a statute for the benefit of national security and world peace unless Congress is also willing to surrender documents which involve national security determinations. Finding otherwise would force the political branches of government into a Hobsons choice: either make the penalties civil in nature or submit to a judicial review. Making the penalties civil would almost certainly prove impotent. In light of the enormous investment of time and money required to produce todays highly sophisticated defense articles, the threat of civil penalties alone would do nothing to prevent exports sanctioned by those hoping to avoid the costs of developing the technology they seek to obtain. That is, there does not exist a civil penalty severe enough to make the attempt not worth the risk. Alternatively, keeping the penalties criminal at the expense of submitting to a judicial review would, because such a review is inappropriate, merely begin the loop again. Due process does not necessitate this absurdity. In addition to the unique national security implications of the present listing determination, the court perceives another, perhaps more important, basis for distinguishing these administrative actions from those relied on by the defendants. Specifically, neither the AECA nor the EAA involve classifications which initially and directly affect individuals; rather, these particular procedures pertain to the classification of commodities. This was not the case in Estep and Mendoza-Lopez. In Estep, the court dealt with a prior administrative procedure that engendered the qualification of an individual for the draft; that individuals subsequent failure to submit to induction resulted in his prosecution. Similarly, in Mendoza-Lopez, the Court dealt with a prior adjudicative procedure that resulted in the deportation of an individual pursuant to the determination that he was an illegal alien; that individuals subsequent re-entry resulted in his criminal prosecution. Such distinctions are important inasmuch as the convictions in both Estep and Mendoza-Lopez were dependent upon a determination which directly affected the defendant but which was ultimately in the control of the agency. The agency, then, by way of its prior administrative determination, had the power to bring a particular individual one step closer to conviction. The court is of the view that it is precisely this aggressive quality that causes a particular administrative procedure to play the critical role necessary for the defendants to secure a judicial review. Unlike the administrative procedures found in Estep and Mendoza-Lopez, the listing determinations made under the AECA and EAA affect, at the outset, not individuals but commodities. The agency decisions are, with respect to a given individual, passive and remain so until they are willfully, intentionally, and knowingly violated. As such, the determinations do not play the elemental role necessary for due process to require review. As noted by the court in United States v. Gregg, 829 F.2d 1430, 1437 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1022, 108 S. Ct. 1994, 100 L. Ed. 2d 226 (1988), requiring a license to export is as simple a matter as forbidding a passenger to ride on a train without a valid ticket. Likewise, in terms of due process, denying discovery is as simple a matter as concluding that a person who is pushed off a cliff has the right to ask why; a person who jumps does not. Present defendants allegedly jumped inasmuch as their guilt depends on the government showing that they willfully violated the licensing requirement. It would be a strange holding indeed to conclude that procedural due process is violated merely because a knowing and willful violator is denied the opportunity to contest the sensitive political determinations that he freely elected to ignore. The Supreme Courts willingness to assess procedural due process differently when presented with a more passive administrative procedure is evidenced by its decision in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 64 S. Ct. 660, 88 L. Ed. 834 (1944). In Yakus, the defendants were convicted of selling beef at prices above those decreed by the Emergency Price Control Act -- a wartime act which imposed criminal sanctions for its willful violation. Defendants sought judicial review of the underlying regulation, arguing that the price controls were invalid. The Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether the provisions of the Act, which denied defendants the opportunity to attack the regulation in their prosecution for its violation, deprived them of due process as guaranteed by the fifth amendment. Id. at 431, 64 S. Ct. at 670. The Supreme Court held that there was no novel constitutional issue presented by foreclosing the defendants ability to attack the validity of the price requirements during their prosecution for its violation. Due process was satisfied since the Act itself provided a means of testing the validity of the regulation by a prior, independent administrative proceeding. Id. at 444, 64 S. Ct. at 677. In Mendoza-Lopez, the Supreme Court paused to address the importance of Yakus as the one case wherein the Court upheld a criminal conviction for the violation of an administrative regulation where the validity of that regulation could not be attacked during the criminal proceeding. The Court in Mendoza-Lopez defined its holding in Yakus as one motivated by the exigencies of wartime, *fn13 the fact that the Court dealt with the propriety of regulations rather than the legitimacy of an adjudicative procedure, and, most significantly, the fact that adequate judicial review of the validity of the regulation was available in another forum. Mendoza-Lopez, 107 S. Ct. at 2155, n. 15. The Court specifically left for another day the issue of whether, under different circumstances, it would be proper to use the results of an administrative ruling in such a way. That day has now arrived. Both the AECA and the EAA are designed to be largely self-correcting. *fn14 Although the EAA provides a means for applicants to challenge the listing of commodities by submitting a written declaration with the Secretary concerning the commoditys foreign availability, *fn15 the feasibility of such a challenge, in light of the apparent difficulty of submitting effective documentation, makes the opportunity insignificant in terms of the present inquiry. Moreover, the AECA apparently does not provide any public means of challenging the eventual listing determinations. Nonetheless, the court is not persuaded, presented as it is with such sensitive national security determinations, that congressional failure to provide for a significant public challenge is a crucial distinction. The fact that this is an administrative proceeding does not take away from the fact that the actions taken are also part and parcel of the Presidents position as Commander and Chief of the Armed Forces. U.S. Const., Art. II, ? 2. *fn16 [The Presidents] authority to classify and control access to information bearing on national security . . . flows primarily from this constitutional investment of power in the President and exists quite apart from any explicit congressional grant. Department of Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 108 S. Ct. 818, 824, 98 L. Ed. 2d 918 (citation omitted). Certainly, it cannot be held that the executive branch never has the power to impose criminal sanctions for the sake of national security unless its reveals the details of its determinations. A defendant tried for treason would not have the right to challenge the Presidents determination that a particular country qualified for enemy nation status. Accordingly, a defendant does not have a right to challenge the executives determination that a particular commodity qualifies for export controls. Merely because the present executive determinations are made under the framework of an administrative procedure does not automatically open the determinations to judicial review. Thus, the court finds that congressional failure to codify a meaningful opportunity to challenge the listing determinations made under the AECA or EAA either before or after prosecution is not a violation of the defendants constitutional rights. The fact that the listing determinations pertain to commodities, that a criminal violation under each act is dependent on willful, intentional and knowing conduct, and that the determinations themselves involve sensitive national security concerns distinguishes the acts from those addressed in the line of cases relied upon by the defendants and satisfies the requisites of due process. Finally, the court is convinced that its ruling in no way foreshadows any meaningful reductions in the procedural requisites of due process which would ultimately threaten the constitutional rights of the accused. Specifically, the statutes before the court contain certain precautions so as to ensure that the eventual listings are confined to their original purpose. Moreover, the courts findings are limited to the unique administrative procedures before the court. *fn17 For the foregoing reasons, and good cause appearing therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion for reconsideration of the magistrates order denying discovery dated December 12, 1988, is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, upon reconsideration, said order is REAFFIRMED under the political question doctrine. IT IS SO ORDERED. DATED: May 31, 1989
Posted on: Mon, 11 Nov 2013 20:23:58 +0000