Greco-Italian relations in the early 20th century[edit] Ever since Italian unification, Italy had aspired to Great Power status and Mediterranean hegemony. Under the Fascist regime, the establishment of a new Roman Empire, including Greece, was often proclaimed by Mussolini. In the 1910s, Italian and Greek interests were already clashing over Albania and the Dodecanese. Albania, Greeces northwestern neighbour, was, from its establishment, effectively an Italian protectorate. Both Albania and Greece claimed Northern Epirus, inhabited by a large[15] Greek population. Furthermore, Italy had occupied the predominantly Greek-inhabited Dodecanese islands in the southeastern Aegean since the Italo-Turkish War of 1912. Although Italy promised their return in the 1919 Venizelos–Tittoni accords, it later reneged on the agreement.[16] Clashes between the two countries forces occurred during the occupation of Anatolia. In its aftermath, the new Fascist government, headed by Mussolini, used the murder of an Italian general at the Greco-Albanian border to bombard and occupy Corfu, the most important of the Ionian Islands. These islands, which had been under Venetian rule until the late 18th century, was a target of Italian expansionism. A period of normalization followed, especially under the premiership of Eleftherios Venizelos in Greece from 1928 to 1932, and the signing of a friendship agreement between the two countries on 23 September 1928. In 1936, the 4th of August Regime came to power under the leadership of Ioannis Metaxas. Plans were laid down for the reorganization of the countrys armed forces, including a fortified defensive line along the Greco-Bulgarian frontier, which would be named the Metaxas Line. In the following years, great investments were made to modernize the army. It was technologically upgraded, largely re-equipped, and, as a whole, dramatically improved from its previous deplorable state. Additionally, the Greek government purchased new arms for its three armies. However, due to increasing threats and the eventual outbreak of war, the most significant purchases from abroad, made from 1938 to 1939, were never or only partially delivered. A massive contingency plan was developed, and great amounts of food and utilities were stockpiled in many parts of the country for use in the event of war. Diplomatic and military developments in 1939–1940[edit] Trench construction in the Elaia-Kalamas line by Greek soldiers, March 1939. On 7 April 1939, Italian troops occupied Albania, gaining an immediate land border with Greece. This action led to a British and French guarantee for the territorial integrity of Greece. For the Greeks, however, this development canceled all previous plans, and hasty preparations were made to defend against an Italian attack. As war exploded in Central Europe, Metaxas tried to keep Greece out of the conflict, but, as it progressed, he felt increasingly closer to the United Kingdom, encouraged by the ardent anglophile King George II, who provided the main support for the regime. This was ironic, for Metaxas, who had always been a Germanophile, had built strong economic ties with Hitlers Germany.[12] At the same time, the Italians, especially the governor of Albania, Francesco Jacomoni, began using the issue of the Cham Albanian minority in Greek Epirus as a means to rally Albanian support. Although Albanian enthusiasm for the liberation of Chameria was muted, Jacomoni sent repeated overoptimistic reports to Rome on Albanian support.[17] In June 1940, the headless body of Daut Hoxha, an Albanian Cham patriot, was discovered near the village of Vrina.[18] Jacomoni blamed his murder on Greek secret agents and, as the possibility of an Italian attack on Greece drew nearer, he began arming Albanian irregular bands to be used against Greece.[17] Soon after the fall of France, Mussolini set his sights on Greece. According to 3 July 1940 entry in the diary of his son-in-law and foreign minister, Count Galeazzo Ciano: ...British ships, perhaps even aircraft, are sheltered and refueled in Greece. Mussolini is enraged. He has decided to act. By 11 August, the decision for war had been taken: Mussolini continues to talk about a lightning attack into Greece at about the end of September.[19] Mussolini revealed in his private comment to his son-in-law, Count Ciano: Hitler always faces me with a fait accompli. This time I am going to pay him back in his own coin. He will find out from the newspapers that I have occupied Greece.[20] In the meantime, the original Italian plan of attacking Yugoslavia was shelved due to German opposition and lack of the necessary transport.[21] A propaganda campaign against Greece was launched in Italy and repeated acts of provocation were carried out, such as overflights of Greek territory and attacks by aircraft on Greek naval vessels. These reached their peak with the torpedoing and sinking of the Greek light cruiser Elli by the submarine Delfino in Tinos harbor on 15 August 1940, a national religious holiday. Despite undeniable evidence of Italian responsibility, the Greek government announced that the attack had been carried out by a submarine of unknown nationality.[12] Although the facade of neutrality was preserved, the people were well aware of the real perpetrators, accusing Mussolini and his Foreign Minister Count Ciano.[22] On 12 October 1940, the Germans occupied the Romanian oil fields. Mussolini, who was not informed in advance, was infuriated by this action, regarding it as a German encroachment on southeastern Europe, an area Italy claimed as its exclusive sphere of influence. Three days later, Mussolini ordered a meeting in Rome to discuss the invasion of Greece. Only the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Pietro Badoglio, voiced objections, citing the need to assemble a force of at least 20 divisions prior to invasion. However, the local commander in Albania, Lt. Gen. Sebastiano Visconti Prasca, argued that only three further divisions would be needed, and these only after the first phase of the offensive, capturing Epirus, had been completed. Mussolini was reassured by his staff that the war in Greece would be a campaign of two weeks. This overconfidence explains why Mussolini felt he could let 300,000 troops and 600,000 reservists go home for the harvest just before the invasion.[12][23] There were supposed to be 1,750 lorries used in the invasion, but only 107 turned up. The number of divisions was inflated because Mussolini had switched from three- to two-brigade divisions. Lt. Gen. Prasca knew he would lose his command if more than five divisions were sent, so he convinced Mussolini that five were all he needed.[24] Foreign Minister Ciano, who said that he could rely on the support of several easily corruptible Greek personalities, was assigned to find a casus belli.[25] The following week Tsar Boris III of Bulgaria was invited to take part in the coming action against Greece, but he refused Mussolinis invitation.[12] The possibility that Greek personalities, as well as Greek officials situated in the front area, could be corrupted or not react to an invasion, proved to be mostly internal propaganda used by Italians generals and personalities in favour to a military intervention;[12] the same was true for an alleged revolt of the Albanian minority living in Chameria, located in the Greek territory immediately behind the boundary, which would break out after the beginning of the attack.[12]
Posted on: Sat, 26 Oct 2013 21:47:41 +0000
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