A defense of (1) in the KCA: The Kalam Cosmological Argument (hereafter KCA) is very simple. Its first step is to assert a metaphysical first principle (ex nihilo nihil fit): from nothing no thing comes. Premiss (1) of the KCA goes as follows: (1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause This premiss is intuitively obvious to many people. In fact, to deny this premiss typically reflects an academic skepticism, rather than a sincere search for truth. Be that as it may, people reject (1). Why do they do this? (a) They claim that there isnt any justification for premiss one. In this post, I shall address these objections and explain why they are impotent. (a) Justification for (1): Are their any reasons or justification to believe that (1) is true? I believe so. In fact, I think that (1) has justification which isnt propositional, non-doxastic, as they say. There is justification for (1) that doesnt involve an argument. Here, it will be important to note that the naturalist typically rejects non-doxastic justification under the presumption of evidentialism. Every belief must be justified through argument, they say. But this is practically and theoretically wrong. The evidentialist thesis is practically wrong because we hold beliefs in our everyday experience which isnt justified by argument. For example, imagine that we see a red ball in the grass of a school yard. We can infer, Q, A red ball in the grass. This reasoning would look like this: (A) I see a red ball in the grass. (B) If I see a red ball in the grass, then a red ball is in the grass. (C) Therefore, a red ball is in the grass. What is the justification for (A)? Its not an argument. (A) is justified by the perception of the red ball. The perception or sensation of being appeared to as a red ball in the grass is justification for claiming that one sees a red ball. Thus, its false that all justification for a belief requires an argument because (A) is justified without one. Here the naturalist might object to this argument. We dont perceive that everything which begins to exist has a cause, so we dont have that kind of justification for (1). True, we dont perceive the truth of (1) in the same way we perceive the truth of (A), but the justification is nonetheless not dependent on argument, and this example was sufficient to show that the evidentialist thesis I present is false. Now that weve proved that justification can be non-propositional, an important question is about the type of justification for (1) that we have. To answer this question, consider the following statement of the law of non-contradiction (LNC): (LNC) : ~ ( P & ~ P ) LNC states formally that no statement and its complement is true. For example, it is false that (A) and ~(A) are true, or its not the case that this statement -- I see a red ball in the grass, and Its not the case that I see a red ball in the grass. -- is true. Both of these statements cant be true in the same place and at the same time. So, I think that we understand LNC, do you now believe its true? If yes, then you have an intuitive justification for LNC. What is intuition? Thats a very good question. Intuition, as Im using it, isnt a feeling. I dont have an intuition if I feel like something is true. Its really not even clear what a feeling of intuition would be. In contrast, I have an intuition that P if and only if Im disposed to believing P merely on the basis of understanding P. Thus, we have intuitive justification for believing LNC. Now, for the person who lacks an intuition that LNC, they are wholly without justification. For any argument proffered to prove LNC will presuppose it. Any indirect proof used to prove LNC presupposes that no statement with two truth values is true. Hence, any formal proof of LNC which relies on the indirect method will presuppose the statement their attempting to prove. Hence, any indirect proof is circular, and any conditional proof must rely on assumptions which presuppose LNC. Let us return to premiss (1) of the KCA: (1) Whatever begins to exist has a cause. If upon understanding this premiss youre disposed to believe (1), then you have the intuition that (1). Hence, you have a non-propositional basis or justification for accepting (1). Its important to note *who* has justification for (1) if they have the intuition that (1). If Peter believes (1) upon understanding it, then Peter has justification (intuitive) for (1). If Paul doesnt believe (1) upon understanding it, then he lacks intuitive justification for (1) and must seek justification for the belief elsewhere. The fact that Paul lack intuitive warrant for (1) does *nothing* to eliminate the warrant which Peter has for (1). Hence, weve established that some many people, people who accept (1) as intuitively true, have a non-propositional justification for accepting (1). But are there any arguments for (1)? Does the person who accept (1) have any reasons to accept? I think he does. Consider this argument: (I) Something cant come from nothing (II) If some thing cant come from nothing, then whatever begins to exist has a cause. (III) Therefore, whatever begins to exist has a cause. Thus, with this argument in place, the person who accepts the Kalam has both propositional and non-propositional justification for (1). A natural question for the naturalist (no pun intended) could be why think that (I) is true. Well, (I) just seems true intuitively. Also, one is a metaphysical first principle -- from nothing no thing comes. And our always confirms it and never disconfirms it. Thats three independent reasons for accepting (I). Hence, the atheist can no longer claim that their are no reasons to accept premiss (1). That statement is false.
Posted on: Wed, 30 Jul 2014 22:59:51 +0000
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