EGYPT’S POST-MUBARAK PREDICAMENT Ashraf El-Sherif © 2014 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. All rights reserved. Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the Carnegie Endowment. Please direct inquiries to: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Publications Department 1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20036 P: +1 202 483 7600 F: +1 202 483 1840 CarnegieEndowment.org This publication can be downloaded at no cost at CarnegieEndowment.org/pubs. CP 198 The Carnegie Endowment’s Democracy and Rule of Law Program gratefully acknowledges support from the Ford Foundation that helped make this publication possible. Contents About the Author v Summary 1 Introduction 3 The Old State 5 Authoritarian Guardianship 6 Origins of Uprising 8 Muslim Brothers: An Undemocratic Interlude 11 The Muslim Brotherhood in Power 14 The Muslim Brotherhood’s Fall 18 What Comes Next? 20 Failures of the Democratic Forces 32 The Future of Change 36 Notes 39 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 42 v About the Author Ashraf El-Sherif is a nonresident associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Based in Egypt, El-Sherif is a lecturer in political science at the American University in Cairo. He is an expert in political Islam, state-religion rela - tions, democratic transition, social movements, and state-society relations in the Middle East and North Africa. 1 Summary Three years after the uprising that ousted Hosni Mubarak from power, Egypt continues to grapple with an authoritarian state. Throughout the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood, authoritarian forces remained the key political players. Democratic alternatives have not capitalized on cracks in the system. Prospects for the Brotherhood’s political reintegration and a democratization of political Islam are bleak. As long as credible alternatives fail to gain traction, the old state will persist and Egypt’s central challenges will remain unresolved. Key Themes • Egypt is where it was before the 2011 uprising—revolutionary battle lines are being drawn over support for an old state characterized by a series of institutional fiefdoms that act in their own interests rather than in the national interest. • The Muslim Brotherhood’s rule constituted an undemocratic interlude in Egyptian politics, and its downfall was a product of its inability to deal effectively with the old state. It can only be politically reintegrated after a complete political surrender on its part, which is unlikely. • Egypt is becoming increasingly ungovernable. The state cannot convert its reasserted dominance into legitimacy, and as intrastate competition and unruly protest politics engulf the political arena, the country faces a politi - cal vacuum with no clear resolution. Findings The old state, with its competing institutional power centers, persists. The new constitution has the potential to exacerbate the problem, preserving the privileges of old state institutions and providing them the capacity to act as power brokers within a fragmented system. Egypt needs a complete reinvention of its political sphere. Despite the development of a contentious public space since 2011, Egypt still lacks a capa - ble political class, without which it will be unable to confront entrenched insti - tutional obstacles to democracy. The coalition that supported the July 2013 coup that overthrew then pres - ident Mohamed Morsi is fragmenting. A split is developing between groups 2 | Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament that want to reproduce Mubarak’s authoritarianism and those that support a more democratic future for Egypt. No one group has monopolized the debate. The possibility of reconciliation between the regime and the Muslim Brotherhood remains elusive. So far, the Brotherhood has chosen a path of political intransigence. Given the regime’s crackdown and the Brothers’ political incentives against moderation, they face an increasingly limited set of options. Democratic forces must overcome leadership and capacity deficiencies. They need to move beyond hollow slogans and develop tactics that support their goals. The development of a successful democratic movement is crucial for Egypt’s future. 3 Egypt is in need of a complete reinvention of its politics: wholly new state-citizen relations based on democratic social, political, and economic contracts. Introduction Confusion and incoherence in Egypt following the 2011 uprising against the regime of former president Hosni Mubarak have left analysts puzzled and unde - cided about the nature of the political evolution of the country. Many point to the problems of a putative democratic transition as the source of Egypt’s woes. However, more than simply struggling to achieve a democratic system, Egypt is still grappling with the continued reality of an outdated, authoritarian, and oligarchic old state. Egypt is in need of a complete reinvention of its poli - tics: wholly new state-citizen relations based on democratic social, political, and economic contracts. Such a far-reach - ing transformation is necessary to address the country’s myriad socioeconomic and political problems. The fall of the Mubarak regime was a hopeful moment for many revolutionaries. The January 2011 uprising was spurred by a demand for changes to state authoritarianism and despotism in Egypt. The main enemies in this context were the old state’s military and civilian institutions and their associated networks and interest groups, as well as these forces’ political worldview, interests, and value system. But that system did not disappear with Mubarak’s ouster in February 2011. Rather, the strongman’s overthrow ushered in more of the same—an authori - tarian political process. This time around, the process was dominated first by the military and then by a new partner, the Muslim Brotherhood. After two and a half years of confusion and disturbance, the military removed the country’s first elected president, the Muslim Brotherhood–affili - ated Mohamed Morsi, from power on July 3, 2013. Both the Brotherhood-led regime and the military’s decision to overthrow it were described as “dem - ocratic” and “revolutionary” by their respective supporters, but despite this empty rhetoric, both were not. Problems continue to mount in Egypt, and the existing