How can it be that equally intelligent and well-trained philosophers can disagree about the freedom of the will or nominalism or the covering-law model of scientific explanation when each is aware of all of the arguments and distinctions and other relevant considerations that the others are aware of? How-and now I will drop a broad hint about where I am going-how can we philosophers possibly regard ourselves as justified in believing much of anything of philosophical significance in this embarrassing circumstance? How can I believe (as I do) that free will is incompatible with determinism or that unrealized possibilities are not physical objects or that human beings are not four-dimensional things extended in time as well as in space, when David Lewis-a philosopher of truly formidable intelligence and insight and ability-rejects these things I believe and is already aware of and understands perfectly every argument that I could produce in their defense? - Peter van Inwagen
Posted on: Tue, 28 Oct 2014 10:33:35 +0000
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