A date for military intervention was set for the last ten days of November 1973. Excerpt from the book “The Oil Kings How the U.S. Iran, and Saudi Arabia Changed the Balance of Power in the Middle East Page 131 - 133 A date for military intervention was set for the last ten days of November 1973. At that time several American destroyers would be in place at the entrance to the Persian Gulf to take part in previously scheduled CENTO naval exercises. It would be convenient to have military forces from United States, Great Britain, Iran, and Turkey hovering just off the coast practicing such war drills as amphibious landings. The Aircraft carrier USS Hancock with more than eighty attack aircraft was steaming toward the area, "WE need a public line on the Hancock when it arrives, " ," Schlesinger. "Routine. An exercise that we have been planning a long time,” replied Kissinger. “I will discuss it with the Shah. If he wants in, I will let you know.” He was about to leave in a few days for the Middle East and China and fretted that the Soviets still had not gotten the message form two weeks earlier. “ The Russians may make a run at us while I am away, “he said. “What can we do? “ “Turn Israel loose on the Third Army and tell Sadat if he lets the Soviets loose, it we be very bad,” replied Schlesinger. They could also work with Turkey to close the Bosporus Straits, a key choke point through which the Soviets had been moving nuclear –armed warships. A few hours later, on Sunday, November 4, the Shah received formal notification that a U.S. naval task force led by the carrier Hancock and accompanied by destroyers was moving toward a holding area off the coast of Oman. Helms asked the Shah if he would open Iranian airfields to American P2 spy planes and short-range flights to the Hancock for a period of twenty days. He also sought Iranian assurances of fuel deliveries to the task force. The Shah was willing to comply so long as the fuel was supplied indirectly through the Iranian navy. Washington was now leaning heavily on the Shah, perhaps in ways Nixon and Kissinger had never intended. Iranian ports, airstrips, and fuel depots were opened to the U.S. military and supplies made available for American use during a major international crisis. At first glance the Nixon Doctrine appeared to have paid off with interest. Yet there were risks involved that neither Washington nor Tehran had properly thought through. For one thing, the deal was guaranteed to antagonize Iran’s northern neighbor. Under the terms of a 1962 agreement signed with Moscow the Shah had agreed to never “allow any foreign power to establish rocket launching sites of any kind on Iranian territory. “The Soviets were naturally anxious to prevent Iran from being used as a base for U.S. intervention on its southern border. The Shah’s secret decision to supply the U.S. naval task force during the October crisis did not violate the terms of that treaty, but it did make him vulnerable to the accusation that the United States did not need to construct bases of any kind in Iran when it enjoyed free and unfettered access to Iranian facilities. There were also repercussions for the United States. Washington was in the humiliation position of having to ask an ally’s permission before taking the measures it deemed necessary to defend its national interest. There had been a subtle but profound power shift within the relationship. The Shah knew better than anyone just how eroded American power was in late 1973 and the extent to which the Nixon administration relied on his continued cooperation and goodwill. The political paralysis induced by Watergate and the growing mood of isolationism in the U.S. Congress made him question America’s ability to defend the interests of its allies when it could barely defend its own. Over the summer King Hussein of Jordan let the CIA know that during a recent visit to Tehran the Shah had “ opined that the Watergate affair was unfortunate for everyone since it appeared to have brought the U.S. Government to a standstill. There were many problems between the U.S. and its friends which need attention, the Shah continued, but these days they did not seem to be receiving it. “ His confidence in U.S. intelligence gathering had eroded to the point where he stopped receiving fortnightly reports from the CIA station chief in Tehran. Kissinger arrived in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, on November 8 for a three hour discussion with King Faisal. Since the imposition of the embargo Saudi oil production had fallen from its daily average of 8.3 million barrels to 6.2 million barrels. The discussion took place in a tense atmosphere. Both men knew that just off the coast lurked enogh naval firepower to reduce Faisal’s kingdom to rubble. The Hancock was a reminder of who really wielded power in the relationship. Saudi Arabia was little more thatn a giant filling station whose primary goal was to service the needs of the industrialized democracies, as the United States saw it. Faisal intimated that he was ready to reach a deal to end the embargo. “You can make Israel withdraw immediately in the space of the three weeks, “Faisal implored Kissinger. The king pleaded, “Can’t you help me? Can’t you give me Jerusalem? “AN unbending Kissinger told him, “That’s the last. Our enemies would like to hang us up on a tough point like that one. Give us time and we will do it.” The challenge now was for the White House to walk Faisal back from the edge with his honor and American integrity intact. Kissinger had the opening he believed he needed to pursue diplomacy. On November 19, the same day the CENTO exercises kicked off in the Persian Gulf, the White House sent reassuring signals that the United States had decided “ for the time being not to retaliate against Arab states. “ But lest anyone doubt American resolve, two days later Kissinger announced at a press conference that the administration would consider “countermeasures” if economic pressures continued “ unreasonably and indefinitely.” Washington would not tolerate a situation in which it was subjected to economic pressure while trying to negotiate a Middle East peace deal. It was the first time a U.S. official had publicly floated the idea of using force to smash the embargo. Sheikh Yamani issued a blistering response, threatening to slash Saudi oil production by 80 percent if the Western powers took countermeasures to break the embargo , and
Posted on: Thu, 18 Jul 2013 17:37:23 +0000
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