political forces have proven unable to deliver any real solutions. The country faces a societal and polit - ical vacuum, with no democratic, popularly based governing institutions to fill the void. The undemocratic, proto-fascist, and intransigent Islamist movement’s political behavior has exacerbated the void that emerged when Mubarak was overthrown. Moreover, the old state’s deep authoritarianism continues to plague Egyptian society and thwart efforts at real change, while infant democratic pro - test movements are incapable of offering a viable third way. 4 | Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament In many ways, Egypt is now back where it was nearly three years ago. The popular mobilization against Morsi, which reached its crescendo in the mass demonstrations of June 2013, signaled a reorientation. Following the long parentheses of Muslim Brotherhood rule, society is returning to the revolution - ary battle lines against the old state’s authoritarianism. Some optimists believe that after the old state finishes off the Brothers, it will establish a democracy. At the root of this hope, however, lies either naïveté or dishonesty. The current political process, framed by the military’s announcement of a political road map after Morsi’s overthrow, is no less authoritarian than that led by the military and the Muslim Brotherhood together after Mubarak’s ouster. Furthermore, the new political process does not position the interim government to better handle Egypt’s current crisis of democratic legitimacy, much less create a better political future for Egyptians. A political battle rages on between the old state and the Islamists, immobilizing all political actors in the country. A new, inclusive, democratic polity is not likely to emerge soon, but the old authoritarian system cannot be sustainably reproduced either. Though the old state is reasserting its dominance over the political system, it faces endemic crises of legitimacy and performance. As long as the institutional crises of the state, society, and economy persist, the old state will remain incapable of turn - ing its current dominance into a legitimate grip on power, and Egypt’s prob - lems will remain unsolvable. Accordingly, any future success on key issues, including economic development, state modernization, security, and political stability, will remain highly unlikely. All this means the system will continue to suffer from a lack of acceptable, inclusive rules of the game. In addition, the sizeable coalition that supported the July 3 coup is divided into subgroups of actors with different viewpoints about the new political sys - tem. These include the more conservative political forces who want to repro - duce the authoritarian, clientelist, and elitist politics of the Mubarak era as well as those who want to introduce substantial policy and governance reforms. Both options are problematic and lack widespread support for various reasons. Different state actors are competing with one another for influence, resources, and power. These elite divisions and this rapacious intrastate com - petition have led to considerable differences among political players about the new constitution, electoral system, and public policies. No state or nonstate actor within the July 3 caretaker regime has managed to dominate the debate. This situation threatens to produce a fragmentation of powers rather than a separation of powers. After their unpopular failed experiment with governance, the Muslim Brothers are seeing their old dreams of state domination move further out of reach. Instead, they face a more limited set of options and are encountering a series of political and existential challenges. The fate of Islamism in Egypt is key to the potential for the emergence of any new democratic polity in the country. However, Islamists are part of the problem and cannot in and of Ashraf El-Sherif | 5 themselves be the solution. Democratic forces continue to lament their unmet revolutionary goals, but they remain as helpless as ever. Suffering from crises of organization, funding, leadership, and discourse, they have a long way to go in developing their own tools of change and resistance and moving beyond slogans to clearly define the new polity they pursue. Society is confused and significantly polarized; aver - age citizens increasingly tend toward public engagement but do so in a perplexed manner. Bonapartism is probably unachievable and certainly unsustainable. But this does not mean democracy will emerge as the automatic alterna - tive. Instead, a political vacuum and a period of political limbo are likely to persist. So far, the Egyptian uprising has been a demonstration of the intensity of the ongoing political and socio - economic crisis, which is making Egypt increasingly ungovernable. An entirely new structural approach must be taken if Egypt is to establish a democratic and effective state and political system. The Old State It is difficult to capture the political substance of the term “old state” due to the shifts in policies under the different regimes over the last century and chang - ing historical economic, institutional, and social conditions. But the post-1952 state in particular stands out. Its institutions, value systems, modes of perfor - mance, and interests made the post-1952 era a significant milestone in the his - tory of state-led modernization in Egypt. Despite some initial developmental successes, the post-1952 state experi - enced a series of far-reaching debacles that revealed its fundamental limita - tions. Even though this crisis-ridden state is often depicted as “the modern state” of Egypt, it can be dubbed the “old state” because it quickly proved outdated, lacking the capacity to address problems and deliver solutions. It was at the heart of the political breakdown in Egypt through the 2011 uprising. Although it evolved over time, this old state retained three primary features in its constitutional and legal structures and its political behavior: elitism and centralism, authoritarian guardianship, and violence. Elitism and Centralism The old state was dominated by power elites grouped within the military, secu - rity, and bureaucratic institutions. Historically speaking, over the last quarter of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century, the elites who dominated Egypt’s econ - omy and were largely responsible for the state’s modernization, such as the landed aristocracy, commercial and industrial bourgeoisie, and the business class, partnered with state elites in a marriage of convenience. When Gamal An entirely new structural approach must be taken if Egypt is to establish a democratic and effective state and political system. 