Alexander Mercouris, nailing it as usual The bitter feuds between these factions within the regime should not however obscure the fact that they remain united in their key aims, which are (1) the total elimination from Ukrainian political and social life of the faction that was defeated in February and (2) the realignment of Ukraine in a way that maximally distances it from Russia. In the case of the two leading blocs, the Poroshenko bloc and the Yatsenyuk bloc, it is impossible to see any ideological divide at all. The differences that do exist are entirely matters of tactics and personality. The elections do nonetheless provide some indication about the balance of forces within the regime and of the regime’s present standing within Ukrainian society. The elections confirm that Poroshenko has failed to consolidate his position as the country’s undisputed leader. The fact that his bloc came second or tied with the one led by his sometime ally and rival Yatsenyuk shows the extent to which his popularity has declined since the Presidential election in May as a result of the economic crisis and the military defeat in August. If one of Poroshenko’s objectives in calling the election was to consolidate his position at the head of the regime, then that objective has failed. (...) That what is happening in Ukraine is a purge and that the parliamentary elections should be understood in that way is revealed in the way in which the two parties most closely identified with the defeated faction – the Party of the Regions and the Communist Party – were destroyed before the elections to prevent them from taking part. These parties were eliminated not just by an administrative act, which is undemocratic enough, but via sustained political violence and the persecution of their leaders and supporters. (...) If the history of this year’s power struggle proves anything, it is that in Ukraine it is not governments, elections, parliaments or public opinion that ultimately decides matters. It is political violence exerted by those who control the streets. This explains the role of Right Sector and of the various Nazi groups. The fact that these groups have little electoral support (a point endlessly made by the regime’s apologists) is irrelevant to their actual political role. This is not to win elections; as militantly anti-democratic organisations they have little interest in doing so. It is to actively terrorize and intimidate the regime’s enemies. This is the role these Nazi groups played in the coup in February and it is the role they have continued to play ever since. That role however gives them considerable power within the regime since there is always the threat that they will put this violence to use on behalf of groups engaged in the regime’s perpetual inter-factional quarrels. (...) The elections have also failed to stabilise the regime in Kiev or to resolve its internal differences. On the contrary they appear to have worsened them. Instead of one leader – Poroshenko – the regime now has two – Poroshenko and Yatsenyuk. It is generally acknowledged that one of the reasons for the failure of the post-“Orange Revolution” government between 2004 and 2010 was the divisions between its leaders: Yushchenko and Tymoshenko. The falling out occurred when Prime Minister Tymoshenko’s corruption became apparent to the former president, when she attempted to re-nationalize thousands of private assets and re-privatize them in a way that would be personally financially beneficial to her and her allies among the country’s oligarchs. (...) Although Tymoshenko had effectively discredited herself by the time of her 2011 arrest and left behind a party that was too corrupt and ineffectual to generate enough popular electoral support in western Ukraine to forgo the need for a second Maidan event, many of her Fatherland Party compatriots managed to revive their political careers by joining the People’s Front of Arseniy Yatsenyuk.
Posted on: Fri, 31 Oct 2014 20:07:30 +0000
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