1998: “It is this consideration that has made the pipeline issue so central to the future of the Caspian Sea basin and Central Asia. If the main pipelines to the region continue to pass through Russian territory to the Russian outlet on the Black Sea at Novorossiysk [2014: Crimea has access to the Black Sea, which is why Russia seized it before mainland Ukraine, and is one of several reasons Ukraine is a current covert Western target of influence], the political consequences of this condition will make themselves felt, even without any overt Russian power plays. The region will remain a political dependency, with Moscow in a strong position to determine how the regions new wealth is to be shared. Conversely, if another pipeline crosses the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and thence to the Mediterranean through Turkey [2014: The BTC pipeline was finished being built in 2006 through Azerbaijan, Georgia, & Turkey to the Mediterranean Sea, then transported through Israel to the Red Sea next to Saudi Arabia] and if one more goes to the Arabian Sea through Afghanistan [2014: The TAPI Pipeline is currently being built through Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, & India to the Indian Ocean], no single power will have monopoly over access. […] For Ukraine, the central issues are the future character of the CIS and freer access to energy sources, which would lessen Ukraines dependence on Russia. In that regard, closer relations with Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have become important to Kiev, with Ukrainian support for the more independent-minded states being an extension of Ukraines efforts to enhance its own independence from Moscow. Accordingly, Ukraine has supported Georgias efforts to become the westward route for Azeri oil exports. Ukraine has also collaborated with Turkey in order to weaken Russian influence in the Black Sea and has supported Turkish efforts to direct oil flows from Central Asia to Turkish terminals. The involvement of Pakistan and India is more remote still, but neither is indifferent to what may be transpiring in these new Eurasian Balkans. For Pakistan, the primary interest is to gain geostrategic depth through political influence in Afghanistan-and to deny to Iran the exercise of such influence in Afghanistan and Tajikistan-- and to benefit eventually from any pipeline construction linking Central Asia with the Arabian Sea. India, in reaction to Pakistan and possibly concerned about Chinas long-range influence in the region, views Iranian influence in Afghanistan and a greater Russian presence in the former Soviet space more favorably. Although distant, the United States, with its stake in the maintenance of geopolitical pluralism in post-Soviet Eurasia, looms in the background as an increasingly important if indirect player, clearly interested not only in developing the regions resources but also in preventing Russia from exclusively dominating the regions geopolitical space. In so doing, America is not only pursuing its larger Eurasian geostrategic goals but is also representing its own growing economic interest, as well as that of Europe and the Far East, in gaining unlimited access to this hitherto closed area. Thus, at stake in this conundrum are geopolitical power, access to potentially great wealth, the fulfillment of national and/or religious missions, and security. The particular focus of the contest, however, is on access. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, access to the region was monopolized by Moscow. All rail transport, gas and oil pipelines, and even air travel were channeled through the center. Russian geopoliticians would prefer it to remain so, since they know that whoever either controls or dominates access to the region is the one most likely to win the geopolitical and economic prize.”
Posted on: Wed, 04 Jun 2014 16:11:51 +0000
Recently Viewed Topics
© 2015