6 | Egypt’s Post-Mubarak Predicament Abdel Nasser and his military elite came to power in 1952, the power balance shifted to the state elites. The new government installed a state-led, paternalistic mode of production, which obstructed the development of self-aware and empowered social groups and a clear class structure. Any political or social institutions that sought to articulate or represent the wishes and interests of the grass roots were co-opted by the state elites and incorporated within the existing, elite-dominated struc - ture in a top-down fashion using a complicated system of administrative and legal control, police intimidation and monitoring, and political patronage and clientelism. Political corporatism prevailed. The state was not a totalitarian “big brother.” Civil society and a small mar - gin of popular political representation did exist, particularly with the policy of political liberalization under Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak. But civil soci - ety was always controlled. The state was the predominant political and social actor in the country. Modernization projects that were not led by the state were for all practical purposes nonexistent because it was impossible to drum up popular support for them. Upper-crust Egyptians either tried to find ways to manipulate the state to meet their socioeconomic interests or simply accepted being co-opted by the state if doing so was more suitable for their interests. Traditional forces in rural and semi-rural areas, such as family groups, clans, and tribes, behaved simi - larly. The state’s political system was for all intents and purposes a forum for incorporating these classes and groups and allocating patronage. Disempowered and lower classes looked to the state as the key patriarchal modernizer that tended to the interests of all. Since Nasser’s time, the main - stream labor or peasant movements did not think about reconfiguring the state-led political economy but rather pressured the state to make good on its moral and populist duties and promises of economic egalitarianism. Authoritarian Guardianship Despite regime changes over the last two centuries, the old state retained its status in Egypt as the sole agent of social and economic modernization and progress as well as its place as the exclusive protector of Egyptian national identity. The state was the guardian of a society that was otherwise backward, underdeveloped, and unruly. The state guided the economy in a paternalistic way and in partnership with the private sector when necessary. This became particularly clear under Mubarak’s oligarchic crony capitalism. In this unbalanced state-society relationship, different social forces, actors, groups, classes, and agencies were not allowed to compete for power or repre - sent their own interests, demands, or worldviews. The diversity and plurality of interests, viewpoints, and even identities was overlooked. The state blocked Ashraf El-Sherif | 7 effective political competition and pluralism by denying rights of independent organization, representation, participation, and expression. Myriad legal and administrative mechanisms restricted activism that the constitution might have nominally tolerated. Instead, the military and civilian bureaucracy technocratically managed the state and the society. This state bureaucracy was above social and class conflicts (essentially, above politics) and had the national mandate to decide on public policies in the name of the national interest. That national interest was defined exclusively by the state elites, morally and politically acting as the guardians of the people. Leaders cited Egypt’s paternalistic culture and doctrines of state custodianship and tutelage to justify the system. The “people” were merely the objects of state public policies. In practice, this meant the death of politics. Violence State institutions used violence to discipline Egyptians. State violence ranged from the legal to the extra-legal and was at times employed with fatal results. The state also proved unable to protect the lives of Egyptian citizens, for example, in cases of political and social unrest as well as symbolic violence against women and religious and ethnic minorities (such as Copts, Bedouins, and Nubians). Old State Failures Today These three structural features of the modern authoritarian Egyptian state per - sisted throughout the second half of the twentieth century and were codified in constitutions and laws. No less importantly, they were enshrined in the state elites’ and the masses’ political imagination and policymaking processes. This overdose of state authoritarianism could have been justified if it man - aged to introduce significant achievements. Many authoritarian regimes in other parts of the world have developed their countries. But this was not the case in Egypt. The old state was both undemocratic and unable to bring about development. Rule of law by even the most conservative definition was absent, in terms of not just favoritism and arbitrariness in law enforcement but also the declining quality of regulative capacity, especially under Mubarak. The state did not achieve sustainable economic development or wealth-generating indus - trialization, there were no competent state institutions, unemployment soared, poverty spread, food insecurity increased, rent-based activities prevailed, bud - get deficits ballooned, urban slums and shantytowns swelled, and the educa - tional system collapsed. Negligence was evident in the deteriorating quality of public utilities and basic service provision as well. By the end of Mubarak’s rule, Egypt ranked low in human development reports assessing living stan - dards, quality of life, and access to basic needs such as housing, food, educa - tion, and healthcare. Many Egyptians also died in traffic accidents each year thanks to poor government implementation of transportation regulations.
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