12].SayyidQutbborrowedmain ideas from the prominent scholar Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328), who first codified takfir to denounce unpopular Muslim rulers of his time (namely the Mongolians who converted to Islam after their intrusion into Muslim territory). A. Armborst Islamic State of Iraq) with parallel institutions like ‘ministry of Sharia commissions’, ‘finance ministry’, ‘ministry of security’, or‘ministry of information’ and claim that these are the legitimate Iraqi institutions [14]. Other Islamists at some point of their revolutionary campaign have dismissed their violent activism and sought political legitimacy instead. Again othersnever wentviolent but tried to capture the state through legal (or at least: non-violent) activism only, although still for the ultimate purpose to assert the Islamists’ agenda, e.g. building a society solely based on Islamic law. This mindset is perfectly illustrated by a remark once made by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan: “democracy is like a train –we shall get out when we arrive at the station we want.”11 To keep with this metaphor: The jihadi fundamen- talists may be traveling in the same direction as the Islamist movements, but they dislike the means of transport. AQ criticises the political Islamists so vehemently because they anticipate their gradual transformation to mainstream secular parties, or in terms of Mathiesen a transformation from the competing agreement to the non-competing agreement. Politically integrated groups may indeed ultimately adhere to the laicist imperative for the separation of mosque and state, which does neither compete with nor contradict the status quo. In contrast jihadi fundamentalists, like AQI uphold competi- tion with and contradiction to the status quo. Islamic fundamentalism According to Oliver Roy’s account on“the failure of political Islam” contemporary fundamentalism is the other current which branched off from traditional Islamism.12 Unlike Islamic nationalists who try to assert Islamic ethics and morals top down through state institutions, the Islamic fundamentalists approach the same goal from the bottom up,thatis,through religiouspropagation.Islamic fundamentalistsare convinced“thatan Islamic state should result from the re-Islamisation of the ummah and not be a tool for this re-Islamisation“([15]:247).13 The common ground of Sunni fundamentalism is the austere and traditional Islamic denomination of Salafism, which is, like all kinds of religious fundamentalism, characterised by three features: it strictly opposes the con- cessionstomodernism and secularismmadebytheir moderate and reformative brothers- in-faith; it perceives societal pluralism as an existential threat to the religion and its congregation; and it follows a scriptural interpretation of the holy texts to counterweight profane influences.14 With the exception of jihadi fundamentalism, the agenda of the Salafists is a non-competing contradiction because they do not seek (secular) political power but religious influence. Many highly respected Islamic legal scholars (ulama) are Salafists but despite their high standing as legal experts they do not play a major political role. One of the 11 Erdoğan cited this phrase, which is actually taken from a poem by the Turkish intellectual Ziya Gökalp, in a speech he held when he was still Istanbul’s mayor (1994–1998) and before he became Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey. The Turkish State Security Courts sentenced Erdogan to a prison term for the content of this speech. 12 Roy calls post-Islamist fundamentalism ‘neo-fundamentalism’ to distinguish it from the pre-Islamist fundamentalist movement. When I use the terms fundamentalism and Salafism I refer to its contemporary forms and not to the ‘classical Salafiyya’ embodied by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhammad ‘Abduh at the end of the 19th century. 13 Author’s emphasis. 14 For an excellent article on Salafism see the aforementioned article of Wiktorowicz [16]. Radicalisation and de-radicalisation of social movements characteristics of the Salafi mindset is their refusal of secular governance, man-made law and nationalism which they perceive as unislamic. However, especially in Saudi Arabia, many Salafi ulama live in a symbiotic relation to the monarchy: they do not openly question its legitimacy, but sanction even the most controversial political decisions, as to alleviate the government’s occasional dilemma caused by too strict interpretation of Islamic law and political necessities.15 The ulama are a very influ- ential force in the Saudi Kingdom, but when it comes to the religious approval of political decisions they often go along with the political will of the rulers in order not to jeopardise their own standing and influence. Other, more purist Salafists take an open critical or even dissident stance against their government. By Western standards, and also accoding to the understanding of many Saudi citizens, Saudi Arabia is a theocracy.16 But for some conservative Salafists it is a state governed by opportunists who bend Sharia law as they please with the help of hypocritical and corrupted state ulama. However, many disappointed salafi scholars express their criticism as a ‘fully formed’ theological message and remain essentially apolitical. Salafists meticulously pay attention to the adherence of licit individual conduct. They reject pragmatism and political opportunism as illicit human desire, even if it is allegedly used for a good end. Because some Salafists refuse both, a too profane Islamic government as well as political opposition against it, Hegghammer calls this Salafi current (for the Saudi Arabian context) rejectionist Islamism: “a particular intellectual tradition within Saudi Islamism, which categori- cally rejects the legitimacy of the state and its institutions and which advocates withdrawal from the state’s sphere” ([17]:117).InMathiesen’s model this attitude exactly matches the non-competing contradiction. Where the nationalist Islamists seek political integration the salafi fundamentalists seek religious purification. “The split [into political Islam and fundamentalism] lies not on the question of the necessity of an Islamic state, but on the means by which to arrive at one and on the attitude to adopt with respect to the powers in place: destruction, opposition, collab- oration, indifference” ([8]:24). Jihadi fundamentalism combines traits of nationalist Islamism and rejectionist Islamism (Salafism). Salafi jihadists agree with both currents in their argument that the despotic Arab governments lost their Islamic legitimacy. In particular they agree with the rejectionists that secular governance and nationalism as such are illegitimate, even if these modern concepts are seemingly attractive means to implement Islamic morals and values and to Islamise the society top down. However the salafi jihadists additionally maintain the competing element of their ideology because, unlike the rejectionists, they engage in violent activism to enforce their goals. But again, the purpose of jihadi violence is not the coup d’état but the abolition of the nation state. That is precisely why the jihadi ideology does not transform to an agreement (right column of Table 1).Thereisnothingsubstantialanygovernmentcouldnegotiatewith 15 Most notably ulamas sanctioned the decision of the Saudi kingdom to host American forces on the Arabian Peninsula in 1990. This event was, and still is, a sacrilege for many Salafists and even for some reformative Muslims. Two prominent Salafi scholars, Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah, were imprisoned between 1994 and 1999 because they exhausted their credit of criticism against the Saudi monarchy ([17]: 105). 16 In the precise meaning of the term theocracy Saudi Arabia can also be described as a theo-monarchy. See al-Atawneh [18].
Posted on: Fri, 10 Oct 2014 12:13:37 +0000
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