Autonomy and Self-Governance The architecture of a viable Kashmir settlement consists of several interlocking elements. The most important of these building blocks is the autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir. An honourable compromise between the power of the Indian state and the aspiration to Azaadi that resonates with much of Indian-controlled Kashmir’s population will be actualized only by the restoration of substantial powers of self-government to the valley. The pre-1954 division of powers—in which J&K was responsible for all matters of governance except external defense, the conduct of foreign affairs, and currency and communications, subjects that were under the jurisdiction of the Union government in New Delhi—can and should serve as an approximate benchmark for the reinstitutionalization of an autonomous regime4. This entails that the Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which enshrines the autonomous status of Jammu & Kashmir, must be fully implemented. This is essential for a peace process to take a firm start. If this is further substantiated by genuine guarantees of inviolability, demilitarization, and free and fair elections, they might go a long way toward satisfying Kashmiri aspirations. All pro-independence and most pro-Pakistan political groups in J&K know that complete sovereignty is almost unattainable but correctly regard the recognition and institutionalization of the right to self-rule as indispensable, given Kashmir’s history since 1947 and especially since 1990. Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK) however has a range of autonomous institutions, including its own president, prime minister, legislative assembly, Supreme Court, high court, election commission, and public service commission. Yet ‘intrusive interventions and heavy-handed control by the Pakistani government have endured in AJK causing serious discontent among parts of the population’5. This situation too needs to be reformed. The sense of alienation has greatly aggravated after the devastating 2005 earthquake which showed the degree of apathy in Pakistan for a genuine Kashmiri suffering. The present Chief Minister, Omar Abdullah argued in a policy article in 2005 that the 3 Samina Yasmeen , “Kashmir: The Discourse in Pakistan”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 37, No. 7 (Feb. 16-22, 2002), pp. 611-613 4 Sumantra Bose, Contested Lands (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), pp. 194 5 Ibid, pp. 195 devastating earthquake offers a fateful opportunity to begin a peace process like the devastation caused by tsunami in Indonesia in 2004 which resulted in the Aceh peace process which resolved the conflict between the Aceh nationalists and the Indonesian government6. This opportunity too was missed due to the callous attitude of the two governments which led to the loss of an invaluable opportunity to initiate a lasting peace process7. Unlike in Jammu and Kashmir, the Self-governance dilemmas lie in the AJK constitution and not the Pakistani one. It is the AJK constitution that contains the oath of allegiance to Pakistan which would have to be amended. This statutory relationship is not enshrined in the Pakistani Constitution thus legally making the possibility of greater autonomy for AJK more feasible. However, an adaptation of Northern Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement formula, embedding autonomy in a trilateral and wider regional framework, might provide the solution. Under such a framework, Azad Kashmir would remain under Pakistani control, and Jammu and Kashmir would remain with India. Both countries would guarantee autonomy, and in both parts of Kashmir state assemblies could be reconstituted to ensure that minorities were adequately represented. Strategically and culturally distinct Ladakh could be given its own autonomy, either within Kashmir or directly within the Indian federation. Both countries would also guarantee demilitarization, and work toward freedom of movement—of people, goods, and services— and a soft border, under the supervision of an India-Kashmir-Pakistan advisory or coordinating body8. Divided Kashmir could, at the same time, plan a joint future through an Azad Kashmir– Jammu and Kashmir development council. If the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation could be simultaneously jumpstarted, as the Gujral government had tried to do in 1996–97, and the Vajpayee government appeared to try, economic renewal in Kashmir would be part of overall trade normalization between India and Pakistan9. 6 Omar Abdullah, “Does the Earthquake impact the Kashmir Peace Process” in, Radha Kumar ed. Kashmir after the Quake: Prospects for Peace (New Delhi; Delhi Policy Group) pp. 44 7 The Indian government offered aid and volunteers with heavy-lift military helicopters which was rejected by Pakistan. 8 Radha Kumar, Untying the Kashmir Knot, World Policy Journal, Spring 2002, pp. 21-22 9 Ibid, pp.22 It is however unclear what the self-rule or self governance would entail in Law and practice, not to mention the politics and spin. Broadly speaking, three distinct approaches can be visualized10: 1. The government of India, the Government of Pakistan and different Kashmir groups seek to find a mutually acceptable solution by agreeing that self-governance will combine earlier freedoms (pre- 1952 in J&K and Pre 1949 in AJK and Northern Areas) with cross LOC institutions for effective cooperation. In such scenario, “Constructive ambiguity” in defining self-governance could be helpful, especially as it would need to be combined with an “honourable retreat” for militant groups. Such a solution may likely begin as an interim one, but has the potential to become a permanent one. Ladakh clearly wishes some degree of self-governance within the Indian Federation, and some parts of Jammu are divided on the nature of relationship with Srinagar and New Delhi. Same may also be true for the Valley. Hence it can be said with some degree of certainty that the Aazadi groups would prefer “constructive ambiguity” in any settlement. 2. The government of India, the Government of Pakistan and different Kashmir groups seek to find a permanent solution based on self-governance and cross-LOC institutions. This demands that the constitutional, administrative and the security details be carefully worked out involving every party, community and region. Its virtue is that it seeks a speedy and lasting agreement rather than a prolonged process but is fraught with political vulnerabilities and demands a toiling effort for public consensus building by the parties concerned. 3. The government of India, the Government of Pakistan and different Kashmir groups seek to bring militant groups on board the peace process through negotiations on selfgovernance and cross-LOC institutions. In this scenario, the emphasis would be on symbolic and specific details (Like honour for the armed groups of Kashmir, cultural and trade ties between Jammu-AJK, Kargil-Baltistan, separate autonomies for Ladakh 10 This is a loose summation of the published proceedings of the International Seminar on Kashmir held by Nelson Mandela Centre for Peace & Conflict Resolution in 2006. The participants included the eminent intellectuals from India, Pakistan, J&K and AJK. The proceedings have been published under the title, Kashmir: Prospects for Peace. Ed. Sangamitra Misra and Giligit-Baltistan) and on security issues (Ceasefire, decommissioning of armed groups, troop withdrawal etc.)
Posted on: Thu, 22 Aug 2013 16:51:46 +0000
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